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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
Jewish Society in Israel consists of a wide-ranging 
mixture of ethnic, racial and religious groups. For the 
sake of convenience, they may be classified into the 
Ashkenazic Jews of European and Russian origin, Sephardim 
of Spanish and later North African origins, Jews of Middle- 
Eastern and Balkano origins, and the Oriental Jews of West 
Asian origin (Iran, India, Kurdistan, etc.).
Social conflicts have arisen between these groups for 
many complex reasons. During July through September of 
1973 I had the opportunity to study these problems through 
the sponsorship of the World Sephardi Federation. Depend­
ing upon one's point of view, Israeli social problems stem 
from racial discrimination to the gross national product. 
Solutions are often unimaginative and repeat mistakes 
already made in other countries. Observation led me to 
believe that possible solutions to some of these problems 
may derive from the application of basic social and physi­
cal planning concepts, which will be explored later.
Expressing the weight of their numbers, organization, 
and economic and political power, Ashkenazim have directed
1
2the Zionist movement and international Jewish organizations 
ever since their inception. For the most part, Oriental 
and Sephardi Jews were unable to play an active role in the 
Zionist movement for political, geographic and a number of 
other reasons. As a result, when they arrived in Israel 
many were placed in "development areas", primarily new towns 
without an economic base and located in high-risk border areas. 
They simultaneously arrived at a time when the provision of 
decent accommodations for newcomers was very low on the list 
of national priorities.
In present day Israel more than twenty percent of the 
population lives below the accepted poverty line. Although 
there are "haves" and "have-nots" in all countries, ninety 
percent of the latter in Israel belong to Sephardi and 
Oriental communities. The problem, therefore, becomes com­
munal as well as economic. Many of these families suffer 
malnutrition, inadequate housing and minimal educational 
opportunities. Consequently, seventy percent of the juve­
nile delinquents in Israel come from these same communities. 
Most are functionally illiterate and 30,000 of these juvi- 
niles have police records.
Poverty of this type is self-perpetuating and is 
well on the way to creating a permanent sub-class in Israel 
distinguished by semi-racial characteristics. Equal oppor­
tunity is meaningless to most members of a group who are 
ill-equipped to break exclusionary patterns and enter the
3
mainstream of Israeli society dominated by Western education 
and manners. Israeli society has largely accepted the notion 
that in order to attract new immigrants from Western coun­
tries, who possess occupational skills vital to Israeli 
society, special opportunities and incentives will have to 
be provided. The Israeli Government, at the same time, 
responded to comparable yet lesser demands for housing and 
jobs from its own poor and long-time citizens by suggesting 
that they should patiently wait. As a result, the disadvan­
taged communities have displayed increasing antagonism 
towards olim (immigrants in residence three years or less) 
from Russia and the West because of the privileges granted 
to them.
The problem of national integration between Sephardic 
and Ashkenazic Jews is one of the crucial challenges facing 
Israeli society. There are many gaps in education, housing, 
income distribution, and political representation between 
these two groups. Sephardic families earn less than 
Ashkenazic ones, most families living in slums and crowded 
housing are Sephardic, the percentage of Sephardic children 
in high schools and universities relative to the total popu­
lation is low, the poorer development towns are mainly 
Sephardic, new immigrants get better apartments than many 
who have been in Israel for more than twenty years, and most 
of Israel's welfare recipients and 350,000 people living 
below the poverty level are Sephardim or Orientals.
In seeking causes for the above disparities, many
4organized and individual Sephardo-Orientals accuse the 
government of discrimination, which is to simplify the 
problem - even though criticism of government social policy 
is legitimate. A large proportion of Sephardic immigrants 
to Israel were unskilled and illiterate. As a result, a 
major reason for their lower average income is due to dis­
advantages in skills and education. Another major factor 
behind social problems is that the majority of Sephardic 
and Oriental Jews are relative newcomers in Israel. In any 
country older immigrants have a temporary economic advantage 
over newer ones. In any case, a large proportion of the 
Sephardic community has advanced rapidly on economic, social 
and political levels while a large minority has remained 
below the poverty line. An even larger proportion would 
have achieved an average living standard had family size not 
interfered. Large families only compound problems such as 
housing and tend to inhibit the development of children in 
school.
Those who protest government policies are right to 
demand more energetic efforts to provide better opportu­
nities for educational and economic advancement. It is 
incorrect, in many instances, to analyze the problem of 
communal gaps strictly in terms of discrimination. The 
plight of uneducated, unskilled, welfare recipients and slum 
dwellers requires more investment and imagination in the 
quest for solutions.
This thesis, therefore, focuses upon the detailed
5nature and causes of communal gaps between various social 
groups in Israel. In addition, approaches are explored 
aimed at diminishing inequality of opportunities for various 
ethnic groups in Israeli society.
CHAPTER II
BACKGROUND
Immigration to Israel varied greatly according to 
country of origin and time of entry. Immigrants from Moslem 
countries were economically, culturally, and politically ill- 
equipped for what they found in Israel. With different 
family structures, they were not prepared to change, but 
rather to perpetuate their existing cultures. Certainly 
they had no desire to assimilate any aspect of a Western 
style of life. Coming as they did, for the most part, from 
countries still lagging far behind in technological develop­
ment, Sephardic and Oriental immigrants have entered the 
lower socio-economic strata of an Israeli society with politi­
cal, social and economic patterns determined by European set­
tlers .
The period of immigrant arrival was an important 
factor in creating current social problems. Depending upon 
when one arrived, individual development was often intimately 
tied to the political, ideological and economic development 
of overall Israeli society. Those who came to Palestine 
during the Mandate Period (1917-1948) were generally equipp­
ed with appropriate ideological connections even before ar­
rival; they came to settle the land. In pre-1948 Palestine 
and for part of the post-1948 period, the process of bring­
6
7ing in new immigrants involved adapting the economy to their 
integration, while at the same time modifying their occupa­
tional, economic and social patterns. An economic and oc­
cupational realignment was required, reversing the conven­
tional trend and reinstituting a movement from town to 
country and from tertiary occupations (service, merchants, 
clerical) to secondary (industrial) and primary (agri­
cultural) ones.
After the establishment of the State, authorities 
had to take charge of directing the sudden influx of new im­
migrants to various locations. Some were sent to immigrant 
moshavim and kibbutzim (collective agricultural settlements) 
while others were referred to development towns. This was 
only an initial distribution and the newcomers were subse­
quently free to choose their own places of residence. The 
pattern generally seemed to occur as in Table I.
Table I indicates that the greatest disparity in 
settlement patterns lies between those from Moslem countries 
and Europe. The late arrival of the former precluded a role 
in the development of the economy or institutions. Whereas 
the economy was somewhat adapted to new immigrants, it was 
really an adaptation to European immigrants. By the time 
the Sephardic and Oriental immigrants arrived, the Europeans 
had gone through a "rural cycle", where they had temporarily 
sacrificed their tertiary occupations for primary ones.
Their later moves to cities and development towns were in
8pursuit of greater economic opportunities, generally based 
upon earlier occupational training, prior to coming to 
Israel. The economy did not, however, adapt to later non- 
European immigrants because there was not much to adapt to. 
The paucity of their occupational skills did not allow much 
flexibility in adaptation to new economic life in Israel. 
They were placed in moshavim, often as laborers, or else in 
poor development towns. Those who later moved to cities had 
not achieved new political or economic skills along the way.
TABLE I
IMMIGRATION BY PERIOD, COUNTRY OF ORIGIN 
AND TYPE OF SETTLEMENT PROPENSITY1
Place of Origin
Until 1933 
Pioneering 
Selective
1933-1948
Non-Se-
lective
1948 Onwards 
Mass Immigra­
tion initial 
direction Subsequent
Eastern Europe Rural Set­
tlements
Moshavot Development 
town or moshav
City and de­
velopment town
Western Europe Rural Set­
tlements
City — —
Moslem Countries ” Development 
town or moshav
City and de­
velopment town
Though Table I uses the term development towns, no 
indication is given of the wide variations which exist be­
tween these areas. The Europeans moved to development
'''Alexander Berlier, New Towns in Israel (Jerusalem: 
Israel Universities Press, 1970), p.4.
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towns for economic opportunities, such as Ashkelon and 
Ashdod, with advanced port and shipping junctions, or Arad, 
with a number of chemical industries; these towns are eco­
nomically viable. Sephardic immigrants, on the other hand, 
were often placed in poor towns, such as Dimona, Mitzpeh 
Ramon or Beit Shean. Often placed in border areas, these 
poorer towns have little economic viability, since the 
reason for their existence is artificial and their geo­
graphic site arbitrary. Their inhabitants were placed there 
by the government upon arrival as a means of settling other­
wise undesirable areas. They remain there because they have 
little to offer somewhere else and, therefore, no prospect 
for improving themselves.
Israel has always been an ideological country, 
especially during its earlier years. The choice of ideology 
and level of one's ideological understanding were often the 
keys to success. Although some may view religion as an 
ideology, political and social ideology shaped the structure 
of modern Israel. Country of origin was often the determi­
nant of one's ideological involvement.
The Jewish communities from which the immigrants 
came were of three types:
1. Eastern Europe - Jews were mainly engaged in 
"neutral" occupations, neither industry nor agriculture, but 
dependent upon rural areas for supplies and on the towns for 
customers. They also resided in fringe areas (neither urban
10
nor rural). The occasional militant ostracism they 
received from non-Jews only strengthened this behavior pat­
tern. The result was a synthesis between rural society and 
an urban occupational structure and culture which character­
ized the shtetl (or small, only Jewish towns). Some Jews 
moved to major cities where they established communities in 
segregated neighborhoods.
2. Western Europe - Here the Jews were more inte­
grated because of a more powerful urbanization process.
Since Western cities were much more developed they found 
far greater economic opportunities in liberal professions, 
industrial-administrative positions, and the mercantile 
trades.
3. Moslem Countries - The situation here was dif­
ferent from both Eastern and Western Europe. Here the dis­
tribution of Jews was similar to the indigenous population, 
with a high percentage of the population found in the cities. 
Significantly, there was a high degree of polarization with­
in the Jewish community between a small wealthy elite and
an impoverished majority. The Jewish population in these 
countries, unfortunately, resembled the non-Jewish one in 
terms of social and economic backwardness, typical of under­
developed countries.
The impact of background upon present day circum­
stances is striking. Jews from Moslem countries are 
deficient in political know-how and have no leadership 
positions or models in modern Israel. The majority of Jews
11
from Moslem countries had, and still have, no communication 
with Zionism or Zionist education. Zionism implies an 
entire doctrine concerning the voluntary regeneration of 
the Jewish people in its own land. Yet, whoever settles in 
Israel is not necessarily a Zionist. One must subscribe 
to the Zionist ideology to be considered as one. Zionism 
is essentially a secular movement rooted in a modern 
ideological conception of people and homeland. From the 
ideological point of view, the majority of Oriental Jews 
are not Zionists.
The migration to Israel of Jews from Oriental 
countries was due to their ties with Judaism rather than 
Zionism. This link to Judaism and thus, to the land of 
Israel, has diminished in second and third generation 
Oriental communities. Attachment to heritage is becoming 
continually weaker with the rise of new generations who 
have grown up in an atmosphere which is free and uncompli­
cated in its attitudes.
Jewish society in Israel continually builds on a 
foundation of technology and progress regarded as ideology, 
rather than Judaism. As long as this technological culture 
continues to exist Sephardic and Oriental Jews will find 
themselves on the bottom of society. While many Oriental 
Jews may succeed in entering the technological and admini­
strative elite, they would only be solving their own per­
sonal problems and not those of their community as a whole.
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The heritage of the Eastern European shtetl still 
affects the tenor of life in Israel. That heritage was a 
revulsion against caste and privilege and a positive com­
mitment to social welfare and egalitarianism. Life was with 
the people and the source of strength was human solidarity. 
When East European immigrants came to Israel, therefore, 
they immediately adapted to the prevailing forces of Zionist 
and Socialist thought, whether previously familiar with it 
or not. From the ideological point of view, North African 
Jewry was very poorly prepared for immigration to Israel.
In Tunisia and Algeria the Zionist movement could express 
itself freely during the period of French presence. In 
Morocco, however, the country that provided the largest 
number of North African immigrants, the Zionist Movement 
was tolerated but never legally recognized by the French; 
the Zionists were obliged to act with discretion. This 
lack of ideological preparation is at the root of many of 
the difficulties encountered by North African Jews on their 
arrival in Israel.
The Oriental immigrants brought with them tradi­
tional patterns of Jewish life which had been relatively 
unaffected by ideological currents, such as those which had 
swept through European Jewry. In the fact of their 
Jewishness, the Oriental and Sephardic Jews see a common 
bond with their Ashkenazi brethren as the key to their 
acceptance into Israeli society. In addition, Orientals
13
are anxious to distinguish themselves from Arabs, and they 
are accordingly likely to stress their Jewishness.
In examining the historical development of Israeli 
ideology it is important to note that the first wave of 
immigrants (pre-1930) was crucial in later development.
They developed a pattern of politics and society that became 
the national character; all those who followed had to fit 
this pattern.
As in America, the first waves of immigrants developed 
a set of attitudes and values so powerful that even 
today, when the passage from pioneer society to modern 
industrial state is nearly complete, one still associ­
ates them with Israeli politics and manners. It will 
suffice to mention a few examples: 1) the party system 
and its unique centrality in political life; 2) the 
strong belief in equality; 3) the continuing informali­
ty and simplicity in manners, dress, and language;
4) the agrarian ritual; 5) the belief in voluntary 
action; and 6) the notion of an official (Zionist) 
state ideology.
In a way, all this has created problems because of 
conflicts between values, ideologies, and realities.
Through Zionism's rural ethic, many of Israel's present 
values are rooted in a modern type of farm life which 
stresses the importance of physical work. The Israeli 
village fostered many important ideas - the social image of 
equality, respect for physical work, belief in changing the 
face of nature through human efforts, and looking toward 
development as a community responsibility.
Amos Elon, Israelis: Founders and Sons, (New York: 
Bantam Books, 1971), P.191.
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As Israel developed so grew its urban population 
at a time when emphasis was not placed on how a city should 
be built. Ideologically the city in Israel was considered 
unimportant. While rural lands were being held as public 
property, private persons acquired large areas in the cities 
for speculation. While in the West property dominated 
social and political thought, in Israel private property 
had been reduced to virtual insignificance.
In retrospect, the Zionist challenge was all em­
bracing. It not only rejected long established notions 
concerning Jewish identity but also tried to abolish its 
secondary characteristics, such as its predominantly urban 
character. The early Jewish settlements, therefore, at­
tracted people inspired by purely ideological motives of 
return to the land and egalitarianism. Although the latter 
was always deeply imbedded in ideology, equality has become 
a touchy issue in Israel because of importation of poverty 
and ignorance from areas where ideological models did not 
apply. The Zionist mystique of "return to the land" did 
not appeal to people who had lived on the land and were 
anxious to move to cities. The goal of a national economy 
owned by the workers through their trade unions had little 
effect upon Afro-Asian immigrants who were refugees and not 
ideologists.
The establishment of the State of Israel was con­
nected with three major processes - the influx of new
15
immigrants, the differentiation of the socioeconomic 
structure, and the transformation of the pioneering elite 
into the ruling elite. The continuity of the process of 
developing a collective identity has become a major problem 
due to continued shifts in these processes.
The changing structural position of the elite con­
stituted the focal point of these problems. The ruling 
elite has emphasized that its legitimacy depends upon an 
adherence to various "movement" symbols and viewed them­
selves as responsible for implementing major collective 
goals inherent in the "movement" ideology. The ruling 
elite maintained and intensified adherence to the pione­
ering-socialist ideology. Adherence to their policies was 
guided by a system of reward allocation achieved through 
the major collective organizations, such as government it­
self, the Histadrut (the General Labor Federation), and 
various settlement organizations. The elite, through its 
system of rewards, counteracted tendencies toward autonomy 
by different educational, professional, and occupational
groups, thereby minimizing status differentials that tended
3to develop between various groups.
Major problems have arisen as to how the pioneer 
image could continue to be the sole focus of identity and 3
3 S.N. Eisenstadt, Integration and Development m 
Israel (New York: Praeger Press, 1970) , pp. 678-679.
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how its bearers could retain exclusive elite status. In 
an attempt to develop an "Israeli" identity the "pioneers" 
and their successors tended to gloss over potential cleavages 
between religious and secular groups, traditional and modern, 
and between different ethnic traditions or cultural orien­
tations .
With Israel's growth, for the most part, into a 
Western country, changes have occurred in the strength of 
its pioneering tradition and adherence to Zionist ideology. 
Such changes can also be found in other modern societies 
whose formative stages were ideological. Israel's future 
social struggle lies in the extent to which commitments to 
a collective ideology, through which it was hoped to forge 
a modern Israeli culture, can be maintained in light of 
technological and westernizing forces which threaten to
erode it.
CHAPTER III
SOCIAL COMPONENTS OF ETHNIC RELATIONS IN ISRAEL
Large cities have always provided crucial gateways 
towards modernization in developing countries and they play 
a leading role in breaking rural migrants away from tradi­
tional social practices. Migrants to the city are more 
likely to be receptive to social change by being exposed to 
a heterogenous population. Both domestic and international 
movements of population to cities can be attributed to an 
economic "push" from the land and a "pull" attraction of 
city living.
Migrants to Israel responded to "pushes" and "pulls" 
which were spiritual, ideological, and nationalistic, rather 
than economic and social. Uniquely, the majority of im­
migrants to Israel came from urban environments in their na­
tive countries and went to rural environments in Israel.
Even though the cities of North Africa differed greatly from 
those of Europe in terms of complexity and economic base, 
they were all urban environments. As pointed out in 
Chapter II, more universal forces of migration became 
operational in Israel after 1953. This is where social 
analysts in Israel often miss the point of origin to modern
17
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day social problems.
Changes have occurred in Israeli patterns of domes­
tic migration since 1948 (see Table I). A major issue con­
cerns a sizeable population which has not yet attained 
either a stable residence or a stable source of employment. 
Rural-to-urban migrants in Israel have faced major societal 
changes, experiencing problems similar to migrants in other 
developing countries. Some of these problems include the 
breakdown of clan structure and abandonment of traditional 
values; breakdown of the extended family and the development 
of conflicts and misunderstandings within the family; in­
stability of a society in flux; lack of education; conflicts 
between children who are in school and parents who never 
went; lack of understanding between educated parents and 
children who have acquired new outlooks and values; con­
flicts between husband and wife, when either begins to de­
mand new standards; the rejection of traditional values and 
customs by individuals not yet able to adapt to new ways; 
poverty, overcrowding and malnutrition; and imitation of 
Western standards and behavior without a real understanding 
of them.^
A question arises which remains to be explored: is 
it desirable for Israel's population to be composed of
4Mt. Carmel Int'l Training Center For Community 
Services, International Seminar on Social & Cultural 
Integration in Urban Areas (Haifa, 1964), p.134.
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ethnic blocs grouped according to country of origin or does 
such a composition impede effective reconstruction of a new 
population? On the one hand, this rather ethnically homo­
genous settlement pattern makes it difficult to utilize 
various waves of immigration and different ethnic groups as 
components in building a larger society, since it offers a 
reward to the more ethnically cohesive areas through the 
political process. On the other hand, if the various ethnic 
groups are inter-mixed and forced to integrate, they might 
lose necessary mutual support, available through social 
solidarity, which assists new-comers in adapting to a new 
society. There are elements of both alternatives currently 
operating in Israel. It becomes important to first under­
stand those social elements which create diversity and con­
flict and those which minimize diversity and foster harmony. 
These forces are crucial in conceptualizing their inter­
action with and resolution through current and potential 
social and physical planning methods.
The Nature of Ethnic Relations in Israel
Ethnic relations in Israel are exacerbated by the 
complexity of defining clear-cut problem areas. There are 
multiple factors which both impede and promote integration 
of Jewish ethnic groups in Israel. It becomes difficult to 
say that one factor clearly promotes integration while 
another only impedes it. Rather, one must weigh the dif­
ferent impacts of these factors on society as a whole. One
20
could say, for example, that differences in ethnic back­
ground have been a major impediment to social integration in 
Israel. Although all Jews share the same language (after 
immigration) and religion they differ in dress, how they re­
late to each other, in socialization patterns and family 
structure. One often hears claims in Israel about how primi­
tive were the Moroccan Jews while the Western and European 
Jews belonged to the most advanced middle-class of Western 
society. People often find it easier to cope with these 
extreme examples, though they be factually incorrect. Most 
Orientals are really quite close to a modern life-style, 
while many Europeans left environments only in the begin­
ning stages of modernization, such as in the rural parts of 
Eastern Europe. It should be emphasized, nevertheless, that 
Israel contains a large variety of ethnic behavior patterns. 
These differences are significant where close contact and 
coordination are necessary such as in schools, factories, 
the army and when political issues have to be decided.
Religion also plays an important role in Israel and 
could work either way with respect to ethnic relations.
There have been many differences among people in Israeli 
(Jewish) society over matters of religious observance and 
administration of the educational system. The meaning 
attached to religious symbols and events, such as the 
Bibical Exodus from Egypt, or such rituals as fasting, is 
quite varied depending upon background. Whatever the nature 
of observance, however, the same symbols are meaningful to
21
everyone. Differences arise in the degree to which people 
are prepared to act upon them. Because of religious dif­
ferences, there are those who would completely separate 
themselves from the mainstream of Israeli society, while 
there are others who view these symbols as a unifying force.
Another major area for consideration is the con­
siderable correlation of ethnic background with economic 
and demographic characteristics. Issues which would be de­
fined in ethnically homogenous societies as class differ­
ences have implicit ethnic elements in Israel. While such 
statistics as income levels would seemingly indicate a 
clear-cut issue of the "haves" vs. "have-nots", there are 
other factors which would preclude clear impacts. The 
majority of Europeans immigrated prior to 1948 and seniority, 
besides ethnicity, plays a vital role in determining one's 
social position, as it would in any immigrant society.
Those who have been in the country longer have had greater 
time and opportunity to gain more prestigious positions and 
more desirable housing. Thus we find that status differ­
entials and ecological differentiation overlap with ethnic 
background. Once again, in the political process, the ad­
vancement of Orientals to leadership positions is quite 
selective. They are, therefore, less prominent in national 
politics but well represented in local politics when 
Orientals comprise the majority in a given locale.
While the overlap between socioeconomic status and
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ethnic background is an aggravating factor in ethnic re­
lations, it is in the dynamic development of the Israeli 
economy that improved ethnic integration is hoped for. The 
twenty-eight years of Israels' existence has been a period 
of rapid expansion. Although population expanded, resources 
such as land, capital, expertise and power expanded even 
more rapidly. While the gap between average income of old- 
timers and newcomers widened during the 1950's, this trend 
was reversed in the 1960's; the gap has diminished steadily, 
although slowly, since then.
Established Israelis, who are predominantly of 
European origin, did not lose economically in sharing with 
later immigrants, but actually prospered in the process due 
to the enormous increase in resources which became available. 
The economics of ethnic relations in Israel, therefore, was 
more a mixed sharing of economic benefits. Jews of European 
origin not only gained economically from the influx of 
Oriental Jews, but successive waves of immigration also 
increased social mobility. As the newcomers took over the 
lowest positions, more powerful and rewarding roles opened 
up for the old-timers. Furthermore, the establishment of 
the State, with all of its government branches and agencies, 
provided new careers for which the better educated, more 
experienced Europeans were natural candidates. While the 
Europeans benefited, so did the Orientals who attained in­
come and standards-of-living well beyond what they possessed 
in their countries of origin.
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Components Of Culture That Create Diversity
From the early days of the State of Israel, the sub­
ject of unity vs. diversity has been debated. To what ex­
tent should the process of cultural integration aim at pro­
ducing a level of uniformity as opposed to preserving the 
traditions that each group developed in its previous en­
vironment? Unity is always desirable for a nation, yet each 
diverse element offers a special contribution to national 
culture.
Immigration to Israel since 1948 has added a great 
variety of cultural patterns to its society, although 
tensions and problems have inevitably developed. The roots 
of Israeli culture are firmly planted in Jewish tradition. 
This fact is fundamental to the educational system, the 
language, and in the general life-style of the country. The 
impact of tradition, however, is not uniform and it impacts 
differently upon religious and secular groups. Each Jewish 
community which came to Israel brought with it distinctive 
traditions. Emerging cultural expression in Israel, there­
fore, represents a synthesis, still in the process of for­
mation, of communal sub-cultures based on the common denom­
inator of Judaic heritage.
Various immigrant groups also brought with them 
unique identities. Attempts by these groups to resolve con­
flicts of interest with other groups found them shifting to
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ethnicity as an organizing principle through which they could 
make claims on the resources of the state. Specifically, 
Israel's ethnic relations can best be described in terms of 
two major relationships: (a) that between European/Western
and non-European/Oriental Jews, and (b) that between Jewish 
and non-Jewish (mainly Arab) groups. This is somewhat of an 
oversimplification. As noted in Table II, both the European 
and non-European Jewish groups are divided into many sub­
groups which differ in their language, level of education, 
income, life style and other characteristics. Although such 
simplification does not completely correspond to demographic 
reality, it does organize meaningfully the complex network 
of ethnic attitudes and relationships. Since the scope of 
this paper is limited, relations between Jewish and non- 
Jewish groups will not be dealt with.
Any society is based upon social values. Such values 
are preserved by tradition through generations, bound by 
family ties and certain societal groupings. Western mass 
urbanization has undermined the traditional and close human 
relationships prevailing in rural and less technological 
societies. Those groups who came to Israel were faced with 
the problem of resolving their values with a new modern 
society. Even though they may not have thought of themselves 
as belonging to a particular non-Jewish group in their native 
country, they soon found identification with an ethnic group 
as an important means of protecting their value systems.
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Needless to say, the development of Israeli society has be­
come an extensive network of ethnic groups, each protective 
of a value system and in conflict with others.
TABLE II
ETHNIC DISTRIBUTION OF THE JEWISH 
POPULATION IN ISRAEL5
European Descent Asian Descent
Total 57% Total 26%
U.S.S.R. 13 Iraq 11
Poland 17 Yemen, Aden 6
Rumania 11 Turkey 4
Balkans 4 Iran 2.5
Central Europe 6 Others 2.5
Western Europe 2
Others 4
American Descent African Descent
Total 1% Total 16%
North America 0.5 Morocco 9
Central and 
South America 0.5
Algeria, 
Tunisia 3
Libya 2
Egypt 1.5
Others 0.5
5Yochanan Peres, "Ethnic Relations in Israel", in M. 
Curtis (ed), People and Politics in the Middle East 
(Jerusalem: Keter Publishing, 1971), pp.34-39.
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At this point, we come back to the strategic efficacy
of ethnicity as an organizing principle.6 In the most 
natural way, those individuals low on the socioeconomic lad­
der who are of similar backgrounds have the best chance of 
changing the system, if they behave as a group. It is as a 
group that their struggle becomes not merely negation, but 
affirmation; not merely against the norms of some other group, 
but in favor of the already existing norms of its own group. 
Ethnic groups do often differ as to what is desirable and un­
desirable. By contrast, one of the difficulties of social 
class as an organizing principle is that there is not much 
conflict of norms between most social classes.
There is considerable heterogeneity within the 
Sephardic and Oriental sectors of Israeli society. Although 
many are in the lower socio-economic strata, there are wide 
differences in socio-economic status and educational back­
ground between immigrants from different countries and be­
tween those from rural as opposed to urban regions within the 
same country. Some immigrants came from peasant societies 
untouched by any technological development, while others had 
already been influenced by modernization before they left. 
While these differences do exist, the Sephardic and Oriental 
communities tend to regard themselves as underprivileged as
6Nathan Glazer and Daniel Moynihan, "Why Ethnicity?," 
Commentary, Vol. 58, No. 4, October, 1974, page 34.
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compared with the Ashkenazi community, which is seen as the 
dominant sector. With the psychology attendant on feeling 
"second-class", communal belonging is accordingly more 
central in the consciousness of Oriental communities than it 
is among Ashkenazi groups.
Communal "belongingness" among Sephardic and Oriental 
groups often manifests itself in the way people associate 
with each other. In their countries of origin, most Oriental 
Jews lived in a social structure based upon tribal associa­
tions, such as kinship groups or extended families. Upon 
arrival in Israel they sought to maintain such a social 
structure as a means of individual and community support 
during times of changing environments and values. This 
eventually became a losing battle as nuclear families, char­
acteristic of Western environments, became the dominant form 
of family structure in Israel. The changing forms of social 
structure certainly provided sources of conflict and tension. 
They created instability of norms and values particularly 
among the younger generation. The nuclear family could not 
provide the support, moral and otherwise, that extended 
families could. As a result, many within the Oriental com­
munity are seeking this support through association with a 
larger community of similar ethnic backgrounds, while at the 
same time finding themselves in opposition to those of dif-
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ferent backgrounds.
In spite of all this, one cannot say that the ex­
tended family is no longer a significant force in Israeli 
society. Rather, it remains a force finding itself increas­
ingly in conflict with other social forces. In fact, a 
typical feature of ethnic communities from Islamic countries 
is their adherence to the extended family structure. Coming 
to Israel as part of extended families, they continue to main­
tain intensive relations with kin.
This family structure leads to ethnic particularism 
with all its social and cultural effects. Studies have shown 
that close social relations outside the extended family circle 
seem to be more of a rarity, especially among the adult popu-
7lation. The combination of friends who are relatives and 
those who are not provides for a circle of acquaintances 
which may be considerable,but hardly varied either in ethnic 
affiliation or in the type of relations maintained. This, 
however, is much less characteristic of the younger Israeli- 
born generation than of the old-timers.
Problems of intracommunal and intercommunal conflict 
in Israel are quite similar to what has occurred in other 
developing nations. While many of the conflicts are either 
of a generational or ethnic nature, there are indications 
that the major source of conflict is based upon differences
Berlier, New Towns, p.144.7
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between modern, transitional and traditional peoples. In a 
study of Turkish society, Marshall Clinard found such intra-
communal and intercommunal conflicts.8 He found the lack of 
a stable community having norms of behavior recognized and 
supported by general consensus made itself acutely felt in 
parent-child relationships. The larger kinship group as a 
functioning unit has given way, in the cities, to the nuclear 
family consisting only of parents and children. Furthermore, 
occupational differentiation in urban centers has made pos­
sible the employment of married and unmarried women outside 
the home. These role changes have invariably altered the 
social status of women and affected interpersonal relation­
ships both within and outside the home.
Shifts in values, family roles, and community struc­
ture do not fully explain the problem of conflict between 
Oriental and European groups in Israel. As with the Turkish 
experience, such intercommunal conflicts go beyond ethnicity 
to involve those at different stages of the modernization 
process. Clinard defines this process as involving four 
variables seen as preconditions for modernization to occur: 
(1) cities - which function as urban centers to provide the 
physical and psychosocial conditions that set in motion the 
need for modernization and the facilities for bringing it
8Marshall B. Clinard, "The Absorption Problem of In- 
Migrants," in Noel Gist and Sylvia Fava, Urban Society (New 
York: Thomas Crowell Co., 1964), p.220.
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about; (2) literacy - preferably based upon a national 
education system (uniformity), the literacy rate among the 
general population must achieve sufficiently high levels;
(3) media participation - conditional upon literacy, the 
population must be involved with media communications net­
works to foster information exchange, elements of decision­
making, etc.; (4) political participation - people in a 
modern society must be capable of imagining themselves as 
part of the political process, making decisions of personal
political involvements at whatever level, based upon their
 9literacy and media participation.
Israel possesses all four variables at an advanced 
level, symbolic of advanced modernization. Consequently, 
those portions of the population who are more modern often 
find themselves in direct conflict with those groups which 
are more traditional. Those who are modern belong to a 
Westernized and urban society; they are literate, consumers 
of the mass media, capable of imagining themselves in 
varieties of situations beyond their immediate boundaries, 
and willing to formulate opinions and make judgments relative 
to public issues. The traditionals, on the other hand, are 
illiterate and nonparticipants. They are incapable of 
imaginatively projecting themselves beyond their immediate 9
9Ibid., p.222.
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milieu and are lacking in interest or opinions concerning 
problems of a community or social character.
The strong kinship structure of Sephardic and 
Oriental groups, which provides mutual support to its members, 
has helped ease problems of adjustment to changing social and 
economic conditions. At the same time, successful adjustment 
by one group often provokes resentment in other groups. Thus 
success for one group may produce disharmony and conflict 
in the community as a whole and, more importantly, with those 
outside the community of different origins. Minkowitz con­
cludes that:
...changes in the direction of social and economic 
modernization sometimes derive from efforts made by 
individuals or groups to cope with problems, feuds, 
rivalries, aspirations for prestige, etc., which 
originate from the older social structure; that is, 
the frame of reference in these new activities is 
still the traditional setting. While the end 
product of this course of events may sometimes be 
desirable in terminal modernization, it may also 
bring about a vicious circle where modern items may 
be absorbed into a traditional setting. Neglect of 
this possibility may lead to illusions about the 
process of modernization. These illusions may explain 
why apparently advanced communities (referring to 
rural settlements), which are thought to have made a 
good adjustment, suddenly and surprisingly collapse.
It is misleading to take superficial changes for
actual social modernization.10
In spite of the fact that immigration to Israel 
called for drastic changes in old social structures, social
10Moshe Minkovitz, "Old Conflicts in a New Environ­
ment: A Study of a Moroccan Atlas Mountains Community
Transplanted to Israel," Jewish Journal of Sociology, Vol.
9, 1967, p.191.
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background has had an immense influence on some important 
developments in the new environment. Settlers arrived with 
few possessions and left old environments where often the 
occupational structure provided few opportunities for Jews. 
They were 'absorbed' by agencies stressing equality in 
material support and in opportunities for social and econ­
omic mobility. They were sent to cooperative settlements 
which required membership in a larger community based upon 
entirely different modes of behavior. From a society in 
which success was based upon kinship relations and social 
class, they came to a society which emphasizes voluntary 
selection in social grouping and on achievements and qualifi­
cations as criteria for social evaluation, mobility, and job 
holding.
Previous social structure is elemental in explaining 
the attitudes towards present problems of adjustment which 
many Oriental and Sephardic Jews developed. Claims for 
economic and political equality are not so much the product 
of principles and social ideologies as they are the result 
of a desire to compensate for social deprivation in the past 
and for the frustration of hopes in the present. The policy 
of equality provided by the absorbing authorities was 
adopted by the less successful immigrants as the legitimate 
norm in their new environment. Thus, they view themselves 
as only defending their "natural rights" against the more 
successful members of society.
33
The correlation between lower social class and mem­
bership in Oriental ethnical groups is at the root of frus­
tration felt by those groups. Discrimination often causes 
sensitivity in the individual. The person feeling prejudice, 
whoever he may be, is never rational and the reaction to 
such prejudice is equally irrational. Some sociological 
theory maintains that ethnic conflict is simply the form that 
class conflict has been taking in recent decades. Other 
theorists say that ethnic conflicts must be decomposed into 
a variety of elements, including colonial conflicts, the 
uprising of the "internally colonized", the ambition of 
self-appointed leaders, and fashions and fads. A more 
realistic approach to the problem in Israel is to consider 
it as part of a system of interlinked developing and deve­
loped nations. As Moynihan and Glazer assert: "ethnic 
identity has become more salient, ethnic self-assertion 
stronger, and ethnic conflict more marked everywhere in the 
last twenty years. The reasons include the rise of the 
welfare state, the clash between egalitarianism and the 
differential achievement of norms, the growing heterogeneity 
of states, and the international system of communication."11
The traditional modes of life and feelings of being 
discriminated against only serve to isolate Sephardic and 
Oriental communities from the mainstream of Israeli life.
11Moynihan and Glazer, "Why Ethnicity," p.38.
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The isolation is both social and physical, as these groups 
usually live in clearly defined districts within a city, 
especially Jerusalem. Social isolationism is reinforced by 
spatial isolationism, reducing the type and quality of con­
tacts which diverse people in a city will have with each 
other. At least the possibilities of close relationships on 
the basis of social equality are greatly reduced. Instead, 
contacts tend to be formalized and confined mainly to the 
market place or work situation. People who work together 
on the job or who have contacts of a strictly economic 
character may live in entirely different social and sociologi­
cal worlds.
There is considerable theoretical and practical 
interest concerning the effects of contact on ethnic rela­
tions. Y. Amir has reviewed a large number of studies reve- 
vant to this problem and has concluded that the relationship 
is complex.12 Contact influences not only the direction of 
attitudes but also their intensity. Initially positive at­
titudes, for example, tend to become more positive and in­
itially negative attitudes tend to become more negative as a 
result of contact. Attitude change is specific and does not 
generalize to all attitudes held by members of ethnic groups 
about each other. Improved interpersonal attitudes are 
12 .Yehuda Amir, "Contact Hypothesis in Ethnic
Relations," Psychological Bulletin, Vol. 71, 1969, pp.319-342.
35
observed when there is equal status contact between the mem­
bers of the ethnic groups, when the contact is between mem­
bers of a majority group and higher status members of a min­
ority group, when the contact is intimate rather than casual, 
when the contact is rewarding and pleasant, and when the 
members of both ethnic groups reach some important goals as 
a result of such contact.
Unfavorable conditions for contact include situations 
that are competitive, when the contact is unpleasant, when 
the prestige of the group is lowered as a result of contact, 
when the members of one group are frustrated, when the groups 
have moral or ethical standards that are objectionable to one 
another, and when the members of the minority group are of 
lower status than members of the majority group.
There are probably many approaches to resolving 
ethnic conflict in Israeli Jewish society. All will require 
that as people integrate into a country and society they 
will slowly acquire similar cultural, social, and economic 
values and skills as a means of fostering communications and 
reducing conflicts between various groups.
Social Processes That Minimize Diversity
Ethnic conflict runs deep in Israeli society. From 
the very inception of 20th century settlement in Palestine, 
Zionist ideologists were intent on creating a resurrected 
Jewish state, based upon a new Hebrew culture and society 
but uniquely Israeli. Ongoing efforts to maintain a common
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culture, therefore, have become an important feature of 
Israeli life. The effort to physically and culturally in­
tegrate diverse Jewish immigrants into Israeli society has 
met with both success and failure. The mixed Israeli ex­
perience is not due to social processes unique to Israel, 
but to universal difficulties in bringing together people of 
differing social characteristics.
Acculturation, a long-term process whereby indivi­
duals acquire a new social organization, body of knowledge, 
and understanding of culture, begins in early stages of 
migration to a new environment. The problems created by 
migration and the motives that compel people to leave their 
homes and embark upon another way of life are fundamentally 
the same everywhere, be it from rural regions to urban 
centers, from cities to their suburbs, or from country to 
country.
The effort to find a place in a new society usually 
creates psychological strain among newcomers. Bitterness 
often arises from a feeling of not being accepted in the new 
environment. The distressed and embittered person often 
seeks escape in drinking, in venting hate on the community 
or the nation, and in other antisocial behavior. Some in­
dividuals opt otherwise - they attempt to hide their own 
ethnicity and move into another group that offers greater 
advantages. This process of absorption is extremely power­
ful; in the United States it is still a very important 
social process. Americans become more "American" and less
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ethnic all the time, only to return to being ethnic after 
they have achieved some measure of social and economic suc­
cess .
In adapting to a new way of life, migrating groups 
gradually lose their old way of life. Through assimilation 
minority groups incorporate into the fabric of the new host 
society, the end result often the loss of the minority's 
identity. Assimilation, however, does not always result in 
a total and inevitable homogenization, nor is it a one-way 
process in which the minority passively accepts what is of­
fered by the dominant group, thereby losing its own char­
acter. Assimilation, therefore, is the large scale entrance 
by ethnic minorities into primary group institutions 
(political parties, social organizations, etc.) of the core 
society. Numbers alone indicate that migrants are shaping 
the culture of the city as much as they are adjusting to it. 
The classic sociological view of the city as an agglomera­
tion of a large, heterogenous population in a dense, perman­
ent settlement implies not only anonymity but also tolerance 
of change.13
Often times the migrants attach themselves to their 
own particular cultural minority and re-create, where
13D.J. Dwyer, "Absorption Problems of In-Miqrants - 
Migrants in Metropolitan Cities of Developing Countries", 
Rehovot Conference on Urbanization and Development in Deve­
loping Countries (Weizmann Institute of Science, 1971), p.l.
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possible, the moral and cultural atmosphere of their pre­
vious homes. One tendency is for migrants to group them­
selves within the cities according to their prior origins.
The issue is whether previous characteristics can be ex­
pected to fade with the passage of time and whether it is 
still possible to envisage a one-way adaptation of migrants 
to an absorptive urban culture.
Adaptation of migrants is of great importance if 
social engineering is to be a goal of physical planning.
One must consider whether it will be necessary or even 
possible to achieve residential dispersion in order to stimu­
late the absorption of immigrants into the new social system. 
The present arrangements, especially the overall housing 
situation in major Israeli cities, may have a harmful effect 
not only on welfare and working efficiency but also may fail 
to provide adequate incentives for constructive social 
adaptation or satisfactory new values to replace traditional 
goals.
Despite the diverse backgrounds of many social 
groups in Israel, there is strong evidence that Israel is 
creating a unified, cohesive nationhood. Ashkenazi and 
Sephardi differences are steadily declining and giving way 
to an Israeli identity. The two communities thus converge 
culturally and become more similar with each generation. 
There are a number of reasons for this convergence. First, 
the integrative impact of a common Jewish religion and
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Hebrew language is deep and tends to override divisive 
tendencies. Second, the dominant political ideologies in 
Israel are Zionism, socialism and liberalism. Zionist 
ideology emphasizes (1) the common origin of all Jews and is 
directly concerned with the basic objective of overcoming 
differences acquired in the Diaspora (countries other than 
Israel); (2) there is a commitment to the absolute and 
egalitarian integration of all Jewish subgroups; and (3) it 
perceives Jewish faith in different countries and areas as 
essentially the same, and Jews are considered as owing al­
legiance to each other. Another factor involves inter­
marriage between members of different ethnic groups, which 
is not only accepted but highly valued. The rise in inter­
marriage creates more Israelis, neither Sephardim nor Ash­
kenazim. Intermarriage rates compare favorably with those 
in much older heterogenous societies. Finally, the national 
security factor has provided great cohesiveness to Israeli 
society. Israel's involvement in conflict, where survival 
was in question, has had a unifying effect for three reasons
interdependence of fate, definition of a common goal, and
14provision of an outlet for aggression.
Ethnic integration is a process whereby members of a 
society, regardless of background, color or cultural dif­
ferences, move freely among one another, equally sharing
14 Peres, "Ethnic Relations in Israel," p.38.
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similar opportunities, privileges and facilities. Differ­
ences arise, however, because individuals do not always begin 
at the same starting point. For an individual to achieve 
integration in Israel there must be a measure of desertion 
from one's original group and its cultural ethos. Some 
measure of assimilation is necessary to achieve integration 
in any society and, certainly, this is not wholly undesirable. 
Israel's dominant European social group, driven by its de­
sire to create a common cultural identity based upon a 
Western model, has operated under a "You can be one of us if 
you become like us" attitude. Such an attitude can lead to 
social inequality and discrimination, particularly where the 
rights, attainments and privileges of an individual are 
clearly affected by the origin group to which one belongs 
by birth and, in varying degrees, by conditioning. Thus, 
although one ultimate goal of Israeli society has been in­
tegration, assimilation alone could not be relied upon to 
attain this goal. Economic opportunities had to be created 
to buttress the integration process.
S.N. Eisenstadt delineated several criteria which 
determine the ease of integration and which have particular 
significance for the Israeli experience:
1. The motives that induced the immigrants to come to
Israel, and, in particular, their readiness for
change.
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2. The social configurations of the immigration 
process, i.e. whether immigrants came in homo­
genous ethnic groups or in heterogenous groups 
crystallized during the immigration process.
3. The extent of the immigrants' acceptance by the 
host population, i.e. the extent of their institu­
tional and social integration.
4. The emergence of special ethnic immigrant groups 
in various spheres of life.15
The success of any immigrant is partly dependent 
upon the openness of the host society, in terms of access to 
cultural and economic opportunities. Israeli society has 
remained closed in opportunities accessible to newcomers, in 
spite of some sharing in cultural values, particularly of 
religion, with old-timers. While many lower-level economic 
opportunities are available to immigrants from non-Western 
countries, more lucrative options are scarce. Of course some 
of the predominance of Orientals in lower economic strata is 
also due to the immigrants' own lack of readiness for social 
change. At the same time, readiness for change often depends 
upon the nature of social conditions in the country of 
origin. Conditions for Jews in most North African countries 
were physically and psychologically restrictive so that 
upon arrival in Israel their willingness to fill new social
Berlier, New Towns, pp.130-131.15
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roles was simply non-existent.
The integration of Jewish immigrants into Israeli 
society has always presented unique problems. Jewish iden­
tity is at one and the same time both centripetal and cen­
trifugal, manifested in concurrent wills to survive as a 
nation while wanting to become like other nations. No im­
migrant to Israel is, therefore, only a Jew - this fact is 
largely responsible for communal problems in Israel. Al­
though the primary centripetal force revolves around a com­
mon Jewish centrality, centrifugal forces are continually 
pushing towards different cultural, social and even ethnic 
perimeters.
It would be misleading to view Israeli society as 
split between two irreconcilable communities, Sephardic and 
Ashkenazic. The importance of these categories should not be 
exaggerated, but rather the analysis of subgroups within 
these categories provide more useful insights into Israeli 
society. For example, many problems are often more indicative 
of the difficulties specific strata of Moroccan immigrants 
are having than it is of Sephardic communities in general. 
Yemenite Jews, skilled artisans and largely literate, 
came with their spiritual leaders as a whole community 
and had a much easier time integrating. Those from Morocco 
saw many of the more skilled and educated members of their 
communities leave for France or North America. The remainder 
who went to Israel felt uprooted from their traditional way
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of life, atomized, leaderless, largely unskilled and illiter­
ate. Well educated Baghdad Jews, the "Franco"--Algerian Jews 
or the urban middle class from Egypt have little in common 
with Jews from Kurdistan or tribes from the Atlas Mountains 
of Morocco. Similar differences exist between Ashkenazi 
Jews, although they are not quite as marked. Thus, Israel 
is a mosaic of various communities reflecting very dissimilar 
conditions in their countries of origin.
The experience of integration in Israel involves im­
migration to a new country, subsequent movement of people 
within the country, and the relationship between the rural 
and urban sectors. There are a great number of differences 
between the experiences of immigrants and migrants in Israel 
compared to those of others in developing, underdeveloped 
and Western countries, yet there are similarities, too.
Differences in the Israeli integration experience 
has had significant implications for the planning process in 
Israel. The rural-urban relationship in Israel differs con­
siderably from other countries in that the rural sector of 
the prestate society never developed dependency relation­
ships with the urban sector. Immigration to Israel, and 
ultimately to rural areas, was entirely nonselective. It 
brought people from backward rural areas together with people 
from large cities (mostly European). The usual migrant con­
siderations of employment opportunities, social access and 
prior contacts with their place of destination did not play
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any significant role in the decision to migrate. Mass im­
migration in the post-1948 period negated the possibility for 
gradual absorption. The immigrants themselves became the 
society.
Implication of Israeli Social Structure For Planning
Structuring and the spatial organization of Israeli 
society became an absolute necessity. A national policy of 
urbanization and spatial organization had to be formulated 
with a number of goals in mind:
1) Settlement in sparsely populated regions
2) Occupation of frontier regions for defense and 
political reasons
3) Opening of natural resources frontiers in Southern 
desert areas
4) Changing the primary structure of urban development 
by limiting the growth of urban concentrations in the 
central coastal plain through the establishment of 
medium to small size towns in other parts of the 
country
5) Building integrated regional systems through creation 
of urban service centers within rural regions.16
16Arie Shachar, "Development Towns in Israel: Nation­
al Policy of Urbanization and Spatial Organization" in Rehovot 
Conference on Urbanization and Development in Developing Coun­
tries (Weizmann Institute of Science, 1971), pp.89-104.
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The dispersion of population as immigrants were 
absorbed in Israel was attempted by establishing numerous 
rural settlements in areas suitable for agricultural develop­
ment. During the twenty year period 1948-1968, 450 rural 
settlements were established in Israel, of which 62% were 
moshavim (cooperative settlements of individual farm owner­
ship) . The total population living in rural settlements of 
all types was 236,954 by the end of 1972. Growth of rural 
population has accounted for nine percent of Israel's total
 population increase since 1948.17 Social planning in 
Israel's earlier years dealt mainly with the anticipated de­
mands for public services in education, health and welfare, 
but not in broader aspects of cultural adaptation and social 
integration.
Immigrants to Israel have shared the difficulties 
similar to those experienced by immigrants to other countries. 
There are differences in adaptability, of course, depending 
upon the skills immigrants carry with them and whether they 
came from rural or urban environments. For the latter, city 
life becomes less stressful since experience was already ac­
quired with living in cities. Urban dwellers also often 
possess greater educational and occupational skills than 
those from rural or peasant environments. 
17 Israel, Ministry of Information, Facts About 
Israel-1975, (Jerusalem, 1975), pp.74-75.
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Heavier burdens of adjustment, therefore, fall on immigrants 
without urban experience or skills. This is a universal 
experience, as exemplified in a 1956 study of migrants in 
Kampala, Uganda:
For the African peasant (moving to an urban area) in 
particular, who has been adapted in childhood to work, 
comfort and recreation in a comparatively small but 
comprehensive face-to-face group, the transition to a 
series of discontinuous impersonal relations - with 
employers, work-mates, officials, landlords, policemen, 
traders and prostitutes - is abrupt indeed. The craft 
and other skills acquired in early life are often use­
less or at least undervalued in urban conditions. The 
early patterns of domestic, kinship and neighborhood 
relations are often excluded, while the self-reliance 
and group solidarity for shared production and susten­
ance under a subsistence economy are little guide to 
the foresight, economizing and bargaining required in 
the new patterns of wage income and the need to buy 
most goods, while unfamiliar modes of expenditure for 
livelihood and display are offered and even enforced.18
In any case, the burden of adjustment by immigrant 
groups often falls more heavily on the second generation.
The immigrants are protected from the worst effects of dis­
organization by having grown up in a traditional culture 
whose values still guide their behavior as adults, even 
though they have moved to another community setting. Their 
children, however, are caught between the conflicting demands 
of their parents' standards and those of the society trans­
mitted to them by education and mass media. The conflict of 
values may result in no binding set of norms.
18 Daryll Forde, "Introductory Survey," in Social 
Implications of Industrialization and Urbanization in Africa 
South of the Sahara, (United Nations: UNESCO, 1956), p.49.
47
The experience of immigrants groups in American 
cities indicate that many ethnic communities established in 
the 19th century have tended to disintegrate, whereas com­
munities established by later migrations are still fairly 
distinct. After the turn of the century, many immigrants 
came from Southern and Eastern Europe representing cultures 
often at considerable variance from the ones that had become 
firmly established. Arriving fairly late on the American 
scene, after most free agricultural land had been acquired by 
earlier immigrants and after industrial expansion was well 
under way, they crowded into the larger cities, establishing 
segregated cultural or ethnic islands in the midst of a poly­
ethnic community. As a result, they found themselves at 
severe economic, cultural and psychological disadvantages.
Important conclusions can be drawn from the exper­
ience of immigrants to the United States, and probably the 
most important is decentralization - a factor of key impor­
tance for the future success of ethnic relations in Israel. 
Decentralization of ethnic groups is of interest largely 
because of its relationship to desegregation and assimilation 
into American society. The classic hypothesis is that as 
immigrant groups move outward from the central areas of first 
settlement they become less segregated from the native popu­
lation. The underlying dynamic of the relationship is as­
sumed to be that they have become assimilated, or more like 
the native population in terms of socioeconomic status,
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culture and values. This implies that as the physical dis­
tance between ethnic and native population declines so too 
does the social distance.
Decentralization is not necessarily associated with 
desegregation, but in the case of immigrant groups they have 
gone hand-in-hand. Similarly, assimilation does not neces­
sarily correlate with integration, although immigrant groups 
to the U.S. have tended to become more like the native popu­
lation. Abilities in speaking the (new) native language, 
citizenship, educational level and intermarriage are charac­
teristics related to the degree of residential segregation. 
Newer immigrant groups usually score poorly in these areas, 
but the important question for Israel is for how long?
Comparisons between the integration of Jewish ethnic 
groups in Israel and that of the Jews in the United States 
have often been made, but the similarities are really no 
closer than that with any other ethnic group in the United 
States. There are, however, some important points for con­
sideration. The Jewish ghetto in the United States has 
usually been more a voluntary segregation on the basis of 
religion and kinship ties. Second generation Jews, although 
generally better off economically, still lived in "ghettos". 
That is, given the areas where they lived, they still carried 
on their social life almost exclusively within their own 
group. Thus, the second generation had become assimilated 
in terms of living standard but not in terms of social
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relationships. The third generation is much more assimilated 
in terms of living in dispersed, surburban areas, having a 
mixture of people in their social groupings and the increased 
frequency of intermarriage with non-Jews.
The experiences of East European Jews who went to 
Israel and those who went to the United States also provides 
some interesting differences. The former transplanted a 
social framework, as it existed in the ghettos of East 
Europe at the turn of the century, to a land where it faced 
little or no social challenges. The East European who went 
to the U.S., on the other hand, had to face the challenge of 
the new society. In the process he has generally adapted to 
the new environment, democracy became a part of him, and the 
monolithic society was unacceptable. It is not surprising 
that in the pluralistic U.S. society there exist independent 
Jewish social, cultural and educational institutions.
Much of Israeli society, on the other hand, has be­
come increasingly monolithic. Groups from differing cultural 
origins do not exist as co-equals, but rather as "superior" 
and "inferior", even when the latter forego their ethno­
cultural identification in favor of a supposed common culture. 
The fault with a monolithic society is that it cannot be 
satisfied with just a common culture. It demands identical 
patterns of thought and it imposes the will of one sector 
upon another. By contrast, a pluralistic society makes in­
dividual and sectional development not only possible but also
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desirable for the enrichment of the community at large.
Another major aspect of integration concerns inter­
marriage among various social groups. The problem in Israel 
is not only how many Ashkenazim will intermarry with Sephar­
dim but also how many Iraqis will intermarry with Moroccans 
or Tunisians. It is here that the traditional family struc­
ture of the Oriental communities tends to favor endogamy not 
only within the broad Oriental community but also within 
specific and narrower groups, i.e. Moroccans marry Moroccans, 
etc.. Nonetheless, with rising economic and educational 
standards among the younger generation and the emanicipation 
of the younger people from the often oppressive parental 
tutelage characterizing some Oriental families, the level of 
intermarriage between communities is steadily rising. In 
1955, 11.8% of all Jewish marriages in Israel were inter­
marriages between European and Afro-Asian partners. By 1970 
the rate of intermarriage was 17.5% of all Jewish marriages. 
The reason for the rise is that despite some considerable 
differences, fundamentally the various communities in Israel 
regard themselves as belonging, in both fact and principle, 
to a single people with the consciousness of being Jewish a 
very strong force.
With rising levels of education and social mobility, 19
19Benjamin Neuberger, Israel: Unity in Diversity
(New York: American Zionist Youth Foundation, 1972), p.14.
19
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pre-Israeli origins become less important while intermarriage 
becomes an increasing reality. This is especially true among 
the third generation of Israeli youth who possess relative 
independence from parental opinions and who make their own 
social decisions.
Summary
Several factors which foster integration have been 
explored in this chapter including:
1. The existence of a body of cultural symbols 
which serve as a common focus of identifica­
tion by a cross-section of society.
2. The need for an expanding economy in order for 
wide-ranging participation in economic life to 
occur.
3. The perception of a threat originating from a 
common enemy.
These factors are of universal application. Taking 
the first two for example, as ethnic groups in the United 
States expanded their participation in the country's economic 
life, common American cultural symbols became a greater part 
of their lives. In an attempt to become "Americanized", 
symbols of ethnic affiliation were submerged. Gradually 
ethnic groups moved out of ghetto-like residential areas, 
populated by their own ethnic group, and physical dispersion 
became associated with upward economic mobility.
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The assimilation resulting from upward mobility and 
physical dispersion among ethnic groups in the United States 
has resulted in a noticeable decline in prejudice and dis­
crimination against ethnic groups. For these groups, interest 
in and practice of ancestral traditions need no longer be 
submerged on account of social inferiority connotations.
The important question is whether Israeli society will evolve 
in the same fashion and whether assimilation can be achieved 
in the same way by Sephardic and Oriental populations in 
Israel. Subsequent chapters will explore alternative choices 
which can direct the outcome of this question.
CHAPTER IV
THE STRUCTURE OF ISRAELI POLITICAL LIFE
The Israeli political system is complex, consisting 
of a myriad of parties, splinter groups, associations based 
upon country and area of origin, kibbutz membership, and 
even army unit. Israel's political structure has great po­
tential for alleviating social problems through offering 
representation and participation by disadvantaged groups. 
Although the Israeli political system functions quite well 
at the local and municipal level, it seems to fall far short 
of competency at the national level. Due to the unwritten 
Israeli system of protectsia, support of the status quo has 
become so institutionalized that there is little hope for 
facilitating the process of integration.
The persistence of social gaps and communal friction 
in Israel can, in large part, be attributed to European 
dominance in government and positions of power. Although 
this may have been a natural development, it alienates the 
Oriental and Sephardic elements, who have a tendency to see 
foul play where none exists and deliberate discrimination 
which was never intended.
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European dominance in Israeli politics is due largely 
to strong political backgrounds in their countries of origin. 
The low political profile of Orientals and Sephardis in their 
countries of origin was repeated as non-participation in 
Israeli political life. Although certain adults had exper­
ience in Zionist youth movements, where they acquired a 
certain familiarity with Israeli political parties, they had 
not participated in the general political life of their 
country of origin. The proportion of those who had belonged 
to a political party in North Africa was very small. These 
immigrants also lacked political experience after their ar­
rival in Israel. They had everything to learn; they had to 
become acquainted with specific institutions of Israeli 
political life as well as being initiated into exercising 
their right to vote. In this respect the Government did do 
a great deal to teach the immigrants the use of their civil 
rights. The Government organizes civic information courses 
in development towns and in the moshavim which are intended 
to cater to the needs of new immigrants. Nevertheless, 
active use of basic civil rights is still a far cry from 
participation in leadership and decision making in political 
parties at the national level.
In many other countries differences between the haves 
and have-nots are usually explained as class differences. In 
Israel, the problem turns out to be a communal one. More 
than ninety-five percent of youth and children in distress
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(delinquents, runaways, etc.) are from families of Middle 
Eastern and North African origin. Owing to their position 
in society and their lack of articulation as a group, mem­
bers of this segment of Israel's population remain socially 
disorganized. They are easy prey for political leaders who 
seek to control them by ephemeral economic inducements and 
advantages which are extended at election time. Although 
they comprise over fifty percent of the population, their 
representation in the Knesset (national parliament) and in 
Government and national institutions is practically nil, as 
the following figures indicate:
1. In the Sixth Knesset, twenty-four non-Askenazic 
members out of 120 possible seats were returned by all the 
parties combined.
2. In the Seventh Knesset, the number was reduced 
to eighteen.
3. In the Eighth Knesset, only twenty non-Ashkenazi 
members were returned.20
In addition to the twenty Sephardic members of the 
Knesset (out of 120), there are two cabinet ministers 
(Health and Police), two directors general of ministries, and 
almost no Oriental Jews at higher levels of government lead­
ership. Only three percent of those in the top three civil
20Elle Eliachar, "Born to Fail: Israel's Communal 
Problem," The Sephardic Voice (New York: American 
Sephardi Federation, 1974), pp. 12-15.
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service grades are Oriental Jews.21 It is significant that 
day-to-day policy decisions are made at these levels and 
these are the people who supply the information and advice 
on which long-term decisions are based. Since the Sephardic 
community lacks representation it becomes clear that their 
needs are not actively considered, not because of active 
discrimination, but because there is no one present to assert 
them.
The presence of some Sephardi representatives in the 
various parties of the Knesset is misleading. Because of 
the nature of parliamentary elections in Israel, these repre­
sentatives are dependent on the party that chose to put their 
names on its list for election. They are not free to deal 
with communal issues, except through the machinery of their 
political party. Nearly all attempts to establish ethnic 
parties or to exploit the ethnic factor for electoral politics 
have failed.
During elections for the Eighth Knesset (1973) there 
were six "communal" lists of candidates contesting the elec­
tions and not a single genuine communal representative was 
elected. There are two major reasons for such failures. In 
the first place the constant threat of war unites Israelis 
around issues of security and foreign policy, which always
21"Oriental Communities in Israel," Jerusalem Post, 
December 17, 1971, p.8.
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pushes social and economic problems into a corner. Secondly, 
the electoral system of proportional representation ties the 
electorate to political party lists and prevents any direct 
link between the elector and elected. Thirdly, the financial 
assistance of 170,000 Israeli pounds paid to Knesset members 
(for campaign financing) automatically places an incumbent at 
an advantage over any new aspirant. Finally, the party 
machinery has access to public funds which can be drawn upon 
from various national revenues and international Jewish 
contributions.
Local politics in Israel, though far less visible, 
is much more innovative and hopeful than the national scene. 
Municipal successes of Orientals is due to a higher level 
of direct accountability to constituencies. In many places, 
where the Orientals now form a majority, they have ousted 
European old-timers. Sephardi members of municipal councils
have increased from thirteen percent in 1950 to fifty percent
in 1973.22 This resembles a process similar to ethnic take­
overs of local politics by bloc voting in American life, 
particularly in big cities, at the turn of the century. Its 
consequences for Israel may be equally dramatic.
It will take some time before this shift will be as 
visible on the national level of politics since so much
22Neuberger, Unity in Diversity, p.16.
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political power grows out of provincial smoke-filled back­
rooms. Due to Israel's system of proportional party repre­
sentation, decisions about parliamentary candidates are taken 
at the national, central party level and the time lag between 
changes in the composition of local electorates and central 
party response may be longer than in the Western system of 
constituency representation.
The integration of the Oriental immigrant into the 
political structure of Israeli life thus shows many simi­
larities with the process through which immigrants became 
integrated into the American political structure. None of 
the political alienation and exclusion which, until recently, 
characterized the position of the American Blacks can be 
found in the process which Sephardi/Oriental communities are 
undergoing in Israel. Similar to the position which 
Italians and Irish had been in the United States, Oriental 
Israelis are still at the bottom of the economic ladder.
There still exist many popular prejudices against Oriental 
immigrants, but if one looks for American parallels it is 
among the Italians and Irish that one would find something 
comparable, not among the Blacks.
Many of the difficulties Orientals and Sephardim are 
having participating in Israeli political life are due to 
the nature of the system itself. Diffusion of authority is a 
major characteristic of the Israeli political style. It 
explains many of the perplexing aspects of Israeli public
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life, such as the amazing continuity of institutions of the 
pioneering era, the slow legislative process, the difficul­
ties of reform and the permanence with which politicians hold 
office, irrespective of mistakes, old age, or senility.
Israelis endlessly complain that they are a mis­
governed people. They continually call for abler, 
stronger, more effective government. And yet, at 
the same time, few people are so suspicious of 
authority, so abusive in their attitude to power, 
and so adept in the ancient art of circumventing 
it. This dual, and so often paradoxical, approach 
to power is a main characteristic of the Israeli
political style.23
Israelis prefer their government to reflect a con­
sensus of at least half a dozen political parties, and 
national policies are generally a composite of portions of 
each party's platforms. Israel, therefore, is governed by 
a plurality of elites who confederate in the national in­
terest and for political expediency, remaining always jealous 
of one another. These elites constantly purport to base 
themselves on values sacred to Israeli society. While values 
may at times only be veiled greed and ambition, it is also 
true that abstract ideas derived from Zionist history are 
still a powerful force in Israeli affairs.
Various Israeli interest groups and ideologies have 
been represented by many political parties, which have grad­
ually consolidated in modern times. The proliferation and 
fragmentation of power in Israel, however, remains an im- 
23Elon, Israelis, p. 379 .
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portant factor in the political process. The most important 
power factions contain six major and four minor parties; 
major parties are actually coalitions of smaller subdivisions. 
These alignments form parties representing labor interests, 
the religious establishment, the urban middle-class, pro­
fessions, private entrepreneurs and a number of other groups 
in society. Each elite is aided by party-controlled fi­
nancial enterprises; each gets a share of public campaign 
funds; each has a share in the state bureaucracy and economy; 
and each has its own constituency, tightly organized by well 
run political machines.
It is important to note, therefore, that diffusion of 
authority is a major Israeli political characteristic. It 
helps to explain the conservatism of a young society, the 
longevity of pioneering era institutions, the slow legisla­
tive process, the difficulties in achieving reforms, and the 
permanence of old-age politicians. At the same time, it 
also is a major reason freedom is maintained in a country 
possessing many preconditions for authoritarianism.
The politics of consensus are deeply rooted in the 
history of the pre-state period. They bear witness 
to the lingering strength of the institutions and 
procedures established early in this century by the 
founding fathers. The politics of 1909, or even 
1921, affected a few hundred Zionist settlers only; 
their procedures survived the age of mass democracy.
The ruling parties of today preceded the state, and 
not vice versa, they even preceded colonization.
With the exception of a few splinter groups, the 
settlers' parties were founded in Eastern Europe as
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Zionist clubs.24
Israeli distrust of authority allows for an extreme 
egalitarianism to permeate public affairs. It manifests 
itself in the Israeli concept of voluntarism (hitnadvut), in 
which response to social authority is of a higher order than 
state organization and legal coercion. It is reflected in 
the preferential regard accorded to cooperative movements 
and the dominant public position of the trade and labor 
unions and their subsidiaries. Unlike other countries, 
Israeli unions did not grow out of the national economy.
They actively shared in its creation by establishing 
"labor-owned" firms and, like the political parties, they 
preceded the state.
Government Bureaucracy
The characteristic Israeli response to social im­
peratives before legal ones has an undeniable impact upon 
the structure and function of the government bureaucracy, 
which exerts a very powerful force upon the direction of 
Israeli life. Israeli bureaucratic organization consists of 
a hierarchy of offices representing different levels of 
authoritative power. There is likewise a hierarchy of 
statuses in which prestige is distributed among the office-
24 Ibid., p.382.
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holders according to the values assigned to the roles they 
perform. So as with any bureaucratic organization, there is 
a system in which rights, privileges, prestige and power are 
differentially distributed among personnel.
The bureaucratic organization places a premium on 
occupational specialization and most bureaucratic personnel 
are expected to perform more or less specialized technical 
functions. Throughout the bureaucratic hierarchy, but 
particularly on the lower levels, the emphasis is on routini- 
zation of tasks in the interest of efficiency. The hierarchy 
is likewise systematized into a complex of rules and regula­
tions that define the forms and limits of power an individual 
has over others and this manifests itself in the formation 
of bureaus, agencies, departments, etc..
If the central feature of a bureaucracy is formal 
organization and a hierarchy of authority and status, within 
this framework there is an informal organization in which 
relationships between personnel tend to be intimate. Such 
informal organization commonly assumes the form of cliques 
and a generally close association between workers. These 
informal relationships constitute important channels of 
communication. They tend to soften the harshness of a formal 
organization that emphasizes impersonal relationships, 
glorifies efficiency and isolates personnel on different 
levels of authority and prestige.
The problem with Israeli bureaucracy is that much of
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its formal power lies at informal levels of authority. In­
formal relationships often make it very difficult for out­
siders to enter and allows for lower-level decision making 
through benign neglect. Lower level personnel can prevent 
action being taken by screening out and preventing decisions 
from reaching the appropriate level of authority.
Bureaucracy, although indispensable in a modern 
society, nevertheless represents a concentration of potential 
power that threatens existing values. It may be either a 
force for social change or it may harness its forces to re­
sist social change, even when it is in the public interest. 
Generally speaking, the Israeli bureaucracy is very conserva­
tive due to the vested interest of its policy makers. It is 
at the same time both democratic and authoritarian. While 
its lower-level personnel may be selected objectively on the 
basis of competence, its policies and practices are authori­
tarian in nature, formulated and carried out by a managerial 
elite whose behavior lies in party alliances and directives.
The bureaucracy of Israel is under the auspices of a 
Civil Service Commission, headed by a commissioner, appointed 
by the Cabinet and responsible to the Minister of Finance. 
Present policy is to concentrate on guidance, direction and 
supervision, and to transfer routine implementation to the 
Ministries, while reserving major responsibilities for senior 
civil servants. Entry preference is given to university 
graduates - both posts requiring professional qualifications 
and senior administrative positions are reserved for them.
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A full twenty-five percent of the Civil Service is covered
by professional and technical salary scales with this per-
centage continually rising.25 While this may be viewed as 
a positive development in the growth of the Israeli Civil 
Service, it effectively excludes Sephardim, Orientals and 
Arabs from policy and decision-making positions at the 
senior levels of government, since they are at the lowest 
levels of educational achievement.
Israel has experienced a burgeoning civil service 
bureaucracy as Table III indicates (see page 65). Despite 
the official criterion of operational efficiency, the 
Israeli bureaucracy is ruled by the concept of le'histader - 
"to take care of oneself" or "to fix oneself up" by bending 
the rules to one's purpose. It is the password through 
the maze of authority and regulations, which may be objective 
and just, but the needs of the individual are superior. The 
average Israeli recognizes few regulations of universal 
applicability. In dealing with authorities the Israeli de­
mands, firmly and loudly, exceptional treatment - he is 
usually accommodated.
Several power elites dominate the Israeli public 
scene and in all of them power is preserved by the veteran 
leadership. Veterans share a common suspicion of the young, 
newcomers, and innovators who call for reforms in the social 25
25 . .Israel, Ministry of Information, Facts About 
Israel-1975 (Jersalem, 1975), pp. 101-102.
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and political structures established during the pioneering 
era. Although its very existence is denied, the operations 
of the Israeli Establishment are deliberately shrouded be­
hind an elaborate edifice of conflicting ideological plat­
forms and formal or informal committees, both inside and out­
side the Government. The main function of the Establishment 
is to direct the distribution of resources received from 
local taxes and from the funds contributed by Jews abroad.
It also controls the assignment of top jobs within the State 
hierarchy.
TABLE III
STATE EMPLOYEES, ACCORDING TO MINISTRIES26
Ministry 1952 1959 1972
1952-1972
Increase
President, Knesset 
State Comptroller 328 535 677 106%
Interior, Justice,
Police 2,452 3,242 3,769 54%
Foreign Affairs,
Defense 1,427 1,844 2,819 98%
Commerce, Finance & 
Agriculture 7,754 9,013 12,150 57%
Development, Housing, 
Immigrant Absorption — 279 1,440 416%
Health, Welfare, Reli­
gions , Education, 
Culture 4,469 8,261 14,622 227%
Communications, 
Transport, Labor 10,418 14,001 21,537 107%
TOTAL CIVIL SERVICE 26,848 37,145 57,014 113%
General Population 1,629,519 2,088,685 3,200,500 98%
26Ibid.
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Elitism in Israeli Political Life
The current Establishment consists of several elites 
that emerged in the pioneering period and still dominate the 
public scene. They are largely veteran settlers who came 
from Jewish middle-class or lower middle-class homes in 
Poland or Russia; most are in their sixties and seventies - 
men in their fifties are scarce and in their forties a rar­
ity. Upward mobility of younger persons in the national 
political system is a difficult and painful process. In the 
first Israeli Parliament (1949) the average age of its mem­
bers was forty-three, while in the Sixth Parliament (1969)
it was sixty three - indicating the same people were still 
27in control.
Most of these leaders live relatively modest lives, 
and their salaries are rarely higher than that of high 
school teachers. Not officially included as income, however, 
are numerous privileges provided political leaders in lieu of 
money. They do not hesitate to avail themselves of various 
transfer payments which do not appear as income and are, 
therefore, rarely taxed. There are a whole array of allow­
ances available in addition to bills incurred privately and 
paid for publicly, including the use of a car with a gaso­
line allowance, free telephone service for both public and 27
27Edward Geffner, Sephardi Problems in Israel 
(Jerusalem: World Sephardi Federation, 1971), p.48.
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personal use, travel allowances and clothing allowances.
Lower income groups in Israeli society are rarely eligible 
for these types of in-kind income. Significantly, these 
kinds of "income" are never considered in any statistical 
accounting, making it very difficult to develop an accurate 
analysis of income differentials in Israeli society.
The elite establishment can be viewed, in a way, as 
a mandarin class maintaining a firm hold on the institutions 
and instruments of power they have created. Their patern­
alism can partly be explained as the natural reaction of 
former revolutionaries, if you will, who have themselves 
attained power. In theory, members of the Knesset do not 
automatically belong to the Establishment nor vice-versa. In 
reality, the candidacy of at least 100 of the 120 members is 
tightly controlled by the mandarin class. The predominance 
in parliament of Eastern European pioneers and their off­
spring reflects the Establishment even more than the elec­
torate. In the 1969-1974 Knesset, for example, eighty per­
cent of its Jewish members were either East European immi­
grants or Israeli born children (sabras) of East European
28parents.
Sephardic and Oriental Jews are not completely disen­
franchised, since they have experienced some municipal level 
successes. On the national level, however, few have reached *
28Elon, Israelis, p.402.
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positions of real power and their success has not been based 
on capabilities. It was the paternalistic attempt of the 
mandarins to alter their image of East European ethocen- 
tricity without having to yield substantial power. In gen­
eral, Oriental and Sephardic Jews presently are unable to 
catch up economically with Ashkenzaim because they do not 
hold their share of top government and business posts.
The Protectzia System
The practice of rewarding the loyalty of the party 
faithful is commonplace in worldwide politics. It might be 
less offensive in Israel if power would occasionally change 
hands. What makes power brokerage difficult to tolerate is 
that there are several very important quasipublic agencies 
which run on the same system and in which Sephardi represen­
tation is very low. This pattern runs throughout the Jewish 
Agency, the Histadrut and a number of other major public and 
private industries and organizations.
In effect, Israel has three governments - the
Histadrut (a national labor union), the Cabinet and the 
Jewish Agency.29 In addition a high degree of influence is 
exerted on the government by the World Zionist Congress and 29
29The Jewish Agency is an independent, non-profit 
organization supported by voluntary dollars of worldwide 
Jewry, through its fund raising arm, the United Israel Appeal. 
It provides subventions to and deficit financing of Israeli 
government social and other non-military assistance programs, 
particularly to aid in immigrant absorption. It operated 
under a 1976-77 budget of $502 million (U.S.)
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the Jewish National Fund. Each has its own unofficial party 
affiliation and bureaucracy. While there are historical 
reasons for these organizations and while they do important 
work, their continued existence is filled with vested 
interests and vast amounts of overlap, duplication of efforts 
and organizational infighting.
The Histadrut is the largest labor organization in 
Israel with a membership of 1,259,200 in 1973. Besides en­
gaging in basic trade unionism, it worked to build up in­
dustry and agriculture and provides social services to its 
members. To a great extent the Histadrut sets policy in 
wages and fringe benefits, health care and various other 
workers' rights. In addition, it controls many of Israel's 
largest industries and most of its agricultural business 
operations. The Histadrut is governed by a twenty-one mem­
ber Coordinating Committee, of which only four are 
Sephardim.30
The Jewish Agency has by far the greatest influence 
on public life and government policy in Israel. The Agency 
was founded in 1929 and reconstituted in 1971 to include the 
World Zionist Organization and all Jewish fund raising 
organizations in the world. Its purpose is to organize im­
migration, absorb immigrants, assist them in economic and 
social integration, distribute land and provide support for
30Geffner, Sephardi Problems, p.50.
70
new settlements. The general governing board, called the 
Zionist Council, consists of 187 representatives of whom only 
six are Sephardim or Orientals. Of the twelve on the Execu­
tive Committee, only one is a Sephardi and he is without
portfolio (not a department head). Only eight percent of
31the delegates to the Zionist Congress are Sephardim.
Abuse of power in the Jewish Agency has not continued 
without notice. The Fifth General Assembly of the Jewish 
Agency concluded on July 20, 1976 and, surprisingly, a reform 
movement is beginning to emerge. An agreement was reached 
on how United Jewish Appeal and United Israel Appeal funds 
are to be allocated to the "constructive funds" managed by 
the various political parties in Israel. Supposedly, this 
new agreement provides for close and constant scrutiny by 
the Agency's Comptroller, but in a July 17, 1976 editorial 
the Israeli daily Ha'aretz attacked it as a cover-up for 
the continuation of the same bad situation: Jewish funds 
raised abroad for Israel being funnelled into party (politi­
cal) instead of national coffers.
At the same assembly the first public criticism of
the Agency emerged by its own Board of Governors Chairman,
Max Fisher, who called for an end to:
Politicization of job-getting and job-holding with­
in the Jewish Agency. The Agency and its various 
services and programs affect the lives of more than
31Ibid.
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600,000 Israelis and it is vital that it have the 
best men for the top jobs without regard to their 
political or party affiliation. Unfortunately, 
this has not been the case.
The point has not been reached where Jewish 
Agency officials know that their advancement de­
pend solely on their ability and not on extraneous 
political factors. The key of party affiliation 
still bars able officials within the Agency from 
advancing. The party key must be eradicated and 
the selection and advancement policies of the 
Agency must be based solely on merit.32
One has to wonder how these abuses of power and 
control by an elite group, exclusive of Sephardim and 
Orientals, continue to thrive. The whole system is based up­
on the Israeli institution of protectzia. While le'histader 
is the rule of life for the average Israeli, protectzia be­
comes the rule of thumb for the "above average" Israeli. It 
means that one has friends of influence from whom he can 
expect help with any political or bureaucratic problem he 
may encounter. In short, Israel runs on protectzia and the 
Oriental communities have none.
Protectzia is also very important in industry and 
agriculture, whether public, private or cooperative. The 
system involves more than merely knowing the right people.
It is based upon where one is from, in terms of a specific 
region, in certain European countries of origin, what kib­
butz one may have come from, the army unit one belongs to, 
and what political party one is affiliated with. These
July 19,
Jewish Telegraphic Agency, 
1976, p.2.
32 Daily News Bulletin,
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factors become particularly important in the business system 
when consideration is given to the awarding of contracts 
and securing loans. Although exact figures are not available, 
it is generally conceded that there are very few Sephardim 
in the upper levels of the Israeli business world. Thus, we 
get a picture of Sephardim and Orientals as outsiders looking 
in at the institutions that dominate Israel's economic and 
political life.
It soon becomes clear that this system of favoritism 
can only lead to discrimination. As certain groups are in­
cluded in the elite, others must be excluded. If people 
perceive discrimination to exist, the impact is nearly the 
same, whether or not official discrimination exists. This 
point of view was conveyed to me during an interview I had 
with several leaders of ODED (Association of North African 
University Students) at Bar Ilan University, Tel Aviv, on 
August 16, 1973 (see footnote 64). The consensus of this 
group was a keen awareness of discrimination. At the same 
time there was recognition that it does not originate from 
higher levels of government (prime ministerial level), but 
rather is perpetrated at the lower levels of the bureaucracy. 
It becomes more a question of people helping their own kins­
men and thereby perpetuating the exclusion of non-kinsmen.
Methodological research has borne out the prevalance 
of this perception among Sephardic and Oriental Jews. In a 
1973 study of relations between North African Jews and other
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Israelis, it was found that feelings of discrimination were 
a significant force among North African immigrants. The 
study was organized on the basis of geographic dispersion of 
North African immigrants to Israel and it sampled 782 
persons - 325 adults, 247 pupils aged 13 to 18 years, 138 
young workers and 82 college students. In one portion of 
the study respondents were asked: "Do you think that the 
treatment of immigrants, whatever their origin, is based on 
justice and equality or rather differences and favoritism?" 
The following table summarizes the results:
TABLE IV
BASIS FOR TREATMENT OF IMMIGRANTS33
Response
Percentage
Yes
Percentage
No
Percentage
No Answer
Don't Know
Justice 10.2 2.2 87.6
Equality 11.7 3.4 84.9
Differences 23.1 1.8 75.1
Favoritism 49.5 2.8 47.7
It is important to note that the majority of the people in­
terviewed refused to respond to the first three items, but 
one out of two confirmed that there is favoritism. Those
33Doris Bensiom-Donath, "Social Integration of North 
African Jews in Israel," Dispersion and Unity - Journal of 
Zionism and the Jewish World, Vol. 12 (Jerusalem, 1973)
pp.81-83.
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who replied affirmatively to the items "differences" and 
"favoritism" were asked to elaborate and the answers were 
regrouped. (see page 75 Table V)
Most of what has been discussed in this chapter in­
dicates a considerable difference between the aspirations 
held of integration into Israel and the reality of it. In a 
general sense, one way of moderating the effects of the pat­
tern of politics would be recognition by the government of a 
plurality of interests and concerns in Israeli society. A 
more tangible governmental recognition involves the placing 
of responsibility for policy making in the hands of those who 
will be most directly affected by that policy. To date, the 
approach of the Israeli government to solutions of social 
problems has been piecemeal decisions sparked by public out­
cry. Such an approach is wholly inadequate. Tackling funda­
mental root problems, such as housing and education, requires 
planning and implementation at the highest inter-Ministerial 
level with full Parliamentary support. The fact that so 
many Sephardim and Orientals feel discrimination is often 
the result of their neglect by official circles and the lack 
of clear planning efforts aimed at ameliorating their situa­
tion. While a wide-scale reform of the Israeli political 
system would be desirable, this paper seeks to restrict itself 
to the existing and possible planning aspects of solutions.
TABLE V
REGROUPED AFFIRMATIVE ANSWER34
A. Percentage
Affirmation of:
B. Percentage Negation 
of Discrimination
C. Percentage
No Response
D. Total
1) Favoritism - "Ashkenazis benefit" 30.5 1) There is none 9.0
2) Differences - "Sephardim not 
treated the same" 23.4
2) Justify differences 
of treatment 12.5
3) Discrimination 17.5
a. affirm existence 3.6
b. affirm but not personally- 
involved 6.3
c. experienced personally 4.9
d. more in past than now 2.7
4) Justice & Equality but with 
reservations 1.8 Sub-Total
NegativeSub-Total Affirmative 73.8 21.5 5.3 100.0%
34Ibid.
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CHAPTER V
DEMOGRAPHIC ASPECTS OF SOCIAL PROBLEMS IN ISRAEL
Demographic and statistical data can often be meaning­
less, being conveniently manipulated to suit a particular 
author's needs. In the case of Israeli society, however, 
demographic data does point to some significant ethnic dif­
ferentials in the areas of employment, income and education. 
This data becomes useful in identifying problem areas.
One can draw a general picture of ethnic differences 
in Israel by grouping certain kinds of data. For example, 
there are 120,000 families in Israel who require social as­
sistance. Among these, 72% are of Asian and African origin. 
The average age of Oriental Jews in Israel is 30.3 years; 
that of the Ashkenazim is 47 years. Of 643,000 Oriental 
immigrants, 94,000 or 14.6% are under the age of 14, compared 
with only 31,000 out of 715,000 (4.3%) of European immigrants. 
The average size of the Oriental family (4.8 persons) is con­
siderably larger than that of the European family (3.1 per­
sons) .
Orientals enjoy a much lower standard of living than 
Europeans, and this is particularly noticeable in housing. 
Whereas only 6.8% of post-1948 European immigrants and 3.3%
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of earlier settlers from the West live with three or more 
people to a single room, the comparable figures for Orientals 
are 38.0% and 30.7%, respectively. The minimum density 
standard set by the Ministry of Housing, 1.00 - 1.99 persons 
per room, is enjoyed by 56.9% and 62.7% of post and pre-1948 
European immigrants, respectively. Only 28.4% of post-1948 
and 31.9% of pre-1948 Oriental immigrants live this com­
fortably. The same pattern is reflected in the distribution 
of certain household commodities. For example, only 52% of 
Orientals own a refrigerator, compared with 90.7% of European 
families. From this cursory examination of preliminary data,
one can clearly gather an idea of the dimensions of the
35socio-economic problem that presents itself in Israel. 
Population Growth and Migration
Population growth and migration has had a highly 
significant impact upon the problems of planning in Israel. 
For the moment, I shall confine myself to several demographic 
traits of the North African Jewish community in Israel, since 
they comprise the vast majority of those "disadvantaged" 
Sephardic and Oriental immigrants which have previously been 
referred to.
Between 1948 and 1952 North Africans represented 
fourteen percent of the immigration to Israel. While the 35
35 Israel, Central Bureau of Statistics, Statistical 
Abstracts of Israel, 1975, compilation from various pages.
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immigration of Asian Jews was almost complete by then, the 
North Africans continued to arrive in increasing numbers. 
Between 1955 and 1957, 68.7% of all immigrants came from 
North Africa; between 1961-1964, 60%; and in 1967, 52% of 
the immigrants came from North Africa. A full twenty-five 
percent of the Israeli Jewish population consists of persons
born in North African countries.36
North African immigration has had considerable impact 
upon Israel due to the way these immigrants have geographic­
ally distributed themselves.
TABLE VI
GEOGRAPHIC DISTRIBUTION OF GENERAL AND NORTH 
AFRICAN POPULATIONS IN ISRAEL37
Region Percentage General Population Percentage N. Africans
Total North 30.6 36.0
Galilee 15.2 22.0
Haifa 15.4 14.0
Total Central 58.2 39.0
Jerusalem 10.8 15.0
Tel Aviv 29.0 8.0
Central Other 18.4 16.0
Total South 
(Negev)
11.2 25.0
As Table VI indicates, there are high concentrations of popu­
lation in limited geographic areas. The concentration of
36Israel, Facts About Israel-1975, pp.71-73
37 Ibid.
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nearly eighty-nine percent of the population in the central 
coastal strip and the north has resulted in a distribution 
in the supply of services and economic goods which heavily 
favors these geographic areas, particularly the larger urban 
centers. Consequently, those areas such as the Galilee and 
Negev, where forty-seven percent of the North African popu­
lation resides, have not had equal access to these goods and 
services. Settlements in these predominantly North African 
areas, therefore, have generally lagged behind the rest of 
the country in economic growth and development.
In addition to the problem of population distribution 
there exists the problem of extreme densities in certain 
areas. High levels of density result from large urban con­
centrations, such as Tel Aviv and Haifa. Table VII indicates 
the magnitude of these densities.
TABLE VII
AVERAGE DENSITY OF POPULATION PER SQUARE KILOMETER38
District 1948 1956 1961 1972
Northern 44.2 87.7 101.4 142.5
Haifa 209.2 413.1 433.6 563.0
Central 100.4 263.5 327.8 460.8
Tel Aviv 1,834.0 3,464.4 4,113.5 5,324.2
Jerusalem 159.5 311.1 344.5 540.0
Southern 1.5 6.9 12.3 24.9
Total Average 43.1 88.5 107.6 153.6
38 Ibid.
80
In comparison to Tel Aviv's 5,324 persons per square kilo­
meter, London, England has a density of 4,395 persons per 
square kilometer.39 The problem of density in Israel is 
particularly acute since a high degree of urbanization is 
not accompanied by a commensurate level of industrialization. 
Thus there is a shortage of employment opportunities relative 
to population density.
Israel has had the rather unique problem over the 
past two decades of significant changes in the location of 
borders, impacting upon the internal arrangement of Israeli 
settlements. While "border areas" are seen as constituting 
potential opportunities for population dispersal rather than 
strictly security "problems," Israeli settlement policy has 
often found it necessary to settle new areas to make them 
defensible and to establish a basis for territorial claims. 
Israeli settlement policy, therefore, serves multiple func­
tions - to establish defense barriers, to "legitimize" an 
area, and to disperse population.
To a much greater degree than other population groups, 
North African and Oriental Jews have borne the burden of this 
settlement policy. Many of them were settled in areas which 
had no natural reason for existance and which functioned at an 
extreme disadvantage in competing economically and cul­
39Peter Hall, The World Cities (New York: McGraw 
Hill Book co., 1966), p. 65.
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turally with other areas of the country. As noted in Table 
VI, the percentage of North Africans in the Galilee and the 
South, areas which contain the majority of development towns 
and border regions, is considerably higher than the average. 
The years when these areas were opened for settlement, 1955- 
56, coincided with the peak period of North African immigra­
tion and, therefore, it was these immigrants who were most 
readily available for settlement in these areas.
While the intent of Israeli settlement policy was to 
bring about urban deglomeration and to make for a more 
rational population dispersal, it has not provided for the 
decentralization of such intangibles as cultural assets.
There is a marked disparity between economic investment in 
and demographic settlement of border areas on the one hand 
and investment in cultural assets in the same regions on the 
other hand. The threat inherent in this situation is con­
siderable, since the disparity is self-propagating.
The availability of cultural resources is a primary 
attraction for potential settlers whose occupational quali­
fications provide a range of choice. The attraction of in­
habitants, who desire cultural opportunities (music, art, 
libraries, etc.), to a given area depends on the availability 
of cultural assets. The presence of cultural resources, 
therefore, can raise the quality of life in a locale by at­
tracting a more culturally enriched population who them­
selves add to the resources of the area. Conversely,areas
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lacking cultural resources tend to lose population groups 
who find these resources desirable. Thus a culturally and 
economically deficient population is left behind. This type 
of process, in either the positive or negative direction, is 
self-propagating. Enrichment fosters attraction and growth 
while impoverishment encourages outmigration and decline.
Although in the short-run the economic system might 
be regarded as competing with socio-cultural infra-structure 
for the allocation of resources, in the long-run a settle­
ment's development depends on the standard of education as a 
developed economy requires threshold levels of skill and 
know-how. The fact that social and cultural variables tend 
to set several self-propagating processes in motion makes it 
necessary to pay careful attention to the national distri­
bution of cultural resources. The geographic disparity in 
this distribution has created a public image that border 
settlements are pockets of lower-class people and areas 
having little to offer. Over time the image becomes a real­
ity and it is no longer sufficient to eliminate the generat­
ing factor in order to cancel the image.
Once people get used to the idea that border set­
tlements are identified with cultural backwardness it becomes 
a major deterrent for new settlers and one of the main causes 
of outmigration. Thus, delayed investments are ultimately 
more costly. Those settlements to which North Africans and 
Orientals were more or less forced to inhabit were never
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provided with cultural assets sufficient to attract a heal­
thy mixture of population which could have brought economic 
and cultural strength to these areas. These towns, as a 
result, have struggled to maintain their viability, often 
reliant upon direct government subsidy.
Income Components of the Social Gap
The social gap between Western and Oriental popula­
tions in Israel is the result of various factors, both eco­
nomic and non-economic. Since precise measurement of non­
economic variables is difficult, conclusions on the social 
gap are substantiated mainly on the basis of economic vari­
ables. Such variables include level of income, distribution 
of income, and indices of inequality.
In the early 1950's Israel was outstanding among all 
countries for the high degree of equality in its income dis­
tribution. Since the 1960's, however, Israel has been grad­
ually losing this position of high relative equality. The 
question arises, therefore, as to whether wage discrimina­
tion on an ethnic basis exists in Israel. To answer this 
question a comparison of the distribution of incomes of 
families of Asian-African and Western (European-American) 
origin is provided in Table VIII.
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TABLE VIII
DISTRIBUTION OF INCOME BY FAMILY ORIGIN 1968-6940
Income Classification Western Families Asian-African Families
Average gross monthly 1,116 I.L* 797 I.L.
Average monthly per 
capita 372 I.L. 159 I.L.
*$1.00 U.S. = 3.5 Israelipounds (I.L.)
in 1969, at time of this comparison
The average gross monthly income of a non-Western 
family was approximately 72% of that of a Western family.
This ethnic comparison is even more striking when one con­
siders that the average size of a wage earning non-Western 
family is five persons, while that of the Western family is 
three persons. Utilizing per capita income the average mon­
thly income of Asian-African families is only forty-four per­
cent that of Western families. These figures do not include 
"in-kind" income transfers which increase the disparities.
One can quickly surmise two undeniable facts from 
this data. The gap in income is marked and the difference 
in family size is a major obstacle to more equal living 
standards. The Israeli government generally defines a 
"disadvantaged" family as one with one or more of the follow­
ing criteria present:
1. Wage earning head of the family with less than eight 
years of education
40 ...Neuberger, Unity m Diversity, pp.12-13.
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2. Dwelling arrangements consist of three or more persons 
per room
3. Monthly per capita income of 100 I.L. or less
In 1972, there were 25,000 children from disadvantaged fam­
ilies and an additional 45,000 from families just slightly 
above these criteria. It is also significant to note that 
of 930,000 Israelis under the age of eighteen, 190,000 
(twenty percent) are from families which meet at least two
of the criteria and ninety percent of these are of Sephardic
41and Oriental backgrounds.
What are the causes of this inequality? Among 
several factors, the most important are:
1. The gap in occupational levels
2. The gap in educational levels
3. Differences in non-wage income
4. Non-progressive income taxation
5. Income maintenance
Occupational Levels - A flood of unskilled workers 
to the Israeli labor market, a result of mass immigration 
in the 1950's, brought about a lower relative wage level. 
Income disparities between skilled and unskilled labor 
widened with mass immigration, exerting economic forces 
which upset the traditional balance of wage policies.
There are a number of other factors besides occupational 41
41Jacqueline Kahanoff, "Hatikva - The Slum Whose 
Name Means Hope," Hadassah Magazine, November, 1973, p.16.
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background which exacerbate the situation. They are:
1. The number of wage-earners per family
2. The number of days worked yearly by the principal 
family wage-earner
3. The amount of property owned by the family
4. The proportion of income set aside as savings 
Educational Levels - In Israel, as in most other
countries, there is a positive correlation between education 
and income levels. At present, Sephardic and Oriental Jews 
have a much lower educational level and a lower income level 
as compared to European and other Western population groups.
Differences in Non-Wage Income - Although mention 
was made of non-wage income in an earlier chapter, it is 
important to reiterate two items which contribute to income 
inequality:
1. Individual reparations from West Germany. These
payments, at the times they were disbursed, widened income
differentials. In 1970, 10% of all families in Israel
(64,000 families) received restitution payments totaling
$200 million, either as a lump sum or regular income. Obvi-
42ously, all recipients were of European origin.
2. Fringe Benefits. In higher income brackets, an 
important part of real income consists of "in-kind" income - 
fringe benefits which are not officially included as income 
(expense accounts, travel, telephone and clothing allowances,
42 Israel, Facts-1975, p.87.
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etc.)- The proportion of these benefits increases as income 
increases.
Non-Progressive Taxation - Purchase or sales taxes on 
certain products of necessary consumption weaken the effect 
of progressive income taxes and promote income inequality. 
They are, however, one of the primary means of obtaining 
revenue without increasing other areas of direct taxation.
It is important to note that the problem of income 
gaps in Israel is not without hope for improvement. In the 
last decade, the standard of living of Asian and African 
families has shown some improvement in relation to the total 
population. While per capita income differentials remain at 
unacceptable levels, there has been a closing of gaps in 
percentage ownership of durable goods as conveyed in the 
following data:
TABLE IX
PERCENTAGE OWNERSHIP OF DURABLE CONSUMER GOODS 
BY FAMILY ORIGIN, 1960 - 197043
1960 1970
Item
Western
Families
African/Asian
Families
Western
Families
African/Asian
Families
Refrigerator 69% 17% 97% 92%
Gas Oven 75 43 88 89
Washing
Machine 21 8 42 46
Television 2 2 55 48
Automobile 14 4 19 8
43Neuberger, Unity in Diversity, p.13.
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Table IX indicates that Sephardic and Oriental 
ethnic groups lag behind the level of Westerners in owner­
ship of consumer goods. The disparity between these two 
population groups, however, was significantly reduced between 
1960 and 1970. Hopefully, these numbers indicate some
achievement in raising the living standard of the non-Western 
population within a relatively short period.
Income Taxation - The social, occupational and educa­
tional gap in Israel is largely reflected in the disparity 
of the income distribution. While purchase taxes on con­
sumer goods may tend to be regressive, a recently reformed 
system of progressive income taxation may have the capacity 
to reduce the income gap. Other instruments serving similar 
purposes, to be discussed later, include national insurance 
and social service payments.
The concept of poverty can be viewed as the relative 
situation of a family compared to others, on an income scale. 
Thus, poverty appears as a gap between the lower and higher 
income categories. In 1972 Israeli wage policy fixed the 
minimum income level at I.L. 425 per month (national 
average = 1,000 to 1,500 I.L. per month). According to this 
policy families with two children at this minimum level 
would not be liable for income tax, but would be liable for 
national insurance, pension funds and health insurance pay­
ments. The net minimum income for such families, therefore, 
is I.L. 363 per month. In addition, these families often
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receive family allowances paid by employers and the National 
Insurance Institute.
A major problem of Sephardic and Oriental families 
is their large size. In July, 1975 the Israeli government 
introduced a system of progressive taxation which sought to 
increase take-home net income for larger families. It at­
tempts to incorporate a consideration for family size through
44the assignment of a point system.
According to this reformed system, the percentage of 
income deducted for taxes has been decreased. Personal de­
ductions for a citizen and his wife (as a dependent), which 
in the past were subtracted from one's income for the purpose 
of reckoning income tax, have been abolished; instead points 
have been assigned for each family member and their total 
value is subtracted from the total tax computed on the gross 
income. Each point is worth I.L. 100 per month. A man and 
his wife are allowed 1 1/2 points each, for each of the first 
two children one point each is allowed, a third child is 
equivalent to two points, and fourth and fifth children are 
2 1/4 points each. An important change is that payments for 
large families (greater than two children) are made by the 
National Insurance Institute and are tax-exempt.
An example of taxes on a family with a non-working 
wife with three children is shown on page 90. 44
44Association of Americans and Canadians in Israel, 
"Progressive Taxation Introduced in Israel," Aliyon, 
December, 1975, p.5.
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Total Monthly Earnings 
less taxes (25%) 
Plus 3 points (husband-
wife)
I.L. 2,000 
500
+ 300
Net earnings 1,800
Payment from N.I.I.
for 3 children 400
Net monthly spendable
income I.L. 2,200
Fig. 1. Sample of 1975 Israeli tax reform 
as applied to monthly family income.
This point system provides equity for those families who 
earn more than the minimum income, but are still at a low 
enough level to place them in a tenuous position. Two aims 
of the tax reform are to allow the individual to obtain 
proper compensation for his efforts and to allow the govern­
ment to distribute the burden of taxation more equitably 
among the population.
Despite any tax reform system, there are many who 
bear the severe disadvantage of low wage earnings and a 
family that is too large. These families are especially 
vulnerable to fluctuations in economic cycles. Supplemen­
tary income and welfare support becomes crucial for these 
families.
Income Maintenance - There are more than 120,000 
Jewish families receiving some form of welfare assistance 
and services in Israel. Of these families, thirty percent
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receive services without financial assistance, fifty percent 
receive various forms of material help, and twenty percent 
receive regular economic aid.
The main responsibility for insuring some minimum 
level of income rests with the National Insurance Institute. 
Payments are made to all families with many children, to 
those of low income, and to those temporarily or permanently 
unemployed. In 1974, I.L. 2.8 billion or 5.7 percent of 
the national income was paid for these benefits.
Sectors of the population which are not covered by
National Insurance are covered by the Ministry of Social
Welfare. The aged, family and child care, rehabilitation,
social welfare and supervision of voluntary agencies are
programs run by this Ministry. In 1974 it allocated I.L.
525 million for such purposes. Ethnic differentials are
obvious among welfare recipients. In terms of continent of
birth, 69.9 percent of recipient family heads were born in
Asia and Africa, twenty-five percent in Europe and the
45Americas, and only 5.4 percent in Israel.
The Ministry of Welfare is responsible for general 
welfare services as well as for those provided via the local 
authorities. This Ministry has a dual function - to provide 
services to families and individuals of all ages and to 45
45Jewish Agency for Israel, "Social Welfare in Israel 
- Changing Trends and Approaches," Unpublished Report, 
Jerusalem, February 1973. (Photocopied).
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promote community development. Those services which are 
intended directly for family and individual assistance are 
delivered by local authorities under Ministry supervision.
The 1958 Israeli Welfare Services Law established 
definitions and guidelines for the distribution of welfare 
service, but did not legally establish the citizen's right 
to receive such aid. In other words, the Israeli welfare 
system never formally adopted the principle that every 
citizen is entitled to aid in case of need. The same type 
of thinking, which never established the right to receive 
aid, also set the schedule of support payments to provide 
income that is lower than the fixed minimum wage. This 
disparity, as indicated in Table X, reflects the policy of 
stimulating welfare recipients to seek income from wages, 
even though the minimum wage is low.
TABLE X
RATES OF WELFARE PAYMENTS, 1972 
(in Israeli Pounds per month)46
No. of People 
in Family
N.I.I. Definition 
of Poverty Income
Social Welfare 
Rates
Avg. Wage, 
Full-Time 
Unskilled Labor
1 I.L. 126 I.L.123 I.L. 330
2 210 193 340
3 283 251 353
4 346 300 365
5 399 342 378
6 441 382 390
7 483 422 404
8 514 462 419
Geffner, Sephardi Problems, p.8.46
93
While the rate of welfare payments varies between 
eighty-six percent to ninety-eight percent of the definition 
of poverty for a particular category, welfare recipients 
receive additional assistance in the form of medical insur­
ance, food surpluses, help in purchasing domestic equipment 
(appliances), income tax and compulsory loan reductions, free 
educational services and assistance with rental payments.
A final word of explanation is due concerning the 
National Insurance Institute, founded in 1954 by legislative 
act. National Insurance, similar to U.S. Social Security, 
was made compulsory for the entire Israeli population from 
the age of eighteen until eligibility for old-age pension is 
attained. While it covers a broad range of the population, 
it is not specifically directed at solving the economic and 
social problems of the needy. Benefits are given to all 
those insured, according to criteria which determine their 
rights.
Of general importance, National Insurance provides 
income supplements to a number of deprived sections of the 
population, particularly families whose supporters earn low 
wages and have many children (Fig. 1). In a sense, such 
families are guaranteed a minimum income through various 
means, while the purchasing value of this income is safe­
guarded by payment adjustments linked to changes in the con­
sumer price index.
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Educational Integration of Social Groups in Israel
The dilemma in Israel today is whether social develp- 
ment of all sectors can be attained and whether it may be 
too costly. Obviously, the social gap is still the biggest 
internal problem Israel faces, and it is felt most in housing 
and education. While housing will be discussed in the next 
chapter, there have been certain recent developments in the 
educational system which exacerbate an already poor situation.
Among a number of cost-cutting measures, the Israeli 
government is considering the elimination of free tenth grade 
education. In addition, the cost of pre-school tuition 
averages I.L. 500 per month, or half of what most working 
mothers earn. Average high school fees now stand at I.L.
3,500 per year, or two months net wages for most workers. 
University budgets have been cut and tuition averages I.L. 
4,933 per year, a sum most families are unable to afford.
With this background in mind, it is important to realize 
that in 1976 education comprised the third largest item in 
the Israeli national budget, serving one million pupils. 
Education is tuition-free and compulsory between the ages of 
five and fifteen and jointly financed by State and local 
authorities.47
Primary education is limited to six years followed 
by six years of post-primary school up through grade twelve.
47 United Jewish Appeal, Education in Israel, 
Statistical Brief, (New York: UJA, 1976), p.2.
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Fees in secondary schools (grades 10-12) are approximate­
ly I.L. 3,500 per year with State subsidies available 
to some parents.48 About 56.3 percent of all secondary 
pupils are exempt from some payment, with a large portion of 
the cost difference being assumed by the quasi-public Jewish 
Agency.
The number of school children from large families of 
Asian and African origin represents a majority, sixty percent, 
of the elementary school population. Their proportion in 
the school system is larger than the number of African and 
Asian Jews in the national population. After twenty-seven 
years of educational experience in Israel, a new reality has 
developed which casts doubt on the principle of equal educa­
tion for all. Many new immigrant children from underdevelop­
ed countries have acquired the simplest skills of reading 
and writing only with the greatest difficulty. They have 
fallen steadily behind in levels of educational attainment as 
reflected in Table XI, The poor record of comparative 
achievement for Asian and African pupils as shown in Table XI 
is only part of the picture. As of 1973, students of Asian 
and African origins in institutions of higher education com­
prise only thirteen percent of the student population, four 
percent of the B.A. degrees awarded, eight percent of those 
enrolled in M.A. and doctoral degree programs, and only 1.6
48 Israel, Facts-1975, p.149.
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percent of those receiving M. A. and Ph.D degrees. 49
TABLE XI
RATE OF EDUCATIONAL ATTAINMENT FOR JEWISH 
PUPILS ACCORDING TO ORIGIN,BY 
PERCENTAGE, 1967-1970* 50
Origin
Began 
Grade 1
Completed 
Grade 8
Completed 
Grade 9
Completed 
Grade 12
Graduated High 
School
(passed exams)
Asia/
Africa 100% 90.5 72.0 23.0 6.0
Western/
Israeli 100% 95.5 95.0 63.0 35.0
Table XII compares university enrollments of students 
from thirteen older towns to those from twenty-five develop­
ment towns (excludes major cities). Older towns in Israel 
have very high populations of Ashkenazim and European parent­
age sabras (native-born Israelis), while the population of 
development towns consists more heavily of Sephardic and 
Oriental Jews. It is interesting to note that while overall 
enrollment from developmant towns is twenty percent the en­
rollment from older towns, enrollment at Ben-Gurion Univer­
sity in Beersheba exhibits the reverse of this pattern.
49 . .Israel, Ministry for Foreign Affairs, The Black 
Panthers in Israel, Background Paper E/8, 1973, p.2.
50Israel, Central Bureau of Statistics, Students in 
Academic Institutions, 1969/70, Special Publications Series 
No. 345, 1971, p.14.
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Here the enrollment by older town residents is 54% that of 
development town residents. Ben-Gurion University is an 
example of a planned government attempt to upgrade the educa­
tional opportunities of economically deprived Oriental 
students, partly by locating the school in proximity to the 
development towns where these students reside.
TABLE XII
STUDENT POPULATION IN MAJOR ISRAELI INSTITUTIONS, BY RESIDENCE, 197051
Institution
Older
Towns
Development
Towns
Bar-Ilan University 
(Tel Aviv)
1,644 139
Ben-Gurion University 
(Beersheba)
136 252
Haifa University 256 165
Hebrew University 
(Jerusalem)
1,828 601
Technion 
(Haifa)
1,298 286
Tel Aviv University 2,239 119
Weizmann Institute 
(Rehovot)
144 9
TOTAL 7,755 1,571
The Government established Ben-Gurion University in 
1969, after a study of national needs, to help spearhead the 
development of the Negev area. Beersheba was chosen as a
51Berlier, New Towns in Israel, pp.158-159.
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site due to its proximty to the Negev (Southern desert) 
region and because it is one of Israel's main centers for 
absorbing new immigrants. The University is an integral part 
of the absorption facilities in the area.
Ben-Gurion University has a unique national role to 
play in educating the large proportion of disadvantaged 
youngsters in the Negev area. The population of the Negev 
is seventy percent Sephardi and Sephardi students comprise 
twenty-five to thirty percent of the 4,500 students, or 
twice the national average. The University's policy of 
serving primarily as a community oriented center of educa­
tion will lead to a planned increase in the number of 
Sephardi students. As an example, the University has a 
preparatory school program which trains culturally deprived 
students and high school dropouts to specialize in subjects 
related to technology and science. It also attempts to 
bring them up to general university standards in other
academic disciplines.52
The relatively low achievement level and high drop­
out rate among Asian and African children can generally be 
attributed to a number of environmental variables such as 
poverty, educational deprivation in the immediate surround­
ings, and limited family cultural background. Furthermore,
52 Simson Carlebach, "Desert University," The 
Jerusalem Post, October 19, 1976, p.ll.
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the cultural upheaval often involved in immigration from an 
Oriental to a Western culture has also had a significant 
impact. As a direct result of this "clash" of cultures, 
the absorbing society contributed to educational failures 
among Sephardic and Oriental children. Despite concerted 
efforts, study curricula and teaching methods employed in 
Israel's educational system were not adapted to the vast dif­
ferences between pupils of different backgrounds and teachers 
lacked adequate experience and training to respond to the 
difficulties of these immigrant children.
In recent years a number of changes in Israeli 
educational thinking have occurred, mainly in terms of ques­
tioning assumptions on the superiority of the absorbing 
culture. Similarly, the validity of the principle that 
education ought to be egalitarian and uniform has been chal­
lenged. With the notable example of Ben-Gurion University 
as a case in point, Israeli educators have begun to devote 
more attention to equality of educational opportunity rather 
than uniformity of education.
More important than increasing opportunities at the 
university level is doing so at the elementary level.
Israel's Ministry of Education and Culture has implemented 
a number of special programs to raise educational levels 
and opportunities for Asian and African pupils. They include:
a. Free elementary studies (8-9 years) for all; 
free secondary school studies for under­
privileged children - 77.4% of children who 
do not pay fees are of Asian and African
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origin; enrichment syllabuses in arts, the 
theatre and music for children whose natural 
environment does not stress such values 
(7,300 benefited in 1972/73).
b. A longer school year for such pupils.
c. A longer school day for 71,000 pupils in 
1973/74 and hot lunches for 210,000.
d. Special tutoring.
e. Special annual grants for textbooks.
All this is meant to constitute a continuous flow 
of support to children from the age of 3 up to grants 
and loans at universities; the purpose to create equal 
opportunities, and not merely equality of treatment.53
As a result of changes such as these, the concept of 
"disadvantaged" or "deprived" defines children in need of 
relatively intensive educational care due to some form of 
so-called cultural deprivation. This concept is an Israeli 
innovation and was developed out of educational work in the 
particular situations of an immigrant absorbing country. 
Cultural deprivation, nevertheless, implies one culture is 
inferior. In fact, the deprivation is actually economic, 
with Asian and African families lacking the economic means 
or goals for self-advancement. While new Government educa­
tional programs are anticipated to have widespread impacts 
on equalizing educational opportunity, their effectiveness 
remains to be proven.
53 Israel, Facts-1975, p.151.
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Manpower Resources in Israel
Differing origins and socio-economic characteristics 
of immigrants influenced the occupational mobility of African 
and Asian Jews upon their arrival in Israel. One cannot talk 
of these Jews as a monolithic population. The economic suc­
cess of each group was predicated by the particular con­
ditions in the country of origin.
In Morocco, Jews were mainly artisans and small 
traders. In Tunisia and Algeria, Jews had been craftsmen, 
commercially employed persons and, in modern times, clerical 
workers and liberal professionals. These clericals and pro­
fessionals required advanced education based upon French 
culture and educational methods. This provided better abili­
ties for adapting to Western life. A large portion of this 
educated Tunisian and Algerian Jewish population preferred 
emigration to France. Those who came to Israel, the crafts­
men, generally lacked the skills for economic integration 
into a new society in the process of industrialization.
Without clear occupational skills, the masses of 
immigrants to Israel posed serious problems. While some 
could be integrated into the rural sector and others into 
the urban working class, mass immigration brought about 
radical transformations in the structures of the North 
African communities. The immigrant often rejected trans­
formations that were imposed by the demands of a developing
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Israeli society, preferring to attribute them to discrimina­
tion .
In any society there is a threshold of educational 
capital and skilled manpower levels below which a settlement 
cannot exist. Without a mix of manpower resources in a 
given area, pockets of extreme deprivation develop. In the 
industrialized countries, a highly developed division of 
labor is found. There is a range of specialization which 
expands in line with the demands of technological progress.
In such cases, the main manpower problem is to increase the 
levels of diversification. In developing countries that are 
just beginning to industrialize, the manpower problem be­
comes that of inculcating initial specialized skills in line 
with new industrial plants.
Due to high levels of immigration within a relatively 
short time, Israel is unique in that it does not fall into 
either of the above categories. While Israeli industriali­
zation is in full swing, its labor force is characterized by 
a highly polarized occupational structure. On the one hand, 
there are masses of immigrants from underdeveloped countries 
who are not attuned to modern industrial production. Many 
of them are illiterate or poorly educated and lack vocational 
training. On the other hand, there is a cadre of immigrants 
with a high level of professional training and skill who are 
prepared to move into skilled trades and management positions.
Israel has wide geographic variations in terms of 
industrialization and development. Those areas which were
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underdeveloped and exhibited deprivation, such as develop­
ment towns, found that their major problem was a lack of 
skilled workers and professionals. Government attempts at 
rehabilitation never worked because most of the initiative 
came from above and little from below. As a result, small 
and medium-scale industry and services did not develop.
Israel has moved through a transition period between 
stagnation and development in its attempt to cope with im­
migration from abroad as well as internal migration, both of 
which created demographic pressures on Israel's employment 
structure. When Israel, a country of small population, 
absorbed a high proportion of immigrants, it became neces­
sary to adopt a policy of maximum manpower utilization 
through the institution of what is termed "rapid reserves." 
This was roughly equivalent to a combination of the Civilian 
Conservation Corps during the Depression era in the United 
States and a private employment bureau.
The utilization of these reserves was born out of a 
need to provide jobs for all immigrants and to develop a 
given technical production capacity. The system was advan­
tageous because large numbers were activated for the labor 
force, including many who had never worked before. The need 
to provide the newcomers with the minimum means for exis­
tence, however, became a barrier to specialization. While 
it has been essential for Israel, as a developing country, 
to place theoretically equal emphasis on maximal exploita-
TABLE XIII
ISRAELI EMPLOYMENT BY ECONOMIC BRANCH, 1968-1972 
(In Thousands and Percentages)54
Economic
Branch 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972
No. No. No. No. No.
Agriculture 94.3 10.3% 91.3 9.7% 84.8 8.8% 84.5 8.5% 83.5 8.0%
Industry &
Mining 217.6 23.9 226.1 23.9 233.3 24.2 239.6 24.0 248.4 23.8
Electricity 
& Water 11.6 1.3 10.6 1.1 11.3 1.2 11.0 1.1 9.0 0.8
Construction 72.9 8.0 75.9 8.0 80.1 8.3 88.3 8.9 99.3 9.5
Transportation 
& Communication 68.4 7.5 74.7 7.9 72.2 7.5 74.0 7.4 76.9 7.4
Commerce Hotels 
& Restaurants 120.4 13.2 125.0 13.2 125.0 13.0 126.4 12.7 137.0 13.1
Public
Services 205.4 22.6 213.9 22.6 230.3 23.9 241.3 24.2 252.5 24.3
Finance &
Other Service 120.3 13.2 128.3 13.6 126.5 13.1 132.0 13.2 136.4 13.1
TOTAL 910.9 100 % 945.8 100 % 963.2 100 % 997.1 100 % 1,047.0 100 %
54Israel, Facts-1975, p.138.
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tion of available manpower and on large capital investments, 
the waves of immigration at various periods intensified the 
need for the former. As experience has shown, such emphasis 
did not solve the basic problem of many deprived areas - that 
of professionalization. The utilization of rapid reserves 
brought about full or almost complete employment, but it 
often served to conceal the invisible unemployment, such as 
relief work, and the basic lack of skills in the labor force.
While patterns of employment in Israel, by type of 
activity, remain relatively stable, the pressures on man­
power due to shortages of skilled labor and professional 
management have increased. While Table XIII illustrates 
general employment in Israel, it does not say anything about 
ethnic differentials by type of employment. Table XIV, on 
the other hand, illustrates the predominance of Asian and 
Africans in "blue-collar" occupations (the latter three 
categories) while Europeans and North Americans predominate 
in professional and "white-collar" occupations.
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TABLE XIV
PERCENTAGE EMPLOYMENT IN ISRAEL, BY CATEGORIES, 
ACCORDING TO ETHNIC ORIGIN, 197255
Employment
Category Asian/African European/N. American
Total Work Force 34% 43%
Professionals 16 50
White Collar 19 54
Construction 53 32
Industrial 41 38
Service 48 37
Key variables that determine levels of occupational 
and income achievement are length of residence in Israel, 
the educational level of the household head, and increasing­
ly, the education of other family members. Widening educa­
tional opportunities in Israel does offer hope for a more 
equitable sharing of occupational opportunities by all 
segments of Israeli society in coming years.
The importance of ethnic influence on the Israeli 
economy stems from the fact that a modern economy is not 
constituted solely by means of material resources; for its 
operation, it also needs a well consolidated social and 
cultural structure.
55 Israel, Black Panthers, p.4.
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The approach which regards large capital invest­
ments as the magic solution to the problems of 
underdeveloped regions is incorrect. In most 
cases advancement will not be attained if the 
necessary attention is not devoted to raising 
the professional level of manpower. It is all 
the more necessary to pay attention to this 
aspect when the lives of the persons employed 
are themselves inadequate. When their education 
is faulty and the regional development is un­
balanced, when there are slums and the health 
services are insufficient, when cultural oppor­
tunities are unequally distributed, and there is 
neglect of entertainment facilities it is still 
more obvious that priority must be given to 
education, slum clearance, better health service 
and development of backward areas. If it turns 
out that it is these aspects which account for 
unemployment and retardation in economic growth, 
there is every justification for unemployment and 
economic growth not being regarded as top priority.56
While the Israeli Government publicly claims to be 
making advances into those areas mentioned by Galbraith, 
there are wide variations in the realities of individual, 
neighborhood, and community advancement in raising levels of 
personal, economic and cultural growth. Successes in such 
advancement and growth, therefore, depends upon the motiva­
tions of the people who are themselves seeking (or not seek­
ing) to advance.
56J.K, Galbraith, "The Science of Economics vs.
Human Needs," The Economic Quarterly, Nos. 45-46, 1965, p.15.
CHAPTER VI
SOCIAL AND PHYSICAL PLANNING LINKAGES IN ISRAEL
The Relationship Between Physical and Social Problems 
in Israeli Urban Environments
An unbalanced distribution of population and urban 
centers has posed serious problems for planning in Israel.
Where centralization of human activities has its advantages, 
unplanned development negates them. A hierarchy of rural 
communities, regional commercial centers, and national urban 
centers is a system which provides greatest opportunities for 
economic and social progress and easing of social intergration. 
With exceptions, Israel has been largely unsuccessful in its 
attempts to establish a hierarchy of human settlements.
There are three types of social problems associated 
with urbanization: (1) those that stem from the inherent nature
of the urban life style, (2) those that arise from a transfer, 
through migration, of rural problems-poverty, illiteracy, unem- 
ployment-to urban areas where they become more conspicuous, and 
(3) those that result from the process of rapid change inherent 
in urbanization. Thus, social problems are created by increase 
in physical numbers, more congested living, more complex social 
institutions, and by the difficulties of transition from the
108
109
rural to the urban way of life.
Social problems associated with urbanization have 
had great impact upon Israel. Due to the absorption of large 
numbers of immigrants, temporary settlements were construct­
ed during the earlier waves of immigration to cope with the 
large and sudden influx of people. The exact legal status 
of these settlements was always unclear. Depending upon 
time of arrival, immigrants were housed in a variety of dwel­
lings. Large numbers were housed in small, asbestos covered 
buildings. While these housing provisions were originally 
intended as temporary, allowing the immigrant a transitional 
period while adapting to a new environment, the temporary 
gradually became permanent. These settlements could be 
found in rural areas, development towns or within major 
cities. Subsequently, a family of six living in a one or 
two room dwelling originally intended for two or three per­
sons became commonplace in these settlement areas.
Another type of transitional settlement, largely a 
problem in areas surrounding Jerusalem, are squatter colonies 
resulting from wars. Following Israel's wars of 1948 and 
1967, certain areas which were under Arab control were 
vacated. These areas contained a large proportion of sub­
standard housing, usually in the form of old hotels or apart­
ment buildings, damaged by shelling and subsequently condemn­
ed by the Israeli government. Large numbers of Israeli Jews, 
particularly slum-dwelling North Africans, quickly moved in
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as squatters; attempts by the government to remove them 
failed and many remain to this day.
The term "transitional settlement" embraces many 
forms of slums, squatter settlements, and other uncontrolled 
environments. These areas are transitional in the sense 
that their inhabitants are undergoing a social and economic 
change as they adapt to an urban economy. The effective 
land use of these originally temporary settlements have now 
assumed a permanent residential classification. People who 
continue to populate these areas intensify planning problems 
by increasing living densities in central low-rent and low- 
income areas and by invasion of vacant public and private 
land, typically in peripheral areas, which impedes efforts 
required for long-term improvement and development of these 
lands.
While it may be desirable for transitional areas to 
be vacated, their continued occupation by large numbers of 
poorer immigrants is a function of benefits produced. They 
provide their inhabitants: housing at rents within the 
means of the lowest income groups; informal reception centers 
for newly-arrived immigrants, easing their adjustment to 
urban life; employment in marginal and small-scale enter­
prises; accommodations in close proximity to place of employ­
ment; and adequate social support during unemployment and 
other periods of difficulty.
Transitional settlements, while not isolated to a
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particular region in Israel, have significant impacts upon 
Jerusalem and Tel Aviv, Conditions of distress created by 
transitional areas, however, prevail in other areas as well. 
Whether in development towns or in large cities, poor con­
ditions have been created by immigrants left to their own 
devices. Often immigrants settled in neighborhoods based 
upon common periods of arrival and/or country of origin.
These bases for neighborhood organization, therefore, did 
not favor positive intergroup social relations, integration, 
or economic advancement of disadvantaged groups. Conditions 
of distress and deterioration, therefore, came to prevail in 
three types of areas:
1. Certain development towns. Some development 
towns are distressed, especially those located a considerable 
distance from established urban regions. These towns lag 
behind in basic municipal services and cultural resources 
are limited to only occasional contact between the town's 
inhabitants and Israeli institutions. Relations between 
immigrants and veteran Israelis and between people of dif­
fering national origins are often tense. Economically dis­
advantaged towns also have difficulty maintaining population 
since residents leave as soon as they find better opportuni­
ties elsewhere.
2. Pockets of distress in established settlements. 
Pockets of distress are older sections of rural or semi-urban 
settlements. These pockets were temporary "dumping grounds"
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for immigrants in the early years of the State, much like 
transitional settlements in urban areas. As the settlements 
in proximity to these pockets established themselves, develop­
ing economically, residents of distressed areas, lacking 
skills and not having been absorbed into the mainstream of 
Israeli society, became locked out of the economic and social 
life of the settlements.
3. Distressed neighborhoods in large cities and on 
their outskirts. In the three large urban centers of Jeru­
salem, Tel Aviv and Haifa, integration poses problems dif­
ferent from those in the two aforementioned areas. North
African immigrants frequently settled in very old neighbor-
hoods or in katamon quarters.57 In Jerusalem they were hur- 
ridly constructed to accommodate mass immigrant arrivals.
These quarters at times can be found in close proximity to 
affluent neighborhoods, exacerbating feelings of deprivation 
and frustration and sometimes leading to violence and crim­
inal behavior.
Housing Problems In Israel
The combination of short supply and high cost of 
housing in Israel has caused overcrowding, impacting on 
middle and upper-income families as well as the poor.
57The Hebrew word katamon literally means "district." 
While comparisons are difficult, connotations in common usage 
are akin to the American concept of a hard-core inner-city 
slum or a skid-row area.
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The problem transcends regional distinctions. The shortage 
is felt in urban centers, development towns and rural areas.
Mass migration and rapid urbanization created a de­
mand for housing that far exceeded the supply. All types of 
housing were in demand, even sub-standard dwellings. Con­
centrations of low-income populations were forced into slums 
where living conditions are characterized by deteriorated 
buildings, high population density per unit, concentrations 
of populations having similar ethnic origins, high frequen­
cies of welfare, crime, and broken families. Public services 
are unavailable or insufficient in these areas and there is 
a high incidence of depression and isolation among inhabi­
tants. Other city residents look at these areas with disdain, 
as do the slum residents themselves.
While there has been a steady improvement in housing
conditions in Israel over the years, it has not been felt by
the entire population. The system of public housing has
succeeded in increasing the average size of apartments from
thirty-one square meters (334 sq. ft.) in the early 1950's
to about seventy-five square meters (807 sq. ft.) in the 
early 1970's.58 There has also been considerable improvement 
in the structural quality of housing since 1950. Although 
available units have improved, the major problem of supply 
shortages remains.
58Geffner, Sephardi Problems,pp. 17-24
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The reasons for Israel's housing shortage vary from 
the technical to the political. In addition to natural popu­
lation growth, Israel adds about 40,000 new immigrants per 
year to its population. Furthermore, the need to replace a 
significant percentage of existing substandard housing units 
increases the demand. When this is added to the construction 
of public buildings, industrial plants and commercial space, 
the result is a limited labor force not able to meet these 
needs.
The high cost of housing, partially due to demand, 
is driven upward by government land policy. Due to Israel's 
Socialist history, the scarcity of land and the need to care­
fully control land development, the government is the owner 
of most land suitable for housing. Government practice has 
exhibited a reluctance to release land in large parcels and 
instead has favored land appropriations on a piecemeal, 
short-term basis. Thus, a continual shortage of lots has 
resulted in an escalation in housing costs. Furthermore, 
property tax policy falls more heavily upon buildings than 
land. This encourages private landowners to withhold lots 
for development until market prices rise sufficiently for 
owners to realize a substantial profit.
Housing has been a tremendous burden on the Israeli 
economy. Although in the long-run it is an essential part 
of the social cost of development, it is inflationary in the 
short-run. Housing expenditures involve large sums expended
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on materials and labor without an immediate return in the 
form of consumption or export goods. Inflationary pressures 
and resultant high interest rates have made it extremely 
difficult to construct housing at reasonable costs without 
heavy government subsidies. Most housing has to be purchased 
and, despite government assistance in the form of credits and 
subventions, the purchase of decent housing is beyond the 
reach of the poor. Israel has an economy with considerable 
governmental intervention. Housing problems, therefore, may 
be viewed as a failure in policy to control costs through 
regulation and manipulation of vast land resources and 
through construction contracts that are awarded by the 
government to private contractors.
With this background in mind, a picture emerges in 
which social problems and distress in urban neighborhoods 
may be attributed to two major factors:
1. The various relief services in the country are 
ineffective in solving the total complex of problems, par­
ticularly those involved with the creation of an infrastruc­
ture for social and community services.
2. Poor neighborhoods are islands of physical, 
social and economic neglect in the midst of comparative 
prosperity. The proximity of two opposite lifestyles deepens 
the sense of helplessness and anger in the distressed popula­
tion .
Degrees of neglect and of social and economic gaps
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between different populations in Israel vary greatly, 
whether between one urban neighborhood with another or be­
tween one region of the country and another. Two case 
studies will be examined: Nahla'ot in Jerusalem and Kiryat 
Gat in the Lachish Region. The former is a Jerusalem neigh­
borhood which typifies neglect and inefficiency of services 
as a major source of problems, while Kiryat Gat and the 
Lachish Region represent directed planning aimed at achieving 
viable solutions to social and economic gaps in Israeli 
society.
The Nahla'ot Quarter In Jerusalem,
A Distressed Neighborhood
The development of Nahla'ot, now a distressed neigh­
borhood in Jerusalem, has been closely linked to the growth 
of modern Jerusalem. According to Shlomo Gadish, Deputy
Mayor of Jerusalem, many modern-day planning problems stem
59from the varied origins of Jerusalem's Jewish population. 
Prior to 1948, Jews on both the east and west sides of the 
city shared the same facilities, services, and infra-struc­
ture, all of which were relatively poor, but after 1948 dis­
parity developed between the Jordanian (east) and the 
Israeli (west) sides of the city. A population migration, 
mostly of Jews, took place as people sought the better ser­
vices and facilities available on the Israeli side of the 59
59 Interview with Hon. Shlomo Gadish, Deputy Mayor of 
Jerusalem, Hotel Reich, Jerusalem, August 20, 1973.
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city. In addition, between 1948 and 1952 the Israeli 
government moved new immigrants directly to Jerusalem in 
order to fortify the Jewish population, and many were placed 
in unfit housing. The combination of these two population 
movements together with a third - voluntary migration due 
to the spiritual attraction of Jerusalem - has resulted in 
a city built as a patch-work of neighborhoods and adjacent 
incompatible land uses. A major problem confronting Jerusa­
lem's planners is the difficulty in enforcing an already 
weak Master Plan (Tochnit Ha'av) as a means of controlling 
this "patchwork" of neighborhoods and land uses. As Mr. 
Gadish went on to explain, Jerusalem's Master Plan is no 
more than a general scheme, projecting the commercial, 
social and transportation system of the city several years 
hence. The Master Plan, derived from the British Mandate 
era (circa 1935), is archaic in that it only works from the 
top to the bottom; there is little flexibility in response 
to changing needs and changes are implemented without con­
sultation or public participation.
Jerusalem, built on hilly terrain, is not a large 
city in area and distances between the outermost suburbs 
are not very great. The center of the city is the business 
and shopping district near Zion Square. Not far from this 
location is the spiritual heart, the old walled city and its 
numerous holy places. The commercial center, however, is 
the focus of the Master Plan, which calls for dense building
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near the center of the capitol, resulting in a virtual 
doubling of the central city population density. it was 
thought that centralization would unite the population 
socially, bringing together diverse segments, while simul­
taneously offering increased employment opportunities. This 
approach, however, became standard practice even in non­
central city areas and, therefore, open spaces have not 
generally been preserved in residential neighborhoods. Thus, 
starkness and high densities in many local neighborhoods 
have intensified physical deterioration.
Finally, the major problem with the Master Plan is 
that it is often honored in the breach. Although there are 
strict limitations on building height in certain parts of 
the city, zoning variances are often easily granted.
Several major projects, such as the French Hill and Nebi 
Samuel developments (housing projects built on the Judean 
Hills surrounding the city), contradict the basic assump­
tions of the Master Plan with its centralizing guidelines.
In fact, a number of planned and already constructed hotels 
such as the Jerusalem Hilton Tower (30 storeys) are totally 
opposed to the spirit of the plan, which aimed at eliminating 
the spread of the city. Architectural aesthetics, as a re­
sult, are not consistent with the city's history.
It is against this backdrop that one can understand 
the great difficulties the municipality has had to face in 
coping with a population which has mushroomed from 201,000
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in 1967 to 361,000 in 1976. It is doubtful that Jerusalem 
has established the proper planning procedures that will 
enable it to avoid the blight that threatens the city. 
Jerusalem's objective problems become even more difficult 
when one examines some recent statistical characteristics of 
its population. Fifty-three percent of all Jerusalemites 
are of Asian and African origin, with a large majority of 
these being in lower income categories. Thirty-one percent 
of Jewish families in Jerusalem have five members or more; 
and only forty-five percent of Jerusalem's population is in 
the labor force.60 Jerusalem, therefore, lacks the social 
and economic resources to support itself. Its population 
structure is cumbersome to a city which must be concerned 
with delivery of social services and rehabilitation of dis­
tressed neighborhoods.
With regard to economic and social resources, 
Jerusalem is inferior to Tel Aviv. For example, the number 
of families receiving welfare in Jerusalem is fourteen per­
cent; in Tel Aviv 9.5%. Of all housing units in Jerusalem, 
forty-eight percent are substandard; in Tel Aviv twenty-two 
percent of the total housing units available are substan­
dard.61 These figures clearly indicate that Jerusalem must 
cope with severe urban problems while it remains a poor city.
60 Israel, Central Bureau of Statistics, as reported 
in the Bulletin of the Jewish Telegraphic Agency, December
31, 1976 , 
61
p. 2.
Ibid.
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Since the post-1967 unification, the municipality has de­
voted insufficient attention to city planning problems.
It has approved the erection of new suburbs on the periphery 
of the city without a balanced strengthening of the infra­
structure and service networks in the city center. Older 
districts such as Nahla'ot, therefore, remain neglected; 
their needs for social and physical rehabilitation are a 
major part of the developmental problems facing Jerusalem.
General Description of Nahla'ot
Nahla'ot is an older, neglected area physically ad­
jacent to two expensive and well cared for neighborhoods, 
both of which are structurally opposite Nahla'ot - to the 
southeast is Rehavia and to the west lies Kiryat Wolfson 
(Fig. 2). At one time the impact of such an arrangement, 
although unplanned, pointed to hopes for at least a limited 
success in achieving social integration. As design had it, 
poor and affluent neighborhoods bordered each other and the 
children had to attend the same school. While details of 
this process will be discussed later, social integration has 
not been fostered in general. Instead, the poorer children 
confronted the problem of raised expectations, which only 
heightened feelings of frustration.
Nahla'ot is a downtown Jerusalem slum near Government 
offices and the Knesset to the west and the Mahane Yehuda 
central market area to the northeast. Because of its cen­
tral location, construction is going on all around the
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Fig. 2. Nahla'ot in relation to greater Jerusalem
Carta's Jerusalem Map (Jerusalem: Carta Ltd.,1969)
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quarter's periphery. The area is an old Jewish quarter 
embracing several smaller neighborhoods - Sha'arei Hessed, 
Nahalat Zion, and Sha'aeir Rabanim, built between 1900 and 
1910, and Nahalat Ahim and Zichron Ahim built in the early 
twenties and thirties (Fig. 3), In the late fifties some 
new buildings were built on the foundations of the old.
The quarter is located on a steep westerly slope 
which makes construction difficult. Most of the buildings 
are made of stone. The narrow streets are clean and the 
walls whitewashed. Clothes lines are strung across the 
streets from one balcony to the other. The quarter is so 
full of houses that there is little space left for parks, 
and children usually have to play in the streets. Apart 
from a few swings in one small park there are no playgrounds. 
Narrow alleys, sidewalks difficult to travel, old buildings, 
courtyards with dilapidated walls, and overcrowding compose 
the fact of Nahla'ot.
Many of Nahla'ot's problems are derived from its 
pattern of growth. Many early Yemenite settlers built their 
own homes, constructing one room and adding others over time 
as they were able. Plumbing was practically non-existent at 
first, although added later in most cases. Thus, a maze of 
flat little houses grouped around small inner courtyards 
sprang up, helter-skelter. During the 1948 war many Jews, 
fleeing battles raging in the Jewish quarter of the Old 
City, settled in the Nahla'ot quarter; they were accommo-
Fig. 3. Detail of Nahla'ot and Rehavia (enlargement of Fig.2.)
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dated in additional housing built upon a patchwork of streets 
and alleys. As a result of its history, Nahla'ot today has 
deteriorated to a point where physical and social decay are 
extant throughout the quarter, which is populated by large, 
low-income families.
The National Insurance Institute, as may be recalled 
from Chapter V, plays a major role in providing financial 
assistance to low income and/or large families. In a per­
sonal interview with the director of the Institute, Dr.
Israel Katz, an assessment of problem areas like Nahla'ot 
was developed.63 While the hard facts of low income, poor 
housing and education are undeniable, he noted other problems 
arise beyond low-income levels, which involve life styles and 
value systems. Children in areas such as Nahla'ot develop 
an acceptance of limitations which impede their ability to 
make choices that might allow improved social and economic 
opportunities in their future; the cycle continues with their 
children.
Dr. Katz felt that education for the children in 
neighborhoods such as Nahla'ot should not occur solely in the 
classroom. Rather many of Nahla'ot's disadvantaged children, 
and their parents, have failed to respond to the general 
pressures and demands put upon them when changing their 
environment from a Casablanca, for example, to a Tel Aviv.
63 Interview with Dr. Israel Katz, Executive Director, 
National Insurance Institute, Hotel Reich, Jerusalem,
August 21, 1973.
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Failure to adapt to a changed environment creates disparities 
in family life and home environments significantly different 
from higher-income European quarters.
Education, therefore, begins in the home environment 
at an early age and instills a perception of the outside 
environment. It provides basic skills for adaptation to 
that environment. Failure to provide such a learning environ­
ment in places like Nahla'ot is exacerbated by problems of 
poor self-image. As Dr. Katz explained, in any society dif­
ferent groups have varying degrees of social honor and pres­
tige. People often behave in the image of themselves cast 
by other people. Similarly, one's perceived opinion of 
oneself is often based upon the social group to which one 
belongs. While this is not a new revelation in social theory, 
it is significant for Nahla'ot. The residents often exhibit 
negative behavior - juvenile delinquency, prostitution, gamb­
ling, drug-use - due to poor self-image.
Being mostly North African and Yemenite, Nahla'ot's 
residents came from countries where they were by law, second- 
class citizens. This fact, in turn, fostered a second-class 
self image which remained even after resettlement in Israel. 
Nahla'ot's residents compared themselves to western or 
Ashkenazi Israelis, and self-esteem was lowered even further.
In another private interview, Asher Malke, a leader 
of O.D.E.D. (North African University Students Association) 
at Bar Ilan University, confirmed the cycle of negative self-
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image from his own childhood. By the time the child 
achieves some level of social consciousness, two things 
occur: (a) a complete rejection of the parents' value system
which usually results in the breakdown of family life, and 
(b) a shame and denial of one's Sephardic background stemming 
from a false recognition that to be lavan (white) or 
Ashkenazic is the standard. He felt that much of the inte­
gration between Sephardim and Ashkenazim occurs only after 
a Sephardi submerges his ethnic identity, even though the 
Ashkenazi never really establishes such a precondition for 
interchange. Mr. Malke quipped that the most extensive inte­
gration between Sephardim and Ashkenazim usually occurs when
64these youngsters come together to drink and smoke hashish.
While the psychological framework of Nahla'ot's 
residents are a significant contributing factor to their 
generally poor standard of living, the physical realities of 
life in the quarter are equally important in gaining an over­
all picture of life in the district
Housing Characteristics of Nahla'ot
A number of building types characterize Nahla'ot.
One is the single or two-storey house built of concrete with 
stone facing. These houses are built around a courtyard with 
the kitchen and toilet outside against a courtyard wall. A
64 Interview with Asher Malke, President O.D.E.D., 
Bar-Ilan University, Tel Aviv, August 31, 1973.
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second type is the two or three storey stone building with 
an outside stairway leading to entrance-way balconies. The 
kitchen and toilets are indoors, but shared by a number of 
families. Finally, Nahla'ot is characterized by the single 
storey stone house not built around a courtyard, which usual­
ly contains a basement where people live. In addition to 
these three housing types, there are also tin or wooden huts 
scattered throughout the quarter.
Small apartments and serious overcrowding are the
pattern of the low housing standard in the quarter. Most
apartments in Nahla'ot are much smaller than the Jerusalem
average. The average number of occupants per room is 3 to
3.9, compared to 1 to 1.9 for the city as a whole.65 Most 
of the apartments consist of one or two rooms; some families 
have their own kitchen and bathroom, while others share these 
facilities. Interestingly this contributes towards improved 
neighborly relations in many instances, as sharing the facili­
ties involves needs for communication and social interchange 
between those neighbors sharing the facilities. Most of the 
kitchens are narrow and their small size makes them inef­
ficient. Frequently they are not more than cooking corners 
inside the living space. In the numerous apartments where 
there is neither shower nor bath, the family has to wash in 
the corner of the living-room. Some of the apartments lack
65Yocheved Liron, Deprivation and the Socio-Economic 
Gap in Israel (Jerusalem: Israel Economist Press, 1973),
p. 160.
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a hot water system and the occupants heat water on the gas or 
oil stove. These same facilities serve to heat the house in 
winter, although some families have kerosene room heaters.
The dismal picture of structural conditions is large­
ly due to a housing standard rooted in the past,when toilet 
facilities were not regarded as an integral component of 
apartment facilities. A substantial number of the residents 
make some improvements to their apartments, including both 
owner-occupants and tenants. While alterations are an at­
tempt to improve housing standards, they tend to spoil the 
outer appearance of the neighborhood. Large families close 
off their balcony with shutters to make an extra bedroom or 
even another storey. Most who do make improvements aspire 
to a proper bathroom. The resulting jumbled patchwork, while 
improving the area structurally, adds to the crowded and run­
down appearance in Nahla'ot.
As was explained by a social worker in the quarter's 
local community center, the main housing problems in Nahla'ot 
are dampness and overcrowding. These affect both the physical 
and mental health of all who live in the area. Add to this 
the common practice of several children sleeping in one bed 
and/at times, even in the stairways. What emerges is a pic­
ture of high failure rates in school, low levels of education­
al attainment and high rates of crime and juvenile delin-
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66quency.
The Demographic Structure of the Quarter 
Population and Family Size
Nahla'ot is an old quarter founded in stages between 
1900 and 1920. The first settlers were native born Israelis 
who moved from the Old City and immigrants from Afro-Asian 
countries. Approximately ninety percent of its present 
residents arrived in Israel by 1945. Kurds, Yemenites, 
Syrians, Sephardis, Iraqis, and native-born Israelis predom­
inate in the quarter. Most of the families in the neighbor­
hood are large,sometimes consisting of nine or more people. 
There are also many families numbering more than six persons. 
Much of this is due to the traditional mode of life in the 
quarter, which encourages women to marry by the age of 18 
and even younger. Only a small percentage of families have 
only one or no children. The percentage of younger house­
holds in the neighborhood is very low, due to an exodus of 
those younger residents who have more mobility.
In spite of the high rate of natural population in­
crease in the quarter, the area is in a condition of stag­
nation and decline due to self-selective emigration. The 
population of the neighborhood,therefore, is gradually be­
coming older and the permanent residents are mature adults
66 Interview with Menachem Sadinsky, Director Beit 
Pomerantz Community Center, Jerusalem, August 15, 1973.
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and their elderly parents who immigrated with them, all 
living in the same flat. Those few families that purchase 
a flat for their children one flight above or below them 
actually live in a "clan" structure with four generations in 
one household - grandparents, parents with their children, 
one married son, his wife and their babies.
Educational and Occupational Levels
There are some young adults who, after military ser­
vice, have not yet married and are still living in the paren­
tal home. While they constitute some of the work force, the 
economically active population consists principally of the 
older adults. The children go to elementary school to age 
14, while some, including girls, continue for two years be­
yond in vocational studies. Others who neither study nor 
work find their outlet in deviant behaviors, such as delin­
quency and prostitution. Children in school and those serv­
ing in the army constitute an additional burden on the family 
budget, requiring pocket money and clothing. There are many 
youths of working age, therefore, but the father remains the 
principle source of income.
There are families where the father is ill and the 
wife works. This often undermines the value system and 
authority in the family. Furthermore, there are other fam­
ilies where neither of the parents work and must exist on 
welfare allotments and relief. The percentage of families 
where both parents work is negligible.
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Educational level is difficult to determine in an 
ethnically varied population, but generally, a picture of low 
educational standards and achievement emerges. According 
to Mr. Sadinsky, surveys made in the quarter show a large 
gap between level of formal education in Nahla'ot and the 
national average. Low educational level prevents the resi­
dents from making progress and integrating in the stream of 
modern life.67
There is a positive correlation between educational 
level and occupation with job skills rising as education rises. 
The proportion of those engaged in service industries, con­
struction and trades, drivers and peddlers, is much higher 
in Nahla'ot than those employed in technical and manufactur­
ing occupations. Few of the residents, however, are unemploy­
ed .
Income
The average family income of IL 500-800 per month 
derives from either wages or direct social welfare payments.
The proportion of wage income is low due to a low ratio of 
breadwinners to family members. The origin of the bread­
winner has a considerable bearing on income level. Income 
of Asian and African immigrants is lowest in the quarter, 
while that of native-born Israelis is the highest. As Afro-
67 Ibid.
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Asian residents are a high percentage of the district's 
population, there is a concentration of low-income families 
in Nahla'ot.
The existing welfare methods are of little impact in 
raising the income levels of deprived families. A chief 
reason is the social stigma attached to the welfare supported 
population and its effect on the family's chances for improv­
ing their situation. Some families, therefore,avoid using 
welfare services for which they are eligible. The structure 
of the welfare support system, which does not allow outside 
employment, also has a deleterious effect upon lower income 
families. Where the head of a household may want to work in 
order to supplement direct social welfare payments, but where 
wage-income is inadequate to totally forego welfare payments, 
the family will opt for the higher income available through 
welfare. These families are most vulnerable to fluctuations 
in economic conditions, a frequent occurence in Israel.
Life-Pattern of a Family in Nahla'ot
When one visits a family in Nahla'ot, the implica­
tions of income, education, family size and housing become 
clear.68 Entering the family dwelling one finds no hall but 
steps directly into a living-room which doubles as a bedroom. 
There are a number of open shelves with a small collection of
68A teacher/social worker from the Beit Pomerantz 
Community Center accompanied me on a visit to a family in 
Nahla'ot, acting as interpreter and adding some of the 
descriptive material.
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china, utensils and glassware. Some prayer books are also 
visible. In the center of the room is a wooden table with 
five chairs. The tabletop is strewn with schoolbooks and 
writing materials. In a corner of this central room is a 
small kitchen containing a sink, cupboards, and a small 
electric refrigerator.
There is an inner room which is smaller and contains 
the parents' double bed, two folding beds for the children, 
and a clothes cupboard. The toilet and shower is beside a 
stone wall in a cubicle separating two apartments. These 
are shared with another family. The showerhead is open to 
the floor and one must light a kerosene burner which heats a 
small holding tank for hot water. In spite of a generally 
overcrowded appearance, the apartment seemed very clean.
In this two room apartment lived a family of ten- 
husband, wife, six unmarried children, and two aged parents. 
The two youngest children sleep in the parents' bedroom.
The other four sleep with the grandparents in the living-room. 
The father earns IL500 per month and. the mother works part- 
time as a domestic. While they are at work the children 
play in the streets without supervision,although the grand­
parents do provide supervision in the home. The parents are 
not concerned if the older children do not attend school.
Often they are indifferent, or they prefer them to help with 
the housework and care for the younger children. It becomes 
clear that the children are deprived of a basic education 
because of frequent absences.
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While poor attendance contributes to the lack of 
success at school, noise and overcrowding at home prevent 
those who do attend from adequately preparing their lessons 
or studying. Most of Nahla'ot's children drop out of school 
at age fourteen. Those who do go on to high school (usually 
a vocational one) are most often low achievers. Many of 
these drop out of high school so that they can contribute to 
the family income.
Another element which contributes to the educational 
failure of Nahla'ot's (and other Oriental) children was ex­
plained by Dr. Avner Shaki, former Deputy Minister of Educa­
tion. The Israeli schools have a uniform curriculum drawn 
up by the Ministry of Education, whose members are of east 
European origin. The curriculum is structured by a value 
system originating in eastern Europe, This does not coincide 
with the scale of values of sixty percent of Israel's popula­
tion, which is of Mediterranean origin. Educational values 
that originate in the Middle East were pushed aside in the 
Israeli school curriculum as in other aspects of Israeli 
lif e.
Educational theory holds that a child learns more ef­
fectively when the curriculum is geared to his environment 
and experience. The learning process becomes one of drill 
and memorization if content and standards appear meaningless 
and unrelated to the child's experience. The failure to 
provide Sephardic and Oriental music, literature, folklore
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or religious philosophy deprives these children of positive 
and meaningful self-identity and self-pride. The monolithic 
centralist approach can only result in the ultimate obliter­
ation of the ethnic identity of those who cannot resist ef­
fectively. It is not surprising that children who have a 
poor image of themselves and their cultural background fail 
in school.
Of those who drop out of school, some enter the labor 
market for long-term but unskilled, low-paying jobs. Others 
find casual, low status work which often leads to eventual 
delinquency. Youth clubs and movements do not attract these 
children, who are filled with resentment, frustration, and 
a sense of being discriminated against. Even the Israel 
Defense Forces reject many youths because of delinquency, 
lack of education and adjustment problems. Those who do 
make progress in the armed forces, through acquired technical 
and occupational skills, find their problems more acute upon 
discharge. They find it impossible to return to their old 
milieu and they do not fit into a new social framework out­
side the quarter.69
Overcrowding makes it difficult to maintain proper 
standards of hygiene in Nahla'ot. The chances of illness, 
mental or physical, are high. Infections are spread more
69 Dr. Avner Shaki, "Oriental Communities in the 
Educational Network of Israel," lecture given at the Hotel 
Reich, Jerusalem, August 14, 1973.
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readily under these conditions. From an early age the normal 
mental development of children may be impeded and normal 
motor and intellectual development can be delayed or pre­
vented altogether.
It is also difficult for the parents to live a 
private conjugal life under these crowded conditions and it 
is not unusual for young children to witness their parents' 
sexual activity. Grandparents living with the family also 
suffer from chronic physical and mental illness and their 
economic problems are added to those of the family. Problems 
of loneliness and boredom, and the need for help in perform­
ing basic chores are common problems of the elderly, but they 
are aggravated by the difficult physical conditions in 
Nahla'ot.
The older people who came to Nahla'ot attempted to 
build a home in accordance with cultural and religious tra­
ditions. While these traditions have left some imprint, 
family life has since become much less rigid. On the one 
hand tradition preserves the family framework, but on the 
other hand it inhibits the development of the younger genera­
tion. For instance, the father might prohibit a daughter 
from attending school past the compulsory age of fourteen or 
from working outside the home. The younger generation is 
ambivalent with regard to tradition which, while still an 
obstacle in their path, exercises a powerful influence. In 
addition to living conditions, the ignorance and primitive
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outlook of the adults hold back the younger 
maintaining the family framework, but in an 
state of stagnation.
The younger generation is obviously 
cern in Nahla'ot households and the nagging 
their children are not keeping up with some 
of society is common among the parents. As 
household summed it up:
generation, 
undesirable
an important con- 
feeling that 
other segments 
the mother of a
We aren't social cases, just average working 
people. But, somehow we haven't moved ahead 
with the country. Why? Because we are unedu­
cated and without good jobs. That's why the 
children's education is our only hope. Our 
children should have the same opportunities as 
European children. Our most serious problem is 
youth, especially the delinquents and those who 
feel they don't belong anywhere. Many are bitter 
after being in the Army and some others don't 
serve at all. We should have the best schools 
with best teachers, so that our children can 
become part of Israel.
Ironically, as the social worker emphasized, this
same mother, who is so anxious about education as a miracu­
lous equalizing factor, so indulges her children that she un­
wittingly prevents them from forming sound work habits. Even 
small children watch television until 11:00 p.m. and do not 
get sufficient rest. When asked how her children could stay 
awake in school when they go to sleep so late, the mother 
replied, "Just because the children are sleepy in the morning, 
they should have the best of teachers to arouse their inter­
ests. "
It is evident that Nahla'ot has an unsatisfactory
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way of life. Material conditions are poor, presenting the 
prognosis of a hopeless future for its inhabitants. This is 
especially devastating for the young who feel that it is 
impossible to break out of the quarter's poverty stricken 
environment. Youth is torn between loyalty to the traditions 
of the past and the modern life style which offers possible 
satisfactions not provided by the old ways. This conflict 
is expressed by mental stress and, at times, delinquency and 
violence.
Community Leadership in Nahla'ot
While Nahlaot's residents may not have ready solutions 
to social problems, they certainly are not apathetic about 
their needs. There is a well defined leadership in the 
quarter which formed originally to secure improved housing, 
schools, cultural facilities, and community services. These 
leaders form a thin stratum of Nahla'ot society. Most of them 
are native born Israelis of Yemenite origin and are religious­
ly observant Jews. They are in a better economic position 
than most other residents, having had a satisfactory education 
and decent jobs.
The leadership group could well have left Nahla'ot 
long ago. They chose to remain and involved themselves in 
local resistance to a government renewal program. These 
people have not left the quarter or cut themselves off from 
local activities. They work through the "Committee of Little 
Nahla'ot" which was formed in 1972. At that time, its work
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was aimed at opposing a proposed government plan for re­
habilitating the quarter. It has since expanded its role to 
receive complaints on such matters as schools and municipal 
services.
Nahla'ot was the first neighborhood in Jerusalem 
where residents formed a community action group to success­
fully oppose a government rehabilitation plan. The plan 
proposed by the government at that time was thought to be a 
rational, comprehensive approach to slum clearance; it in­
volved evacuation of the population, building demolition, 
and construction of replacement high-rise apartments.
Israeli planners seem to insist on high-rise solutions to 
slum clearance, although this approach has long been dis­
credited in the United States and other Western countries.
The citizen committee's opposition to the plan was based upon 
two considerations: (1) an unwillingness to give up assets
in the quarter for what was felt to be inadequate compensa­
tion, and (2) a feeling that the area did not require restor­
ation. In addition, community leaders feared that while 
demolition of derelict structures characteristically proceeds 
according to plan, their replacement with low-cost housing 
often does not. The Committee felt that Nahla'ot's residents 
could best be assisted by low or no-interest loans to reha­
bilitate their homes. In their opinion the evacuation of 
residents would not have been helpful and would have nega­
tively impacted upon low-income families.
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The Committee conducted an intensive and broad cam­
paign against the renewal plan consisting of petitions, 
meetings with government officials, protest demonstrations, 
sit-ins, and lawsuits. The campaign was carried on for two 
years and in late 1975 the Government rescinded the renewal 
plan and decided to explore other alternatives. The Commit­
tee still remains quite active, is trusted by residents, and 
acts as an advocate on many issues.
At the same time as the "Little Nahla'ot Committee" 
was formed, the "Public Committee for Zichronot and Nahla'ot," 
headed by a member of the Jerusalem Municipal Council, con­
vened to support the renewal plan on grounds that new houses 
would replace the demolished ones. Few of the members or 
supporters of this committee were home owners as was the case 
with the former committee. This Committee's influence is 
very great in Zichronot (the neighborhood directly bordering 
on Nahla'ot's north) but weaker in Nahla'ot. As changes 
occurred, the Zichronot group became active on the issue of 
education and it induced the Jerusalem municipality and 
Ministry of Education and Culture to integrate the schools 
of Nahla'ot with those outside. It conducts campaigns among 
the residents and urges parents to provide adequate study 
conditions for their children.
Each committee denies the other's right to represent 
the residents of the quarter, The Nahla'ot-Zichronot group 
regards the other as a clique of house-owners fighting for 
their petty interests, while the Little Nahla'ot Committee
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sees the other as government pawns, dictated by political 
ambition. Conflicts often arise which relate to personal 
power struggles for local leadership. These may, from time 
to time, stir up the community and cause a great deal of 
excitement, but in fact do not impinge upon the deeper 
problems of the quarter's future development. Fighting is 
usually about positions of power and not about alternative 
development policies or other local concerns.
Social Structure
Life in Nahla'ot is organized around ethnic-clan as­
sociations which have political and economic influence in 
proportion to their size. Consequently, the Kurdish com­
munity has the greatest influence. Economic and social 
organization is also established on a clan basis, drawing 
on tradition as a guiding force. Social life revolves 
around twenty small synagogues organized by ethnic affilia­
tion .
Ethnic solidarity in Nahla'ot contributes to the 
strength of the group and, in time of need, applies organized 
pressure to resolve a problem. In the past the veteran fam­
ilies were the wealthiest, which endowed them with leadership 
status among their groups. Today, for the third and fourth 
generation of Nahla'ot residents, familial wealth has dimin­
ished in importance as a base upon which social relations 
are built, Later generations now possess more political 
acumen and their sights are set more on municipal and
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national trade unions and political organizations. Thus, 
ethnic solidarity within Nahla'ot has been weakening over 
time. Nevertheless, veteran residents are bound to the area 
by memories. Their sons, who also created their own special 
social pattern, are attached to the quarter in a way which 
takes into account neither poverty nor bad housing conditions. 
Thus, ethnic solidarity and special cultural patterns of the 
residents create a social framework to which the residents 
are attached.
Inter-generation conflicts remain in Nahla'ot, how­
ever. The young view political leadership within an organ­
ized council and committee framework. The elders, who main­
tain traditional cultural patterns, maintain belief in tra­
ditional, non-institutional leadership by heads of extended 
families. This generational conflict causes two problems. 
First of all, the leadership of the elders and clan leaders 
is basically particularistic and hinders the growth of a 
democratic way of life. Secondly, this leadership is usually 
conservative and does not answer the needs of groups in a 
modern society. As a result the social framework in 
Nahla'ot does not solve the economic and educational distress 
of the family.
Services and Institutions
Services provided to the residents in Nahla'ot are 
mostly public and include education, culture and entertain­
ment, health, leisure, and general welfare services.
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Educational services. Educational services consist 
of two municipal nurseries and a limited number of kinder­
gartens. The shortage of kindergartens forces many parents 
to send their children outside the quarter. Some of the 
children go to local elementary schools, while others, as 
was mentioned in the general description, go to the Rehavia 
elementary school. In the Rehavia school, an attempt has 
been made to implement a plan to integrate children from 
Rehavia and Nahla'ot,
Up until 1970 the Israeli educational system was 
based upon local districts. The effect was that school 
systems became differentiated according to the surrounding 
ethnicity with wide disparities in school quality. In 1970, 
the Israeli Knesset voted to overhaul the school system, 
providing for six years of primary, three years of inter­
mediate and three years of high school education. While the 
primary schools generally are neighborhood schools, the 
intermediate schools take in larger areas and necessitate 
integration, whether by bussing or some other means.
Eliezer Shmueli, Director-General of the Ministry of 
Education and Culture, explained that when Rehavia received 
an influx of children from Nahla'ot in 1972, the children 
soon made significant progress with the help of additional 
teachers. Unhappily, some parents from Rehavia were so upset 
by the integration effort that in that same year they filed 
a court suit challenging the right of the city to send
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children to school outside of their neighborhood. It was
anticipated, Mr. Shumueli noted, that it would be difficult
to integrate people who, in certain ways, are not equal.
Many parents in affluent neighborhoods do not want their
children going to school with children whom they perceive to
be of lower social and cultural capacity and of inferior in- 
telligence.70 Ultimately, the principle of school integra­
tion was upheld in court. To promote cooperation between 
Rehavia and Nahla'ot's residents, however, the Municipality 
voluntarily developed a modified, scaled integration plan 
which approached integration gradually, grade-by-grade, until 
integration through high school would be achieved over a 
period of years.
Other educational changes, beside integration, have 
been instituted in Nahla'ot as well as other poor areas. 
Kindergartens and primary grades are open all day, from 8:00 
a.m. to 4:00 p.m., instead of half-days as in wealthier areas. 
There is special tutoring for those who require it. In 
addition, the school year is longer and lunches are provided. 
Part of a special program for Nahla'ot children educates 
them on an "activity method" basis whereby the children 
study in work groups with two teachers in the classroom, one 
the class teacher and the other working with weaker pupils.
70Interview with Eliezer Shmueli, Director-General 
Ministry of Education and Culture, Hotel Reich, Jerusalem, 
August 15, 1973.
While eight years have passed since these reforms
were instituted, adequate time has not elapsed to allow for
conclusive evaluations. Mr. Shmueli did have some general
observations at the time of the interview.
Not long ago Israel's education system had 
almost entirely neglected families and 
communities. So we had the problem of cre­
ating equal opportunities and not merely 
equality of treatment. This necessitated, 
in part, inter-ethnic integration between 
neighborhoods and integration between the 
native-born and more recent immigrants.
The communities Shmueli refers to are particularly
disadvantaged ones, of Asian and African origin, as is the
case with Nahla'ot. The generations of immigrant parents in
these communities, he noted, have undergone an important
change due to some of these educational reforms.
They have gone from apathy about their 
children's education to an aggressive 
interest in it . . . Perhaps because
they believe that education is the only 
chance their children have to break the 
social barrier. Contrary to the findings 
of such researchers as Christopher Jencks 
in the United States, education in Israel 
is the main tool for social mobility.71
Welfare services. Direct payments aside (refer to 
Table X, Chapter V), welfare services in Nahla'ot consist of 
a welfare bureau office, a mother and child care center and 
a Kupat Holim (Histadrut sick fund) clinic (see Chapter IV, 
"The Protectzia System").
71 Ibid.
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The services of the welfare bureau are aimed at pro­
blems of illness and disablement, families with a large number 
of children, marriage problems, unsatisfactory housing, and 
other problems. Relief takes the form of financial aid to 
cover the expenses of subsistence, rent, vocational training, 
and child-care. The mother and child care center helps 
mothers look after their children and also instructs them 
during pregnancy in prenatal care. The medical personnel 
at this facility and the Kupat Holim Clinic often serve un­
officially as social workers in addition to their regular 
duties.
Recreational opportunities and community centers.
The problem of relations between ethnic groups stems from two 
factors: (1) the differences in way of life, culture and
tradition, which are very real and can only be overcome 
gradually, and (2) the socio-economic gap between Asian/African 
immigrants and Western ones. It is obvious that there is no 
magic solution to these problems, nor is there room for a 
policy aimed at "homogenizing" the different ethnic groups.
A policy which the Israeli government has developed 
to deal with some of the problems created by the above fac­
tors is a system of neighborhood and community centers, 
particularly in the more disadvantaged areas such as 
Nahla'ot. The function of these community centers falls in 
the following areas:
147
1. To bring together different social segments of 
neighborhood communities; to narrow the social gulfs separat­
ing different age, religious, educational, national, and 
income groups. These efforts bring Nahla'ot residents to­
gether with those of Rehavia and Kiryat Wolfson.
2. To engage in efforts to combat juvenile delinquency 
by providing alternative options in recreational, cultural 
and educational opportunities.
3. To supplement "in-school" education to foster higher 
levels of educational achievement, particularly among dis­
advantaged groups. These efforts include special after 
school tutorial programs to improve reading and study skills.
4. To provide adult education aimed not only at personal 
development but also parent education in creating the proper 
atmosphere for their children's educational development.
5. To encourage the appreciation of local and national 
cultures through mutual exchange programs. Cultural activity 
is seen as one bridge to the absorption and integration of
the different groups and as a starting point for communal
. . 72activity.
Nahla'ot enjoys the benefit of two community centers, 
a small one in the heart of the neighborhood that serves 
mainly children and the larger Beit Pomerantz Community Center 
just outside Nahla'ot. The youth center in the neighborhood
72Sadinsky interview
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has activities occurring from 4:00 - 11;00 p.m. Youth are 
offered a diversified program including sports, handicrafts, 
dance, films, trips, holiday parties and a summer day-camp.
A social worker is employed full-time in the center and a 
part-time teacher gives supplementary lessons to children who 
have difficulty in school.
The Beit Pomerantz Center is located just northwest 
of Nahla'ot. It was founded by private donations from mem­
bers of the Jewish community of Los Angeles and later sup­
plemented by Jewish Agency funds. Its location purposely 
serves the residents of Nahla'ot, Kiryat Wolfson and Rehavia, 
although it is somewhat distant from the latter. The intent 
of the location is to provide a point of contact between 
children of the various ethnic groups as well as between 
religious and secular youth.
The Center provides extensive and varied activity 
such as sport and handicraft groups, workshops and drama 
groups. It also offers a library and swimming pool. Accord­
ing to the Center's Director, Mr, Sadinsky, of the 3,500 
members registered, some fifty percent come from Nahla'ot, 
the greater part of whom attend the center frequently 
(three times per week or more). The young people of 
Nahla'ot (and in theory any other district) are given re­
ductions in membership dues based upon family income.
Special activities are organized for them, such as supple­
mentary afternoon lessons and vocational training in wood 
and metal work etc., for those not working or in school.
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A special educational project at Beit Pomerantz, as 
well as other centers around the country, is the use of 
volunteers, mostly college students, to help Nahla'ot 
high school students in their weak subjects. The munici­
pally sponsored program seeks to at least limit, if not 
eliminate, the educational gap, Even those who did well in 
their local elementary schools often have trouble adjusting 
to the requirements of high school, because they missed so 
much that neither home nor school could provide. If they 
are not helped at the outset, they cannot keep up, and after 
a year or two they drop out of school.
The volunteers in this tutorial program work with 
two students each, usually meeting with them in their homes 
in order to extend some influence on the family. Sometimes 
the volunteers persuade parents to keep their children in 
school instead of sending them out to work. They also assist 
the families in many other ways, such as explaining the con­
tents of official letters and what must be done about them.
It is hoped that through this process families will learn to 
keep the house quiet during study period and will come to 
understand the conditions required for effective learning.
Another of the Beit Pomerantz Center's most valuable 
activities is the preventive family counseling service. 
Parents, usually mothers, come to see one of the social 
workers at the Center to talk about troubles they are ex­
periencing with their children. The children, when they 
want to, are provided an opportunity to tell their side of the
150
story. When they are ready, parents and children may discuss 
their family problems at weekly meetings where parents 
gather to discuss family relationships.
According to Mr. Sadinsky, the preventive counseling 
service has proven to be quite successful and, in many cases, 
invaluable to families where traditional authoritarian 
patterns are giving way under the impact of new social 
forces. Youngsters in such families often rebel against 
seemingly arbitrary parental authority and break away before 
they are prepared to take care of themselves. The program 
at Beit Pomerantz tries to prevent young people from becoming 
delinquents.
Despite the varied activities offered by the two 
centers, many of the children and adults of the neighborhoods 
do not participate. Young people in particular, who are not 
in any formal framework, constitute the potential for delin­
quent activity. The youth of Nahla'ot have problems similar 
to those of other low-income, disadvantaged youth in the 
country. They drop out of school, have difficulty in ob­
taining fixed employment, and have problems of adjustment 
to military service.
While some progress has occurred in terms of inter­
ethnic or inter-class integration at the Beit Pomerantz 
Center, it usually involves children rather than adults.
In spite of numerous efforts, most residents of the higher- 
income Kiryat Wolfson and Rehavia simply do not want to
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participate in activities at the Center, They avoid the 
adult and "inter-cultural" functions in particular. It 
is obviously quite difficult to change the mentality of 
people who do not want to mix. At the same time, many of 
the adult residents of Nahla'ot also fail to participate 
for the same reasons.
One other important reason for the lack of partici­
pation in community center activities are religious institu­
tions. These consist of several synagogues and a number of 
yeshivot (theological seminaries). The synagogues are 
small, usually having one ethnic group as its congregants. 
These synagogues express the religious character of the 
quarter. While the synagogues are clearly centers of 
prayer, they also constitute a social center for a large 
number of the older residents. When the synagogue serves 
in such a capacity, it is common for these people to ignore 
the community center which may be viewed as a distant govern­
ment project.
Summary and Conclusions
Nahla'ot is characteristic of distressed neighbor­
hoods within large Isreli cities. Living side-by-side are 
residents of a low economic standing and those well-to-do 
and long established. Economic and social gaps between them 
widen as relations between the generations deteriorate. At 
the same time, institutions charged with improving social 
and physical problems are not equal to the task. Some pro­
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gress has occurred in improving education. Hopefully, 
third and fourth generations will be able to free them­
selves from the distress of their parents and grandparents.
It is possible that Nahla'ot can be rehabilitated.
The ethnic character of the area, however, must be respected 
and preserved. Only then will it be a pleasant place to 
live, with good services, and social and cultural integration. 
The quarter has great potential for change. There is hope 
that the gap between life patterns will diminish. With this 
end in view, integrated and coordinated action is required 
based upon the following conclusions;
1. Physical conditions, particularly those of housing, 
must be improved in order to alleviate the problems of fam­
ilies living in overcrowded conditions. The burden of young 
families living in high densities must be relieved by 
providing a greater number of structurally adequate dwellings.
2. The system of delivering social services must be made 
more effective.
3. Deviant behavior, especially among youth, must be 
uprooted by coordinated educational and law enforcement 
action.
4. New dialogue between veteran residents and newer 
immigrants should begin as a means to create a healthier
social climate.
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Regional Planning in Israel: Kiryat Gat and
the Lachish Development Region
The Lachish Region is the result of a mid-1950's 
development plan which became the prototype of regional 
planning in Israel. The overcrowding of Israel's major 
cities, causing problems such as those of Nahla'ot, were al­
ready foreseen in the early 1950's by some Israeli planners. 
They attempted to develop a strategy of dispersing popula­
tion when waves of immigration were at their peak.
An urban neighborhood, such as Nahla'ot, is character­
ized by a generally homogenous population, clinging to a cul­
ture and ethnic background. The inhabitants have not been 
able to integrate into the mainstream of Israeli economic, 
social and cultural life. Problems in Nahla'ot-type neighbor­
hoods often result from the failure of planning to provide 
opportunities both for physical and personal development.
The Lachish Region, with Kiryat Gat as its urban center, on 
the other hand can be viewed as a planning effort which 
successfully intervened in the physical, social and economic 
development of the area. Included in this process was the 
provision of opportunities for the personal development of 
its residents, comprised of a large number of ethnic groups. 
These groups were able to retain and maintain their cultural 
heritages while mixing with other segments of Israeli society. 
Physical Description
Lachish is a development region in southeast - central
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Israel, comprising a 275 square mile area (see Figs, 4-6).
The region includes three geographically distinct farming 
areas:
1. The western part, belonging to the coastal plain, 
contains mostly light soils suitable for citrus cultivation.
2. The central portion consists of heavier soils util­
ized for intensive field crops.
3. The eastern part belongs to the foothills of the 
Judean Mountains and is characterized by fruit orchards, to­
bacco, sheep pasture, and field crops.
Outpost settlements of Negbah and Gvar Am were es­
tablished in the western part between 1939 and 1947. After 
1948 a network of thirty-one moshavim and kibbutzim were 
established. Development in the central and eastern portions, 
however, was thwarted by an insufficient water supply. With 
construction of the Yarkon-Negev conduit in 1954, the Lachish 
Development Project was established as a regional planning 
scheme for agricultural and later industrial development. 
Background
Immigrants arriving in Israel during the post-indepen­
dence waves of immigration began to settle the Lachish area 
in 1955. The Ministry of Absorption placed a certain propor­
tion of immigrants in rural areas. At that time, thought 
was not given to ethnic background in immigrant placement.
The many ethnic groups who were placed together, therefore, 
encountered many cultural discrepancies which had to be recon­
ciled. Many of these new immigrants, originating from back-
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NORTH EASTERN SUB-DISTRICT Suitable for intensive
fruit t ee cultivation (apples, deciduous fruits), carobs, al- 
monds, figs, etc. Also grain crops and grazing. Here will be 
built farms of up to 40 dunams, of which 15—20 dunams will 
be devoted to fruit trees. Each farm to have additional 40 
dunams of grazing land.
Fig. 4. Land utilization in the Lachish Region73
73Keren 
Ha'aretz Press,
Hayesod, 
1957), p
Operation Lachish
20.
(Jerusalem:
WESTERN DISTRICT In part suitable for 
oranges, to have orange farms or mixed farms 
consisting of up to 30 dunams per farm unit.
CENTRAL SUB-DISTRICT Conditions are suit­
able for irrigation. Farm units will consist of 40 
Irrigated dunams, to stress cultivation of industrial 
crops (sugar-beets, cotton, etc.).
EASTERN SUB-DISTRICT Conditions are suitable to 
dry farming and grazing. Border settlements, organized 
as kibbutzim-, to be established.
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Fig. 5. Lachish Region in relation to central Israel
Israel, Ministry of Labour-Dept, of Surveys, 
Survey of Israel, 1977.
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LAKHISH
REGION
Fig. 6. Detail of Lachish Region75
75Avshalom Rokach, Israel Today-Regional Rural Devel­
opment (Jerusalem: Israel Digest Publ., 1964), Appendix A.
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ward environments, were suddenly required to learn new life­
styles .
Keeping in mind that Lachish was an agricultural set­
tlement plan, passions and economics became enmeshed in the 
region's main problems which were:
1. How to reconcile the differences between veteran 
Israelis and new immigrants.
2. How to resolve cultural conflicts among various 
ethnic groups,
3. How to train immigrants to become farmers and workers 
capable of managing both their complex farm economy and their 
own regional affairs.
4. How to attract technicians and public service work­
ers to the rural areas.
The problems faced by the Lachish Region in 1955 were 
solved in great measure by the nature of the agricultural 
settlements themselves. The original settlers of Lachish are 
currently veteran farmers of the region, a phenomenon in­
extricably linked to the growth of the State of Israel. From 
its inception, the structure of agricultural settlement in 
Israel has been based on the cooperative idea. This was a 
result of not only a desire for economic efficiency and in­
telligent organization of marketing and purchasing but, in 
many cases, the social and ideological propensities of the 
settlers.
The Lachish Region was a success because planners
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recognized the importance of the Moshav, which became the
basis of the Region's organization. In fact, between 1948
and 1972, 442 new villages were established in Israel, of
76which ninety-eight are kibbutzim and 291 are moshavim.
Most of the new immigrants who have chosen agriculture as 
their livelihood, therefore, have shown a preference for the 
moshav, whereby families own and manage each farm, over the 
kibbutz, where property is owned by the commune (i.e. coopera 
tive moshav versus collective kibbutz) ; (see Figs. 7-9) .
The residents of moshavim are much more strictly or­
ganized than those in villages or towns. Such organization 
does require sacrifice of a certain amount of individual 
autonomy over land management and profits. This lack of in­
dependence, however, has transformed many Jews from North 
African countries, who never had contact with the soil, into 
real farmers using modern agricultural techniques. Immi­
grants who had neither formal education nor vocational train­
ing were often directed towards the moshavim of Lachish during 
the mid-1950s. Since that time these same immigrants have 
learned to calculate the profits of their agricultural labors 
It may be that what is most important to them is the profit 
these territories yield rather than the Zionist ideology of 
exploitation of the soil. Even if the moshav may not be ideo 
logically successful, it is economically.
The moshav concept in Lachish served particularly
76Israel, Facts-1975, p.61.
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KIBBUZ
(COMMUNAL VILLAGE)
 . 7 7Fig, 7. Schematic detail of a kibbutz
77
P • 15
Israel, Ministry of Labour, Atlas of Israel, 1970
161
moshav shitufi
(COLLECTIVE SMALLHOLDERS VILLAGE)
Fig. 8. Schematic detail of a moshav shitufi78
78 Ibid,
162
moshav ovdim
(SMALLHOLDERS VILLAGE)
Schematic detail of a moshav ovdim
79Ibid,, p.16.
79
Fig, 9.
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well to integrate diverse peoples into wider Israeli society. 
The Lachish plan sought to group people according to country 
of origin in the same moshav and even in a series of moshavim 
comprising a settlement area. People from these moshavim, 
however, have had to mix with other types of people when 
utilizing services available only at a series of rural and 
regional centers. The effect was maintenance of ancestral 
traditions while allowing for gradual modernization. These 
immigrants, who were often very close to the secular tradi­
tion they brought with them, learned to develop a cooperative 
structure for rural land development and to accept trans­
formation in agricultural technique as new technology was 
introduced. The younger generation, enjoying the benefits 
of more advanced education, led their parents towards ration­
al exploitation of the land, social integration and very
80strong Israelization.
The Lachish Plan
As the success of the moshav settlements became ap­
parent, both the settlers and the government agencies in­
volved in settlement projects saw the utility of implement­
ing the cooperative concept on a regional scale, integrat­
ing agriculture, industry and services within a defined
80Moshe Minkowitz, "Old Conflicts in a New Environ­
ment: A Study of a Moroccan Atlas Mountains Community Trans­
planted to Israel," The Jewish Journal of Sociology, Vol. IX, 
No. 2, (December, 1967), p. 196.
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area. Such a plan required the improvement of agricultural 
production and the laying of a basis for a different system 
of services. These changes required a new framework for 
organization of rural life on a regional scale.
The initial base for the restructuring of rural, 
moshav life became the rural center, which served to intro­
duce educational facilities and higher order health, com­
mercial and technological services. The functions of the 
rural center, however, had to reach beyond mere provision of 
services. As agriculture improved, less people were re­
quired as farmers and it became important to retain these 
people in the area. To achieve this, light industry of small 
economical units had to be introduced (e.g. packing and 
sorting operations).
In the search for a solution to the introduction of 
industry as a means of retaining population, the notion of a 
composite rural structure crystallized. It was comprised of 
agricultural, service and industrial personnel.
The scheme depicted in Fig. 10 aims at combining 
optimal exploitation of local natural features with the 
speedy absorption of a maximum number of immigrant settlers 
in productive employment. It provides for the establish­
ment of clusters of four or five farming villages, each 
having forty to one-hundred families, grouped around rural 
centers. Whereas the villages have local services (elemen­
tary schools, groceries), the rural center offers higher
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order services (middle schools, clinic, central market, etc.).
Rural Center
REGIONAL
TOWN
Fig. 10. Schematic detail of a composite rural 
structure
The rural center also serves as a meeting ground for 
immigrants from different countries, thereby furthering 
their mutual integration and distributing service costs 
over several hundred families. Each ethnic group, housed 
in their own settlement, has the opportunity to perpetuate 
its own traditions without needless friction and, at the 
same time, share a rural center with other groups. This 
arrangement has helped the settlers of each group to cement 
themselves together as a cooperative unit.
Fig, 11. Schematic map of a rural center in relation 
to adjacent moshavim81
81Atlas of Israel, p.17.
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RURAL CENTRE AND ADJACENT ( 
SMALLHOLDERS VILLAGES
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Rural Center
REGIONAL TOWN
Fig. 12. Schematic map of a regional town in rela­
tion to its surrounding area and associated rural center.82
82Ibid., p.18.
J
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The Lachish Region is a hierarchical arrangement of 
settlements which increase in size and complexity of economic 
function as one moves closer to the Region's center. In 
this hierarchy the rural centers and their adjacent vil­
lages, depicted in Fig. 11, are the basic economic unit.
The rural centers are in turn linked to a rural-regional 
town (Fig. 12) which provides economic, social and cultural 
opportunities,including banking and secondary education. A 
region in the Lachish sense, therefore, consists of a 
network of composite rural structures (Fig. 10) ultimately 
linked to the Region's urban center of Kiryat Gat.
Kiryat Gat
Kiryat Gat functions as the Lachish Region's highest 
order urban center. Therefore, it provides employment in 
regional administration, processing of the region's agri­
cultural produce, and services. In 1954 Kiryat Gat was 
planned for a population goal of 7,500. The current popula­
tion is 25,000 and the city's revised master plan calls for 
an 80,000 population by the year 2,000. Of the current 
population, fifty percent originate from Asian and African 
countries including a large Indian-Jewish community. 
Twenty-five percent are from Europe, South America and the
83U.S.S.R. and twenty-five percent are native-born Israelis.
83Interview with Havi Shlagi, Senior Planner, Depart­
ment of Rural Settlement and Municipal Planning, Office of 
the Mayor, City of Kiryat Gat, August 27, 1973.
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The road network links villages to their rural 
centers and these in turn are linked to Kiryat Gat. The 
location of Kiryat Gat was planned to achieve regional cen­
trality with its site at a crossroads of regional traffic, 
thus facilitating its development as a center of regional 
economic activity.
Economic Development
The origin of Kiryat Gat was initially to provide 
higher order services requiring a larger minimum population 
threshold than rural towns could provide. Among these 
services were a hospital, secondary school, police and cer­
tain professionals such as physicians and lawyers. It was 
not long before an economy based upon more than services 
was felt important to the future development of both 
Kiryat Gat and the Lachish Region.
The development of the city's economy began not only 
with services rendered to the Lachish Region's rural settle­
ments but also with industries based on farming products. 
The enterprises first to become operative included grain 
storage and processing, cotton gins, a sugar refinery, and 
various produce sorting and grading plants. Before long 
other industry came to Kiryat Gat, not all directly connect­
ed with agriculture. A cotton spinning mill, three cotton 
weaving mills, a wool processing plant, three knitwear 
factories, a clothing factory, a diamond cutting plant, and 
an electronic equipment plant, are just a few.
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One of the main factors in this acceleration of
growth in Kiryat Gat was the water piped to the area and
its surrounding region, which has tripled the irrigated area
from the time of the Lachish Project's inception. Of the
nearly 500,000 dunams84 cultivated today, 150,000 are under 
irrigation.85 The development of newly established settle­
ments allowed greater functional specialization in the area 
so that, for example, dairy farms in the eastern district 
could rely on the field-crop farms in the center district 
for many of their supplies. Development of the entire 
region was boosted in this fashion.
Ashkelon, on the west coast, is the largest city in 
the Lachish Region. It has also profited greatly from the 
Lachish Project, although not by original design. Whereas 
Kiryat Gat was planned from the start as a center for the 
surrounding agricultural region, Ashkelon depends on indus­
try focused upon its port facilities and tourism. Mostly 
for reasons of convenience, villages in the western coastal 
belt prefer to use the services of Ashkelon rather than 
those of Kiryat Gat. Not all services, however, are 
available in Ashkelon. Lachish farmers, regardless of 
proximity to Ashkelon, require agricultural processing 
plants, warehousing, and marketing facilities, available 
only in Kiryat Gat, Farmers must also look to Kiryat Gat's 
84one dunam equals one-quarter acre,
85 Shlagi interview.
Fig. 13. General plan of Kiryat Gat 86
86Israel,
Kiryat Gat-1975. Ministry of Labour, Dept. of Surveys,
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government offices for technical guidance in connection 
with farm planning and development loans.
Physical Structure of Kiryat Gat
Kiryat Gat developed in stages and it was felt impor­
tant to ensure that industrial and economic services be phy­
sically separate from other amenities Kiryat Gat was to pro­
vide. The general layout of Kiryat Gat (Fig. 13) consists of 
three residential areas, a central block housing administra­
tive offices and a cultural center (civic plaza), a commercial 
district, scattered areas reserved for parks and playgrounds, 
and an industrial belt near the railway line.
The industrial area, to the southeast of the city, 
was left open to one side to allow room for growth to the 
south and southwest. Since its inception, the industrial 
area was twice enlarged to make room for new enterprises, 
while the commercial region in the center was replanned and 
a municipal park designed. At the same time, the local 
labor demand also made it necessary to attract additional 
population by stepping up housing construction.
Employment in Kiryat Gat is fifty percent industrial,
thirty percent services and the remainder in agriculture,
housing and miscellaneous related occupations.87 Those in 
industrial occupations work in plants in the industrial belt 
which occupies 300 acres. Each industrial facility is re­
sponsible for providing certain services for its workers,
87Shlagi interview.
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including transportation to and from the plant and day-care 
centers for female employees.
From the beginning, a modest commercial center was 
built, principally for the use of the villagers. As the 
industrial district grew, the commercial district has under­
gone vast expansion, with many more shops, a hotel and 
several cinemas. District offices of the various Ministries, 
local government offices, the office of the Lachish Regional 
Authority, and branch banks were opened in Kiryat Gat to 
serve the entire region. Educational services have gradually 
been built up to include, at present, nine primary schools 
and two secondary schools. Two more post-primary vocational 
schools are planned as well as adult education facilities.
Housing and Neighborhood Design in Kiryat Gat
Neighborhood structure in Kiryat Gat is similar to 
the composite rural structure of the Lachish Region in 
general. Each small neighborhood has its center equipped 
with a grocery store and other small-scale facilities which 
provide for daily basic necessities. At the same time, 
neighborhood centers are not allowed to develop to the 
point of competition with the large commercial-cultural 
district in the center of town. This serves to foster the 
interaction of ethnic groups from the neighborhoods. The 
town center, by providing a socialr cultural and commercial 
milieu, has developed a broader outlook among Kiryat Gat's
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residents, emphasizing their belonging to a city as a whole 
rather than the confinement of the neighborhood alone.
This confinement was experienced by many of Kiryat Gat's 
residents in their countries of origin.
Several types of standard housing were planned and 
built in Kiryat Gat, ranging from two to five rooms. As of 
1973, 12,200 housing units had been built and 1,000 were 
under construction. Many of the units are low-rise semi­
detached and extensible, allowing the owner to enlarge the 
living space as the standard of living rises.
As is the case in most of Israel, residents of 
Kiryat Gat live in cooperative housing managed by tenant 
committees. While there is more architectural and size var­
iety in Kiryat Gat's housing than in many other Israeli 
cities, it is nevertheless based upon a characteristic 
Israeli institution - the neighborhood unit of near identi­
cal, cooperatively owned apartments known as the shikun.
The shikun is a planned housing development, often built as 
a housing estate for people who already know each other, 
which may be owned by specific ethnic groups, professions, 
or political party members. In Kiryat Gat shikunim are 
based upon ethnic ties. Thus, a large part of the popula­
tion lives within the confines of a particular ethnic group 
and usually speaking the same mother tongue. Because the 
city is so small, it is still much easier to know "practic­
ally everybody in town" than it would be in a larger city.
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In a residential neighborhood the most restrictive 
factor affecting way of life is population density. Ideally, 
a city should offer a range of residential options with 
respect to densities. Generally, neighborhoods are physical­
ly distinct from each other based upon their particular 
land use arrangement. In order to foster social cohesion 
and, thereby a sense of community belonging, residential 
neighborhoods in Kiryat Gat were established with assumed 
optimal building densities in mind. Such a density ought to 
avoid, on the one hand, sparsely built areas whereby large 
distances between residential districts would tend to create 
architectural and social voids. On the other hand, an overly 
dense environment which threatens the individual and in­
trudes upon privacy is also undesirable.
During Israel's early years, the ruling architectural
style in development towns was low building density. In
addition to social disadvantages, this style created economic
burdens of land wastage and increased expenditures for munic-
ipal services per capita.88 Planners in Kiryat Gat, con­
trary to common practice at the time of its establishment, 
favored greater building density as a means to create a 
more urban way of life. Thus, economic problems resulting 
from a policy of sparse building have been alleviated.
88 "Symposium on Residential Quarters," Adricalut, 
Journal of the Association of Architects and Engineers in 
Israel (July, 1973),pp.15-22,
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Social relationships also have been strengthened because 
the neighborhood in Kiryat Gat was viewed as an instrument 
for social integration. The composition of population was 
planned with homogenous groups living together closely, yet 
still part of a larger heterogenous community. All people 
would have opportunities to meet, share common interests 
and develop neighborly relations.
Urban development in Kiryat Gat, therefore, is large­
ly the product of communal organization, within which the 
residential neighborhood is seen as a subsystem of the 
larger urban settlement. Residential neighborhoods, there­
fore, were physically structured so as to enhance the pur-
suit of city-wide communal activities.89 Just as there is a 
hierarchy of villages and towns there is a hierarchy of 
residential neighborhoods.
There are, however, always caveats in the implemen­
tation of any development plan. For Kiryat Gat it centers 
on the neighborhood.
The problem of the status of the neighborhood 
in development towns has been a controversial 
one. On the one hand, there are planners who 
believe in the concept of a town without neigh­
borhoods (among others, those who advocate 
linear planning). On the other hand, there are 
planners who emphasize the clear need for neigh­
borhoods . . . both extremes should be avoided.
The neighborhood unit, in which all of the 
inhabitants know one another, can constitute an 
important factor in the social and psychological
89Shlagi interview
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integration of immigrants in the cohesive Israeli 
society. One must, however, avoid over-emphasis 
on the neighborhood, since this might lead to par­
ticularism, exaggerated fragmentation and over­
seclusion of the population of the neighborhood.
A small-town mentality, hostile to the growth of 
a large urban society, could develop in the town 
as a result.90
The Future of Kiryat Gat and the Lachish Region
Although Kiryat Gat has outgrown the limits set in 
the original plan, its economic basis is still the agricul­
tural region that surrounds it, with its numerous villages 
and farming families. All the services and ammenities 
which the rural centers cannot provide are supplied by 
Kiryat Gat and, therefore, a large part of the income of 
the city's business enterprises are derived from this farm­
ing population. Conversely, many of Kiryat Gat's inhabitants 
find seasonal employment in the farming villages at harvest 
time. The city's growth and progress, therefore, has 
been the result of the Region's agricultural output and the 
farmer's utilization of its urban facilities.
The regional structures of the larger Lachish Dis­
trict has enabled individual settlements in a particular area 
to pool resources. Central economic and consumer services 
were cooperatively established to the advantage of all 
residents. The cooperative experience has meant the institu­
tion of, for example, cultural activities, tractor stations,
90Berlier, New Towns in Israel, p.71.
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and product processing plants, as well as the employment 
of high-level technicians to serve the Region. Due to co­
operative production, profits of enterprises have remained 
in the hands of these rural communities. In a more con­
ventional economic arrangement, however, the benefits of 
agricultural production and processing would have been 
siphoned off to external urban centers.
The educational network in the Lachish Region is 
based upon equal opportunity and uniform curriculum. The 
impetus which established the school system stemmed from 
the settlers wish to educate their children within a rural 
setting while still meeting urban educational standards.
The result has been a minimizing of the cultural and educa­
tional gaps between rural and urban sectors. In addition, 
by dispersing population, the Lachish notion of regional 
planning has provided an alternative to the dilemma of 
urban sprawl.
Retention of rural population
Regional settlement in Lachish has, so far, proven 
a success in yet another direction. It has played an im­
portant role in preventing the drift of population from 
rural areas to the town and city. One factor which usually 
encourages such migration is the gap in standards of living 
between rural and urban areas. This phenomenon is common 
in countries where technology and industrialization are 
moving rapidly ahead, where industrial expansion brings
179
TABLE XV
 Characteristic Development Stages of the Family Farm91
Farm
Characteristics
Subsistence
Farming
Mixed
Farming
Specialized
Farming
Composition of 
branches: Basic foods Varied products Key crops
Purpose of 
production:
Own
consumption
Own consumption 
plus marketing f'larketing only
Income: Low Medium High
Ratio of income 
to output: Low Medium High
Work schedule: Seasonal Balanced Seasonal
Labor/Capital 
ratio:
Hidden
unemploynent Primarily labor Primarily capital
Dependence on 
supplementary 
industry: Slight Parital Complete
91 Dr, Ra'anan 
Israel Yearbook-1972 
Ltd., 1972), p.84.
Weitz, "The Moshav of the Future," in 
(Tel Aviv: Israel Yearbook Publications,
4
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economic prosperity and a rising standard of living, and 
where manpower demands siphon rural migrants into urban 
areas.
In Israel, population movement from rural to urban 
areas has not been as marked as in some other countries. With 
agricultural and rural development there has been, in fact, 
some migration from the cities to rural areas, partly as a 
result of significant government economic incentives. This 
situation, however, is changing and recently the problem 
of absorbing surplus manpower has arisen in Lachish.
There are several reasons why a surplus of manpower 
may be expected in Lachish, The farm units are constructed 
so as to sustain one family each. As the children of the 
family form their own households, they often lack non-agri- 
cultural sources of livelihood. As a rule, only one son 
can take over the parental farm, and even that is not possible 
if the father has younger children and is physically capable 
of running the farm.
As the moshavim in the Lachish Region have gone from 
subsistence to specialized farming (Table XV), there is hope 
that more non-agricultural branches of industry will be 
expanded and created to cope with a growing labor force. The 
pressure for industrial expansion arises not only to provide 
non-agricultural pursuits for the second and third genera­
tion in the Region, but also due to the difficulty of in­
creasing agricultural production much further. Fortunately, 
the impact of an outmigration has yet to be seriously felt
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in Lachish. Indeed, pressure has been exerted on the 
settlement authorities by young farmers and married couples 
to find a means of settling them near their parents and kin, 
even if they must engage in non-agricultural occupations.
The process of rural-to-urban migration, while ac­
cepted universally as a natural phenomenon in "modernizing" 
societies, is not in line with the rural-regional structure 
as it exists in Lachish. A sizeable portion of the Region 
is inhabited by Asian/African immigrants who still adhere to 
a traditional patriarchal social structure, even in the 
second and third generations. There is a strong inclination 
among these rural inhabitants not to leave the area, but 
rather to find a way of remaining, whether it be through a 
farming livelihood or otherwise.
The inclination to remain in Lachish has led to the 
establishment of development companies which also engage in 
industry. At first, the main endeavors in Kiryat Gat were 
industries connected with agriculture and its development, 
including those which supply agriculture with inputs pur­
chased outside and those based on the processing of raw 
materials provided by agriculture. Today, Kiryat Gat is 
experiencing the development of companies which have gone 
into neutral industries as well, not connected with farming
and with the main goal being to create non-agricultural 
92employment.
92Shlagi interview.
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The experience of Kiryat Gat and The Lachish Region 
points to the importance of a flexible approach to regional 
development, which is capable of recurrent adaptation to 
changes in the structure and organization of the rural com­
munities on which the region is based. The Lachish program 
has responded to each of the development stages in Table XV 
according to changing production needs. The physical and 
organizational framework of the Region has changed with 
shifts in the character and production level of the moshavim, 
which comes as a result of improving technological conditions 
and population growth.
CHAPTER VII
PERSPECTIVES AND CONCLUSIONS
The nature of early Jewish immigration to Israel cre­
ated the character of the modern state. Israel today is 
struggling with the twin problems of culture and community 
along several dimensions, one of which concerns country-of- 
origin communities. Israel is a composite of distinct com­
munities, each sharing a common ancestry and cultural heritage. 
For most of Israel's modern history, the perpetuation of 
such communities was discouraged because they conflicted with 
the Zionist goal of creating a new Jewish unity which would 
be impeded by cultural pluralism. Cultural conflicts arose , 
in great part due to disagreements over whose values would 
form the focus for a new Jewish identity.
Zionist pioneers from Russia and Poland, possessing 
a socialist orientation, represented the driving political 
force and pioneering efforts of modern-day Zionism. They 
have, therefore, dictated the patterns of cultural, polit­
ical, social and economic organization that have formed the 
new state since the 1920's. These twentieth century pioneers 
obfuscated the importance of earlier waves of immigration, 
mostly Sephardi, which began as early as the fifteenth cen-
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tury, long before Zionism as a political movement had any 
meaning. Sephardim, who had long established their settle­
ments in Jerusalem, Jaffa, Safed and Hebron, were not oriented 
towards rural development or collective economic activity. 
Though they were long the established majority in Jewish 
Palestine, they lost their dominant status after World War I. 
Sephardim were replaced by Zionist elements of East European 
origin,who placed new emphasis upon cooperative land settle­
ment rather than urban development. Thus, the ideologies of 
modern day Zionists were new and aggressive; they became the 
basis for shaping Jewish life in the land.
By the time Israel was established in 1948, the 
organized and dominant community was virtually an extension 
of East European communities. After statehood Sephardic and 
Oriental Jews began coming to Israel in large numbers and 
within a short time were equal to the European population. 
While European immigrants were easily absorbed into a culture 
that was predominantly theirs, the Sephardim and Orientals 
had to adapt to a strange culture presented to them as the 
only authentic modern and Jewish culture. Before long 
Oriental and Sephardi Jews became the numerical majority, 
due to a higher birthrate, while remaining a cultural minor­
ity. Immigrants from outside the Yiddish speaking world of 
the Israeli establishment were labelled "backward", even 
though many Sephardic and Oriental Jews originated from highly 
developed societies. The veteran Ashkenazim, therefore,
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sought to "civilize" their Sephardic brethren by bringing 
them into East European Jewish culture/ in the guise of 
Western civilization. In the process, the indigenous cul­
ture brought by the Sephardim and other non-Europeans was 
undermined. As a result, these populations lost not only 
their self-respect but also the respect of their children, 
who thought they had brought nothing of real value to con­
tribute to the State. This notion has been perpetuated by 
the Israeli educational system, which in a number of ways 
taught all children that Ashkenazi culture, as filtered 
through the Zionist movement, is Israeli culture.
While the development of Israeli society and the 
communal tensions which were created along the way may hold 
special sociological interest, the impact of this social 
development has created difficult problems from a planning 
perspective. The end result (until today) of Israel's 
social development was not only the creation of economic 
gaps between Sephardim and Ashkenazim but also a cultural 
disruption which may be even more severe.
Both economic and cultural disruptions in Israel 
have serious consequences for intercommunity relations be­
cause they are so closely linked with ethnicity. Economic 
gaps between communities have, in large part, resulted from 
a national effort to achieve rapid economic growth. Such an 
effort necessitated the provision of incentives for those 
engaged in needed enterprises and possessing certain skills.
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Differential pay rates in favor of needed skills obviously 
resulted in wage inequalities. Policies aimed at providing 
incentives to encourage immigration of needed occupations 
to Israel were intended to raise the standard of living of 
all sectors of the population through long-term development 
of the national economy. The short-term effect, however, 
was to increase income differentials to the disadvantage of 
Sephardic and Oriental populations.
In any society there exist higher and lower income 
groups with economic and social polarization developing be­
tween them. This polarization has more serious implications 
in Israel, however, because socio-economic status differences 
are so directly linked with ethnic origin. The denigration 
of cultural and economic capabilities of Sephardic and Or­
iental Jewish communities in Israel did not cause the de­
struction of the overt or manifest dimensions of community 
life and did not lead to the disappearance of these commun­
ities. Rather, these communities have persisted in a de- 
culturated and economically deficient form, frequently 
exhibiting a great deal of hostility towards those whom they 
see as having deprived them. In Israel, therefore, the 
process of assimilation is still incomplete and these com­
munities will continue to represent basic elements in the 
compound of Israeli society.
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Israel's Social Development-Implications for Planning
Given the nature of Israel's social development and 
structure, an overriding question emerges as to the nature 
of future planning in Israel. In addition, one may ask what 
are the lessons of Nahla'ot and Lachish in terms of their 
links with both the economic and cultural dimensions of com­
munal life in Israel.
In general, Nahla'ot is an example of a community in 
which both the economic and cultural dimensions of communal 
conflict have been perpetuated. No example better illustrates 
this condition than the educational system. While the ef­
fort to integrate the school which serves both Nahla'ot and 
Rehavia has generally been successful in achieving a physical 
mix of different ethnic groups, children from Nahla'ot are 
alienated from the educational system due to the structure 
of the Israeli educational curriculum. In this connection 
it should be noted that, as in most modern industrial coun­
tries, Israel's educational system represents the norms and 
values of the middle class. In Israel these values are prac­
tically identical with the European population whereas most 
of the disadvantaged youth are of Asian-African origin. 
Consequently, the child begins his education by exposure to 
a foreign value system and a gap develops between expectation 
and achievement. The child from a slum area, such as 
Nahla'ot, finds himself at a disadvantage when entering the 
school system and the chances of pupil alienation from school
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are greater. Dropping out of school naturally leads to later 
problems in securing employment and in adapting to the struc­
ture and responsibility which employment involves. From this 
point it is only a short step to social deviance and an in­
ability to enter normal economic life.
While the problem of Israel's educational system re­
mains a difficult one it may be outside the realm of the 
planner to implement change in this area. The efforts of the 
planner in Israel, however, can go a long way in alleviating 
the cultural dimension of communal conflict in Israeli urban 
environments. The source of a great deal of communal con­
flict in Israel stems from the lack of social interaction be­
tween different ethnic groups in its society. This fact is 
particularly striking in Nahla'ot, which is characterized by 
communal insularity, even though Rehavia and Kiryat Wolfson 
border upon it. How then can the planner direct efforts to­
wards providing opportunities for residents of Nahla'ot-type 
neighborhoods to participate in social, cultural, and eco­
nomic life outside its immediate environs?
Government participation in the planning process is 
a critical factor in accomplishing a broad range of social 
and human goals, including the supply of low and moderate- 
income housing, to provide for optimum use of space and 
recreation areas, and to stimulate the economic and social 
development of disadvantaged neighborhoods. While the moti­
vations of planners in Israel may be well-intended, two 
traditional approaches have dominated: (1) local imposition
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of plans from the "top-down", and (2) that physical rehabili­
tation alone results in the improvement of social conditions. 
In Nahla'ot and elsewhere planners have felt that improving 
the physical environment and forcing people to physically mix 
would somehow generate social cohesion and community between 
differing ethnic and social groups. If the experience of 
Nahla'ot and Rahavia illustrates anything, it is that social 
interaction is difficult to foster across differing population 
groups. As seen in Nahla'ot and Rehavia there is an extreme 
reluctance of different populaces to mix. Even within 
Nahla'ot there exists a reluctance by many of its residents 
to extend their realm of social interaction marginally, such 
as crossing outside the neighborhood boundary to participate 
in activities at the Beit Pomerantz Community Center.
The Lachish Experience-Implications for Urban Israel
The experience of the Lachish Region and Kiryat Gat 
in particular, while rooted in a rural framework, does have 
application to a more common urban context. The Lachish 
Plan, unlike the experience in Nahla'ot, has been a directed 
attempt to reverse the economic and cultural dimensions of 
communal conflict in Israel. It aims to provide more satis­
fying physical, social, and economic environments for its 
residents. By contrast, planning in Israel's urban neigh­
borhoods has stressed the development of physical environ­
ments to the neglect of social and economic ones.
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Economic Development of the Lachish Region
It would be misguided to convey a sense of utopian 
existence for the Lachish Region's inhabitants based upon a 
grand social experiment. Rather, some measure of social 
harmony which exists in the Region and in Kiryat Gat has 
resulted more from the Region's economic success than social 
design. The goals of the Lachish Development Plan were of 
a spatial, economic, and social nature. Achievement of these 
goals was intended to serve as a model for incorporating a 
region with development potential within a national system 
of decentralized economic regions. It was seen as a method 
of counteracting urban agglomeration, populating vacant 
regions, tapping resource potentials, settling large numbers 
of immigrants who would otherwise create an imbalanced pop­
ulation distribution, and integrating diverse social elements.
The success of the Lachish Plan and Kiryat Gat de­
pended upon those economic opportunities it could provide 
to potential residents of the area. While new immigrants 
could, in a sense, be forced to live in a region, they could 
not be persuaded to remain without available economic op­
portunities. Similarly, it would not have been possible 
to attract established and educated middle-class Israelis 
to Lachish without economic opportunities and incentives.
The social success of Lachish relied on the creation of ec­
onomic opportunities which, in turn, depended upon Lachish's 
situation in a national urban hierarchy of settlements.
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The higher Lachish ranked in Israel's regional hierarchy 
the greater its draw upon population outside the Region, who 
responded to opportunities for employment and its rewards 
and the provision of local services for consumption.
The development of the Lachish Region with Kiryat 
Gat as its urban center has been successful in attracting 
and subsequently increasing its population. It has been a 
social success because it has been successful economically, 
providing a standard of living which promotes the interaction 
of diverse ethnic groups who inhabit the area. Thus, a large 
measure of the Region's economic success may perhaps be due 
to its close adherence to the principles of central place 
theory, which guided the development of Lachish's economy 
and society since its inception in 1954.
Christaller's Central Place Theory maintains that 
a certain amount of productive land supports an urban cen­
ter. The center exists,in turn, because essential services
must be performed for the surrounding land.93 This theoret­
ical framework can be most easily applied to rural, thinly 
settled areas such as Lachish in its earlier days. Central 
place theory envisions a system consisting of "hamlets 
which perform a few simple functions such as limited shop­
ping (Lachish's rural centers), to larger towns which serve 93
93Edward Ullman, "A Theory of Location For Cities," 
in Readings in Urban Geography, ed. by Harold Mayer and 
C,F~ Kohn (Chicago: University of Chicago, 1959),pp.202-209.
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as market and service centers for a small contiguous area 
comprised of several hamlets (Lachish's rural towns), up to 
a centrally located large city (Kiryat Gat) with a large 
tributary area composed of a network of hamlets and smaller 
towns, which serves to provide more complex services such 
as wholesaling, large-scale banking,specialized retailing 
and the like,"94.
Lachish is not a self-contained community and, as 
one would expect, various forms of interaction between the 
Region and other parts of Israel occur. Israel, being a 
small country, has larger urban centers in relatively close 
proximity to Lachish. Its residents, therefore, frequently 
travel to Tel Aviv, Jerusalem, Ashkelon, Beersheba and 
elsewhere for higher order economic and cultural services. 
Nevertheless, as an independent economic region, Lachish 
conforms fairly closely to central place theory. The 
impact of central place theory on Lachish has generally 
been to ensure the economic and subsequent social success 
of Lachish as a regional development scheme.
The Lachish Development Plan corresponds to two 
objectives of Israeli policy in connection with spatial 
organization. The first objective was to achieve a change 
in urban structure by facilitating a diffusion of hierarchi-
94 Ibid.
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cally arranged smaller size population centers in undeveloped
areas. The second objective was regional integration of a
network of central place-type hierarchies:
Regional integration envisaged the new towns as 
service centers for the agricultural hinterland, 
enabling the agricultural population to get com­
mercial services within their vicinity. The new 
towns had to fulfill an important economic role 
in the processing and marketing of agricultural 
products and in absorbing labor surpluses from 
the rural settlements. For the implementation of 
this objective, the size and location of a con­
siderable number of new towns were determined 
according to the so-called central place theory, 
under which is established a full hierarchical 
structure. . . .New towns in the role of service
centers were designated to increase the ef­
ficiency of the marketing and distribution system 
throughout the whole country.
. . .the new urban centers also serve as focus­
es of culture and entertainment, and as filters 
to reduce by absorption the flow of rural migrants
to the big towns.95
Social Development of the Lachish Region
Lachish is more than a set of spatial and economic 
goals. There were social goals to the region as well. A 
hierarchical system of settlements was applied in the 
Lachish Region not only to stem rural-to-urban migration, as 
suggested by Shachar, but also to integrate diverse social 
elements within a singular framework. Lachish's economic 
success, however, was a precondition for social integration
9 5Arie S. Shachar, "The Role of New Towns in National 
and Regional Development: A Comparative Study," in New Towns 
Why-And For Whom?, edited by Harvey S. Perloff and Neil C. 
Sandberg, (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1972), p.39.
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to occur due to its catalytic role. Experience in Lachish 
indicates that when people of different cultural backgrounds 
interact with each other on an equally competitive economic 
footing they also relate to each other more as social equals. 
In comparison, relationships between Rehavia's residents 
and those of Nahla'ot did not achieve any measure of social 
equality because no economic parity exists between the 
residents of the two neighborhoods.
Physical as well as economic development also played 
a significant role in the social development of Lachish. A 
city such as Kiryat Gat has promoted the integration of 
diverse social elements in a physical way. A variety of 
building types placed around open malls and parks and inter­
spersed with walkways, playgrounds and public spaces provide 
a psychological and architectural focus for promoting 
social integration of the different ethnic groups which re­
side there. Thus, the close proximity of opportunities for 
social interaction based upon an architecturally human scale 
was employed as a means of reforming rather than rejecting 
city life.
Planners in the early years of Kiryat Gat had a keen 
perception of the impact of physical development upon human 
behavior. While Kiryat Gat's planners provided opportuni­
ties for various ethnic groups to live within their own 
neighborhoods, they also created a physical environment of 
public places which helped these groups cope with the cul-
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tural shock of interacting with others.
Final Comments
It is apparent from the case studies in Chapter VI 
that the twin goals of achieving a socially balanced com­
munity on the one hand and a high quality of urban life on 
the other are very difficult to achieve. In Kiryat Gat it 
was observed that the goal of a socially balanced community 
is attainable when the balance is supported by economic op­
portunity .
Kiryat Gat and the Lachish Region in general have 
developed, over a long period of time, a means for equaliz­
ing housing and employment opportunities, for bringing to­
gether population groups of different ethnic backgrounds, 
for creating a physical framework that encourages social 
interrelationships and integration, and a means for improv­
ing the quality of life through use of an efficient land-use 
pattern and attractively designed housing and public areas.
From the Lachish experience one could derive three 
social goals to guide Israel's future social development, 
whether applied to urban areas, new towns, or rural develop­
ment regions:
1. Developing a higher and more uniform quality of 
housing and higher standards of living for those segments 
of Israeli society which do not currently possess either,
2. Integration of various ethnic groups within
Israeli society, and
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3. Closing economic and social gaps which exist due 
to time of arrival in Israel,
If there is one common thread which links Lachish, 
Nahla'ot and Israel it is the need to introduce improved 
ways of building communities of people. This recognizes 
that the individual is at the same time an independent unit, 
a member of an extended family, and a member of different 
arrays of groups, called communities, upon which a national 
community is built. In all these respects the individual 
needs opportunities to develop his human potential.
It is unfortunate that there is a tendency among 
Israeli planners to think of cities as physical structures 
with technological and economic bases manned by labor forces 
rather than as systems of social organization. As a result 
Sandberg notes that:
One of the striking anomalies of . . . Israel is
that social planning is not very advanced. This 
is particularly interesting for, as a consequence 
of their socialist orientations and the creation 
of a broad complex of social welfare programs, it 
could well have been expected that meaningful 
social planning processes would have been develop­
ed. We find instead . , . that planning is geared
to physical and economic concerns and less to 
social needs, particularly the problems of the 
poor and minorities.
Social planning as defined by Perloff is "an 
interrelated system that introduces socio-economic 
and human behavior considerations into the making 
of governmental and private group decisions."
The critical need is for the integration of physical, 
economic, and social planning at the national level, 
because social gains often depend on the use of the 
power of the national government. This can facili­
tate the establishment and ranking of social goals, 
the creation of programs for human resources develop­
ment and problem solving, and the collection of data
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for systematic analyses of social indicators.96
Sandberg's comments suggest certain conclusions as 
concerns Israeli planning efforts aimed at promoting future 
physical, social, and economic development. If planning for 
people is to be taken as a reality, then plans for the wel­
fare of those people must be put at the forefront of the 
planning process. The various aspects of planning-plan 
making, physical design and development, and community 
development-should be considered as one interrelated process 
concentrated on the provisions of a healthy community life.
Israel's social development in the twentieth century 
found Sephardi and Ashkenazi Jews, more specifically the 
northeast European and the southeast Mediterranean Jew, 
pitted against one another for cultural dominance in the new 
State of Israel. The East European Jew emerged in a
dominant role. In the Lachish experience provision of 
economic opportunities were a prerequisite in order for the 
cultural and social restoration of non-East European ethnic 
groups to occur. Thus this discussion has come full circle.
While economic opportunities are certainly not the 
only basis on which to diminish social inequalities in 
Israeli society, they are most important when seen as part 
of the wider opportunities that people need in order to
Neil C. Sandberg, "Can The United States Learn 
From The Experience of Other Countries? A Commentary," in 
New Towns: Why-And For Whom?, edited by Harvey S. Perloff 
and Neil C. Sandberg, (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1972), 
p. 72.
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achieve their human development potential. If social inte­
gration is to be achieved in Israeli society the major 
planning thrust must be the provision of wider opportunities 
for low-income groups to more equally participate in Israel's 
economic life. Only through future efforts at closing gaps 
in economic opportunity can Israel succeed in closing gaps 
in social opportunity.
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